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ABSTRACT 
The resurgence of Bayesian statistics in political research and, in particular, the rising 
popularity of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, has unlocked estimation 
problems long thought to be considered impossible or intractable. Besides opening new 
terrain to political methodologists, these developments have allowed scholars to explore 
new problems or to revisit longstanding puzzles. This dissertation takes advantage of the 
generality and power of the techniques comprising MCMC methods to address novel 
substantive and methodological questions about abstention, voter choice and turnout 
misreporting, areas where substantive controversies remain despite the rich story of 
academic studies on electoral behavior and the considerable attention that has been paid to 
them. 
The second chapter of the dissertation develops a statistical model to jointly analyze 
invalid voting and electoral absenteeism, two important sources of abstention in 
compulsory voting systems that had so far not been simultaneously examined. I illustrate 
the application of the model using data from Brazilian legislative elections between 1945 
and 2006, underscoring relevant differences in the determinants of both forms of non-
voting. The third chapter presents a study of voter choice in Chile’s 2005 presidential 
elections, examining substitution patterns in voters’ preferences over the competing 
candidates and highlighting the influence of candidates' entry and exit strategies on the 
election results, an aspect that has received virtually no attention in previous analyses of 
Chilean electoral politics. Finally, the fourth chapter develops a model to correct for 
misclassified binary responses using information from auxiliary data sources, and applies it 
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to the analysis of voter turnout in the U.S. While the main contribution of the chapter is 
methodological, the empirical application has clear implications for researchers interested 
in the influence of race on voting behavior in America.  
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C h a p t e r  1  
Introduction  
During the past decade, the vast improvements in computing power and the 
development of flexible and freely available statistical software have led to a growing 
interest in Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations for estimation and inference in 
the social sciences (Jackman, 2004). In fact, as argued by Jackman (2000b), the Bayesian 
paradigm, in particular Bayesian simulation based on MCMC algorithms, has “…the 
potential to become the unifying principle for social scientific statistical practice in the 
early 
The potential influence and significance of these methodological advances can hardly be 
understated in electoral politics research, an area where serious scientific work is clearly on 
the upswing and where, despite enjoying a rich and dynamic history and benefiting from 
high-quality data and sophisticated theories, many of the major questions are not yet settled 
(Niemi and Weisberg, 2001; Converse, 2006). This dissertation takes advantage of the 
 century” (p. 310). In political science, the ability of Bayesian simulation to estimate 
complex models, avoiding the need for post-estimation steps or simulation procedures that 
rely on asymptotic normality to characterize uncertainty in the quantities of interest, 
providing a straightforward approach for incorporating prior (e.g., historical) information 
about model parameters and a simple way of handling missing data as part of the 
estimation process has, to a large extent, revolutionized the scope and nature of empirical 
research (Gill, 2000; Jackman, 2009). The increasing adoption and application of MCMC 
methods has allowed methodological specialist and applied researchers to explore new 
terrains and to address many longstanding problems in the discipline (Jackman, 2000b).  
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theoretical and practical advantages of the Bayesian framework – in particular, its ability 
to deal with small sample sizes, to incorporate historical information and to simplify the 
estimation of complex models - to analyze electoral data and to investigate and test 
different models of electoral behavior. In particular, the chapters that comprise this 
dissertation rely on MCMC methods to address substantive and methodological questions 
about electoral abstention, vote choice and turnout misreporting that have not been 
previously considered in the literature, combining macro- and micro-level data from 
different polities, periods and types– i.e., presidential, congressional - of elections. 
Chapter 2 proposes a model to analyze the determinants of abstention in compulsory 
voting systems. Although mandatory voting has been found to be an effective mechanism 
for increasing voter turnout (Hirczy, 1994; Fornos1996), compelling citizens to go to the 
polls does not automatically mean that they will cast a vote for one of the candidates. 
Individuals can cast invalid votes, i.e., blank or null ballots, and thus their right not to vote 
remains intact (Lijphart, 1997). In addition, since mandatory voting does not generate 
universal compliance (Power and Roberts, 1995), illegal abstention constitutes a second 
form of non-voting. While invalid voting and absenteeism can thus be seen as “functional 
equivalents” of abstention under compulsory voting (Power and Roberts, 1995), previous 
studies in this area have not considered the correlation between both variables and ignored 
the compositional nature of the data, discarding helpful information that may contribute to 
better understand abstention and its causes and potentially leading to unfeasible and/or 
erroneous results (Zellner, 1971; Katz and King, 1999). In order to overcome these 
problems, Chapter 2 develops a statistical model to jointly analyze the determinants of 
invalid voting and electoral absenteeism, accounting for the compositional structure of the 
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data, combining information at different levels of aggregation (e.g., individual, district-
level and national-level data), and addressing robustness concerns raised by the use of 
small sample sizes typically available for countries with mandatory voting. In this setting, 
the Bayesian approach provides two main advantages. First, unlike with alternative 
estimation techniques, inference about the parameters of interest (e.g., fixed effects) does 
not depend on the accuracy of the point estimates of the variance-covariance parameters: 
they are based on their posterior distribution given only the data, averaging over the 
uncertainty for all the parameters in the model (Goldstein, 1995). Taking into account the 
uncertainty in the estimation of the random parameters is especially important in small 
datasets, where the variance parameters are usually imprecisely estimated (Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 2002). Also, with small sample sizes, outlying data points can seriously 
distort estimates of location (e.g., means or regression coefficients). Bayesian simulation 
methods are particularly well suited for fitting outlier-resistant regression models such as 
the Student-t regression model implemented in this chapter, allowing us to easily estimate 
the degrees of freedom parameters along with location and scale parameters even with 
moderately sized data, propagating the uncertainty in the former into inferences about the 
parameters of interest, and providing a valuable tool with which to assess the sensitivity of 
inferences to prior distributional assumptions (Gelman, Carlin, Stern and Rubin, 2004). The 
model is used to explore the causes of both sources of abstention in Brazil, the country with 
the largest electorate in the world subject to mandatory voting provisions. The results show 
considerable differences in the determinants of both forms of non-voting: while invalid 
voting was strongly positively related both to political protest and to the existence of 
important informational barriers to voting, the influence of these variables on absenteeism 
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is less evident. Comparisons based on posterior simulations indicate that the 
compositional-hierarchical model developed in this chapter fits the dataset better than 
several other modeling approaches and leads to different substantive conclusions regarding 
the effect of different predictors on the both sources of abstention.  
Chapter 3, coauthored with R. Michael Alvarez, implements a Bayesian multinomial 
probit model to analyze voter choice in Chile’s historical 2005 election.1
                                                 
1 A paper based on the material in Chapter 2 has been published in Electoral Studies 28(2), 177 – 
189, 2009. 
 For the first time 
since the re-establishment of democracy, the right-wing Alianza por Chile, one of the 
coalitions that has dominated contemporary politics in Chile, presented two presidential 
candidates who adopted electoral strategies and platforms appealing to different groups 
of voters. In the context of a fragmented and polarized political scene, there is little 
consensus among scholars about whether the presence of two viable conservative 
candidates bolstered Alianza’s support or, on the contrary, actually damaged the 
coalition’s electoral chances. The lack of rigorous empirical studies of the 2005 Chilean 
presidential election, however, has prevented addressing this issue. Unlike other 
polytomous choice models that rely on the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
property, our multinomial probit model (MNP) allows us to answer this question by 
accounting for possible substitution patterns in voters’ electoral preferences over the 
candidates. Given the computational complexity of fitting the MNP, though, the model 
has seen relatively few applications in the political science literature. Most of them have 
resorted to maximum likelihood estimation, relying on asymptotic normality in making 
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inferences about the error variance and covariance parameters (e.g., Alvarez and Nagler, 
1995; Alvarez, Nagler and Bowler, 2000; Dow and Endersby, 2004). However, as shown 
by McCulloch and Rossi (1994), asymptotic approximations are quite problematic in the 
context of the multinomial probit model. In a series of experiments examining the 
sampling distributions of MLE estimates for a three-choice multinomial probit model, the 
authors found that, even with as many as 1,000 observations per parameter – many more 
than is usually the case in most political science applications - there was considerable 
skewness in the sampling distributions of the error variance-covariance parameters, 
concluding that “…asymptotic theory may be of little use for the MNP model” (p. 219).2
                                                 
2 As noted by Jackman (2000a), part of the problem stems from the normalization employed to 
identify the MNP model, which leads to estimating bounded functions of variance parameters, 
such as variance ratios and correlations. Since there Is not much information about these 
parameters even in large sample, the “boundedness” the estimated parameters is likely to stop 
asymptotic normality from “kicking in”. See also McCulloch and Rossi (1994, pp. 221- 222). 
 
In this regard, the main advantage of the Bayesian approach based on MCMC methods is 
that it allows obtaining arbitrarily precise approximations to the posterior densities, 
without relying on large-sample theory (McCulloch and Rossi, 1993; Jackman, 2004). In 
addition, it avoids direct evaluation of the likelihood function and the resulting 
convergence problems exhibited by maximum likelihood optimization, and is 
computationally more efficient than simulation-based methods of classical estimation 
when dealing with a relatively large number of alternatives (Kim, Kim and Heo, 2003; 
Train, 2003). Hence, the Bayesian approach overcomes some of the main criticisms that 
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have been leveled against the use of MNP in electoral studies (Dow and Endersby, 
2004). Furthermore, since comparison of different models that can be used to 
operationalize alternative sets of hypothesis can be easily achieved using Bayes factors 
(Quinn and Martin, 1998), the Bayesian framework is particularly well suited to examine 
the relative validity of the various competing explanations that have been traditionally 
proposed to account for voters’ behavior in Chile (Valenzuela, 1999; Torcal and 
Mainwaring, 2003).  
Chapter 4, which is coauthored with Jonathan N. Katz, addresses the issue of 
measurement error in survey data. 3
                                                 
3 A shortened version of Chapter 4 is forthcoming in the American Journal of Political Science 
54(3), July 2010. 
  In particular, we focus on the problem of misclassified 
binary responses, which has been a major concern in the political science literature 
analyzing voter behavior, especially voter turnout. The chapter develops a parametric 
model that corrects for misclassified binary responses, allowing researchers to continue to 
rely on the self-reported turnout data commonly used in political science research while 
improving the accuracy of the estimates and inferences drawn in the presence of turnout 
misreporting. In order to do so, our model resorts to information on the misreporting 
patterns obtained from auxiliary data sources such as internal or external validation studies, 
matched official records, administrative registers, and possibly even aggregate data. While 
incorporating this information into the analysis of the sample of interest using frequentist 
methods is far from straightforward (Prescott and Garthwaite, 2005), this can be easily 
accomplished within the Bayesian framework via MCMC simulations, avoiding the need 
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for complex numerical methods to approximate analytically intractable posterior 
distributions. In addition, our approach also allows us to simultaneously address another 
important problem with (political) survey data, namely missing outcome and/or covariate 
values, using fully Bayesian model-based imputation. Compared to alternative imputation 
techniques, Bayesian methods allow easily estimating standard errors in multiparameter 
problems and handling “nuisance” parameters, and have been shown to be particularly 
efficient when data loss due to missing observations is substantial (Ibrahim, Chen and 
Lipsitz 2002). Using Monte Carlo simulations, we show that, even with small rates of 
misclassification, our proposed solution improves estimates and inference with respect to 
standard models ignoring misreporting, and it also outperforms other methods proposed in 
the literature when misreporting is associated with the covariates affecting the true response 
variable. While our model is in fact fully generally, we illustrate its application in the 
context of estimating models of turnout using data from the American National Election 
Studies. We show that substantive conclusions drawn from models ignoring misreporting 
can be quite different from those resulting from our model. 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
A Statistical Model of Abstention under Compulsory Voting  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The desire to provide a political system with popular legitimacy and to increase the 
representativeness of elected public officers have often been asserted as major arguments 
justifying the imposition of compulsory voting provisions (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Hill, 
2002). Twenty-four countries, comprising approximately 20% of the world’s democracies, 
employ mandatory voting to some extent (Australian Joint Standing Committee on 
Electoral Matters, 2000). Although compulsory voting has been found to be an effective 
mechanism for increasing voter turnout (Hirczy, 1994; Lijphart 1997; Fornos, 1996), 
compelling voters to go to the polls does not automatically mean that they will cast a vote 
for one of the candidates. Citizens can cast invalid votes, i.e., blank or null ballots, and thus 
their right not to vote remains intact (Lijphart, 1997); in fact, a long-standing feature of 
compulsory voting systems is a higher rate of invalid ballots (Hirczy, 1994). In addition, 
since mandatory voting does not generate universal compliance (Hirczy, 1994; Power and 
Roberts, 1995), illegal abstention constitutes a second form of non-voting.  
Previous research on compulsory voting systems has focused either on the determinants 
of electoral absenteeism (Hirczy, 1994; Fornos, Power and Garand, 2004) or on the 
determinants of invalid voting (McAllister and Makkai, 1993; Power and Garand, 2007). 
The common approach of studies in this area has been to treat the proportion of invalid 
votes or electoral absenteeism as the dependent variable and regress each on a set of 
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explanatory variables. This standard procedure exhibits two main shortcomings. First, it 
does not take into account the connection between both sources of non-voting and the 
relationship between their determinants. Since, under compulsory voting, invalid voting 
and electoral absenteeism can be seen as “functional equivalents” of abstention, jointly 
modeling them may contribute to a better understanding of abstention and its causes. 
Moreover, without a model for exploring the interrelation between these two sources of 
abstention, helpful information from an inferential standpoint maybe discarded because the 
correlation between them is assumed to be zero, and changes in the standard error estimates 
that might result from a bivariate model could substantially modify the conclusions drawn 
from separate univariate analyses (Zellner, 1971; Thum, 1997). Second, the prevailing 
modeling strategy ignores the “compositional” nature of the data (Aitchison, 1986), i.e., the 
fact that the proportions of invalid ballots, electoral absenteeism and votes for candidates or 
parties among the electorate cannot be negative and that must sum one. Ignoring these non-
negativity and unit-sum constraints might lead to unfeasible results, such as negative 
percentages of invalid ballots or sums of proportions greater or less than one (Katz and 
King, 1999).  
This chapter develops a statistical model to address these problems, jointly analyzing the 
determinants of invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in district-level elections. While 
national-level studies have the advantage of allowing more countries in the analysis, they 
are generally based on a small number of observations and may fail to capture the 
contextual and “neighborhood” effects that might have considerable influence in local (e.g., 
legislative) elections (King, 1997; Katz and King, 1999). In addition, given the absence of 
survey data covering large historical periods in many of the countries with compulsory 
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voting, most of which are recently democratized Latin American nations (International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, IDEA, 2007), district-level elections 
allow studying both sources of abstention at the lowest possible level of aggregation.  
However, analyzing district-level elections introduces an additional methodological 
challenge. The proportion of invalid votes and absenteeism may be influenced not only by 
local variables but also by country-level factors affecting all districts in a given election 
(Power and Roberts, 1995), violating the standard assumption of independent and 
identically distributed errors. Ignoring the hierarchical structure of the data and simply 
pooling national- and district-level variables may thus result in inefficient parameter 
estimates and negatively biased standard errors, potentially leading to “spuriously 
significant” statistical effects (Antweiler, 2001; Maas and Hox, 2004; Franzese, 2005).  
Drawing on the literature on compositional data (Aitchison and Shen, 1980; Aitchison, 
1986; Katz and King, 1999), and on multi-level modeling (Goldstein, 1995; Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 2002; Gelman and Hill, 2007), the model presented here relates both sources 
of abstention in compulsory-voting systems, accounting for the compositional and 
hierarchical structure of the data and addressing robustness concerns raised by the use of 
small samples that are typical in the literature.  I illustrate the use of the model analyzing 
data on invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in Brazil’s lower house elections at the 
state level. Brazil has the largest electorate in the world subject to compulsory voting and 
has experienced considerable variations in institutional, political and socioeconomic 
conditions across history and between states, therefore providing an illuminating case to 
examine rival explanations of invalid voting and absenteeism. The percentage of blank and 
null ballots in the country has been historically larger and more volatile than in most other 
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democracies with compulsory voting (Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas de Rio de 
Janeiro, IUPERJ, 2006; IDEA, 2007), and absenteeism has remained relatively high despite 
mandatory voting.   
Power and Roberts (1995) used ordinary least square pooled time-series regressions to 
separately analyze the determinants of the two sources of abstention in legislative elections 
between 1945 and 1990, combining country-level and state-level predictors by assigning 
the national variables to each state. I extend the period of analysis to include all the 
elections held up to 2006 and compare the results of the model developed in this chapter 
with those obtained from alternative modeling strategies that that fail to account for the 
compositional and/or the hierarchical structure of the data. Based on posterior simulations, 
I show that the compositional-hierarchical model leads to different substantive conclusions 
and fits the data better than these alternative modeling approaches. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews 
alternative theories for explaining invalid voting and absenteeism under compulsory voting 
systems. Section 2.3 presents the compositional-hierarchical model developed in this 
chapter to analyze the determinants of invalid voting and absenteeism at the district level. 
Section 2.4 applies the model to analyze 16 lower house elections in Brazil and compares 
the performance of the compositional-hierarchical model with three competing approaches.  
Finally, Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Alternative explanations of invalid voting and absenteeism 
Drawing on the literature on voter turnout in industrialized democracies, three basic 
explanations, focusing on socioeconomic factors, on institutional variables, and on “protest 
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voting”, have been proposed to account for invalid voting and absenteeism in 
compulsory voting systems (McAllister and Makkai, 1993; Power and Roberts, 1995; 
Fornos et al., 2004; Power and Garand, 2007).  
Some scholars have argued that the high rate of blank and null ballots in polities with 
mandatory voting reflects the alienation of citizens from the political system and is the 
consequence of mobilizing disinterested and poorly informed citizens who would otherwise 
abstain (Jackman, 2001). Previous analyses (1993; Power and Roberts, 1995; Power and 
Garand, 2007) found that socioeconomic variables such as urbanization, literacy and 
education levels substantially affect the percentage of blank and null ballots cast through 
their effect on the perceived efficacy, access to information and development of political 
skills among the electorate. Although the literature on electoral behavior has also found a 
strong correlation between these variables and political participation in voluntary voting 
settings (Verba et al., 1978; Powell, 1986; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993), empirical 
evidence from countries with mandatory voting (Power and Roberts, 1995; Fornos et al., 
2004) suggest that the impact of socioeconomic factors on electoral absenteeism in these 
countries is quite moderate.  
Other authors have underscored the role of the institutional context and design in 
explaining invalid voting and absenteeism. For instance, Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) and 
Kostadinova (2003) concluded that a higher number of political parties depress turnout by 
increasing the unpredictability of electoral and policy outcomes, and the same would apply 
for highly disproportional systems that punish minor parties and reduce voters’ perceived 
efficacy (Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995). In the same direction, McAllister and 
Makkai (1993) and Power and Roberts (1995) provide evidence that institutional factors 
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such as district magnitude and ballot structures have a considerable impact on invalid 
voting in mandatory voting settings.   
Finally, an alternative explanation can be traced to the literature on protest voting 
(Kitschelt, 1995; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000). A protest vote can be defined as a vote 
primarily cast to express discontent with politics, rather than to affect public policies (Van 
der Brug and Fennema, 2003). In a system of compulsory voting, citizens’ discontent with 
the political establishment would translate into higher null and blank ballots and illegal 
abstention (Derks and Deschouwer, 1998). This interpretation has often been quoted in 
Brazil and Latin America to explain temporary increases in invalid voting and absenteeism 
(Moisés, 1993; Jocelyn–Holt, 1998; Escobar, Calvo, Calcagno and Minvielle, 2002).  
Although the socioeconomic, institutional and protest approaches are usually presented 
as competing rather than complementary explanations, previous research (Power and 
Roberts, 1995; Fornos et al., 2004) has shown that fusing them in a combined model helps 
to better understand the phenomena under study. However, since these approaches are 
grounded in the literature on political participation in developed democracies, where 
invalid voting has not received much academic attention (Power and Garand, 2007), past 
work has made no theoretical distinctions regarding the effect of the different sets of 
variables on invalid voting and electoral absenteeism. The underlying assumption in 
previous analyses has been that the same basic causal mechanisms account for both forms 
of non-voting (Power and Roberts, 1995). Furthermore, from a methodological perspective, 
they failed to examine the potential interactions between the determinants of these two 
sources of abstention, implicitly assuming that the effects of the relevant predictors on 
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invalid voting are independent of their impacts on absenteeism. The statistical model 
presented in the next section allows me to test these assumptions. 
 
2.3 A statistical model of abstention under compulsory voting  
The model used to analyze the determinants of invalid voting and absenteeism at the 
district level is grounded in the literature on “compositional data” (Aitchison and Shen, 
1980; Aitchison, 1986; Katz and King, 1999) and on Bayesian hierarchical modeling 
(Lindley and Smith, 1972; Gelman and Hill, 2007), although it is modified and adapted to 
the problem under study.  
Let ,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP  denote the proportion of invalid votes, electoral absenteeism and 
valid votes (i.e., votes for candidates or parties) among the electorate in district i  at 
election t ,  i =1,2…. n , , t =1,2…T . For all i  and t , ,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP  must satisfy the 
following non-negativity and unit-sum constraints (Katz and King, 1999):     
     
                                           [ ], 0,1 ,       , ,si tP s I A V∈ =                                                   (2.1) 
                                      , , , 1
I A V
i t i t i tP P P+ + =                                                               (2.2). 
 
These constraints determine that ,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP   fall in the simplex space. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the simplex sample space using a ternary plot for lower house elections in Brazil 
between 1945 and 2006. Each circle in the figure indicates the values of IP , AP  and VP  in 
a particular district for a given election.  
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  Figure 2.1 
    
       Note: The diagonal lines parallel to the triangle’s left side indicate the proportion of  
       electoral absenteeism, measured on the scale in the triangle’s base. The diagonal lines 
       parallel to the right side mark the proportion of valid votes, measured on the scale in 
       the triangle’s left side, and the dashed horizontal lines indicate the proportion of  
       invalid votes, measured on the triangle’s right side.  
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A model aimed at analyzing the determinants of abstention in compulsory voting 
systems must take the constraints defined in (1) and (2) into account.  Neither the standard 
approach of regressing invalid voting and absenteeism independently on a set of predictors 
nor estimating a system of seemingly unrelated equations satisfies these constraints, even if 
eventually the point predictions obtained happen to fall within the boundaries of the 
simplex (Katz and King, 1999). In order to address this problem, I adapt Aitchison’s (1986) 
and Katz and King’s (1999) models for compositional data using a Bayesian 
implementation of a bivariate mixed model for invalid voting and electoral absenteeism.  
Let ( ), , ,lnI I Vi t i t i tY P P=  and ( ), , ,lnA A Vi t i t i tY P P=  denote the log-ratios of the proportion of 
invalid votes and absenteeism relative to valid votes, respectively.4
,
I
i tP
 Note that, unlike the 
baseline composites , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP , ,
I
i tY  and ,
A
i tY  are unbounded and unconstrained. The 
variables of interest for the analysis, ,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP , are obtained from , , ,,
I A
i t i t i tY Y Y =    through the 
additive logistic transformations:  
                             ,,
, ,
exp
1 exp exp
I
i tI
i t I A
i t i t
Y
P
Y Y
  =
   + +   
                                                    (2.3) 
                                 ,,
, ,
exp
1 exp exp
A
i tA
i t I A
i t i t
Y
P
Y Y
  =
   + +   
                                                    (2.4). 
                                                 
4 Due to the logarithmic transformations involved, the baseline composites are assumed to be 
strictly positive. Although this poses no problem for this type of electoral data, alternative models 
based on Box-Cox transformations (Rayens and Srinivasan, 1991) have been proposed to deal with 
the problem of null composites. 
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Since the , ,   ,
s
i tY s I A= , are defined over the whole real line, it is possible to model 
, , ,,
I A
i t i t i tY Y Y =   using a normal/independent distribution (Andrews and Mallows, 1974; Liu, 
1996; Seltzer, Novak, Choi and Lim, 2002) that assigns weight parameters to each 
observation in the sample, as in a Weighted Least Squares analysis:  
 
                                     ,, ,
,
   i ti t i t
i t
Y
w
ε
µ= +                                                            (2.5), 
 
where 
'
, , ,,
I A
i t i t i tµ µ µ =   , ( )
'
, , ,, N 0, 
I A
i t i t i tε ε ε = Σ   , ,i tw  is a positive random variable with 
density ( ),i tp w υ , and υ  a scalar or vector-valued parameter. The main advantage of 
assuming a normal/independent distribution is that, due to the unconstrained properties of 
Σ , the model now allows for any pattern of dependency between ,
I
i tP  and ,
A
i tP .
5
, 1 ,i tw i t= ∀
  In addition, 
besides including the bivariate normal as a particular case (when  ), the 
normal/independent distribution also provides a group of thick-tailed distributions often 
useful for robust inference and identification of outliers (Seltzer, Novak, Choi and Lim, 
2002; Rosa, Padovani and Gianola, 2003), particularly when the number of districts or 
elections in the sample is relatively small.  
                                                 
5 This is, in fact, the key advantage of assuming a scale mixture of multivariate normals vis-à-vis 
alternative statistical models for compositional data, such as the Dirichlet distribution (Johnson 
and Kotz, 1972) and the S- distribution (Barndorff-Nielsen and Jørgensen, 1991). 
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The focus of the model lies in the specification of ,i tµ . Since ,
I
i tµ  and ,
A
i tµ   are 
unbounded, it is possible to reparametrize them as linear functions of regressors. As 
mentioned in the introduction, it seems plausible that the proportion of invalid votes and 
electoral absenteeism in a district is influenced not only by district-level variables but also 
by national conditions that vary across elections. Moreover, the impact of district-level 
variables on invalid voting and absenteeism might itself be mediated by these country-level 
factors. In order to account for these possibilities, I use a hierarchical random-coefficients 
model for the components of ,i tµ . The first-level equations model ,
I
i tµ  and ,
A
i tµ  as functions 
of district-level variables measured at a particular election. The second-level equations 
specify the first-level coefficients as functions of country-level variables measured 
contemporaneously with the district level variables, plus zero-expectation random effects 
assumed to be constant across all districts in a given election, accounting for election-to-
election variability beyond that explained by national-level variables. In addition, I also 
introduce zero-mean random intercepts in order to account for time-constant heterogeneity 
across districts. This modeling strategy strikes a balance between a completely pooled 
approach, which ignores the clustered nature of the data and the potential variability 
between districts and elections, and local regressions that would be highly unstable given 
the paucity of the data typically available for analyzing countries with compulsory voting, 
most of them recently democratized Latin American nations (Browne and Draper, 2001; 
Gelman and Hill, 2007). 
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Letting ,i tx  and tz  represent ( )1 K×  and ( )1 L×  row vectors of district-level and 
country-level variables, respectively, the specification adopted is then:  
 
         , , +i t i t t iXµ β λ=                                                          (2.6)  
 
        t t tZβ δ η= +                                                               (2.7)  
where  
,i tX  is a ( )2 2 1K× + matrix, , 2 , 2i t i tX I x I = ⊗  , 
tβ   is a ( )2 1 1K + ×  vector, 
'
0, 0, 1, 1, , ,...
I A I A I A
t t t t t K t K tβ β β β β β β =   , 
tZ  is a ( ) ( )( )2 1 2 1 1K L K+ × + +  block diagonal matrix: ( )2 1 1t tKZ I z+  = ⊗   ,  
δ  is a ( )( )2 1 1 1K L+ + ×  vector, 0,0 0, 0,1 0, 1,0 ,I I A A I AL L K Lδ δ δ δ δ δ δ =     ,  
( )'0, 0, 1, 1, , ,, , , ,... , 0,I A I A I At t t t t K t K t N ηη η η η η η η = Ω    and ( )
'
, 0,I Ai i i N λλ λ λ = Ω    are  
election- and district- random effects.6
,
, , ,
,
i t
i t i t t i t t i
i t
Y X Z X
w
ε
δ η λ= + + +
 
From (2.5) - (2.7), the model can be written as: 
                                                                                 (2.8) 
with error terms ,i tε  and random the effects tη  and iλ  assumed mutually independent. 
 
                                                 
6 Throughout this chapter, ⊗  denotes the left Kronecker product. 
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In order to estimate the model, I employ a fully Bayesian strategy, treating all 
unknown quantities as random and specifying prior distributions for all the parameters. The 
Bayesian approach straightforwardly accommodates problems with small samples typically 
available for countries with mandatory voting, since it does not rely on asymptotic results 
for inference (Thum, 2003; Jackman, 2004). In particular, unlike alternative estimation 
techniques (e.g., Full or Restricted Maximum Likelihood), inference about the fixed effects 
does not depend on the accuracy of the point estimates of the variance-covariance 
parameters: they are based on their posterior distribution given only the data, averaging 
over the uncertainty for all the parameters in the model (Goldstein, 1995; Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 2002). Taking into account the uncertainty in the estimation of the random 
parameters is especially important in small datasets, where the variance parameters are 
usually imprecisely estimated (Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002).7,8
                                                 
7 In the context of frequentist estimation techniques, this uncertainty can be taken into account 
through bootstrapping (Goldstein, 1995) or simulation (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). 
However, the fact that the Bayesian approach directly takes into account the uncertainty in 
variance components makes it particularly appropriate for this kind of analysis.  
8 In addition, as shown by Browne and Draper (2001), Maximum Likelihood methods are 
susceptible to convergence problems in two-level random-coefficients regression models with 
few higher-level units.  
   
Assuming conditional independence throughout, the model can be specified in a 
Bayesian context as  
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                                     , ,
,
1,  ,  1,..., ,  1,...,i t i t t i
i t
Y N X i n t T
w
β λ
 
+ Σ = =  
 
                                      (2.9) 
                                              ( ), ,  1,...,t tN Z t Tηβ δ Ω =                                               (2.10) 
                                             ( )0, ,  1,...,i N i nλλ Ω =                                                    (2.11) 
 
with conjugate priors for the fixed effects and the precision matrices: 
                                     
( )
( )
0
1
1
1
~ , ,           
~ ( , ),   0, 2
~ ( , ),  0, 2 1
~ ( , ),  0, 2   
P P
Q Q
R R
N
Wishart P P
Wishart Q Q K
Wishart R R
δ
η
λ
δ δ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
−
−
−
Ω
Σ > ≥
Ω > ≥ +
Ω > ≥
                           (2.12) 
and ( ),i tp w υ  depending on the particular normal/independent distribution adopted for the 
level-1 errors. Routine sensitivity analyses can be performed in order to examine the effect 
of the hyperparameters on the model fit.             
The joint posterior density of all the unknown parameters of the model, 
( ), , , , , , ,f w Yη λβ λ δ υΣ Ω Ω , is intractable analytically, but inference on the parameters of 
interest can be performed by Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations, using 
Gibbs sampling to repeatedly draw samples from each unknown parameter’s full 
conditional posterior distribution in order to form the marginal distributions used for 
Bayesian inference (Gelfland and Smith, 1990; Casella and George, 1992). In order to 
implement the Gibbs sampler, I subdivide the entire set of unknowns in such a way that it 
is possible to sample from the conditional posterior of each subset of unknowns given the 
  
22 
other subsets and the data. This leads to an iterative scheme whereby, given an arbitrary 
set of starting values, samples are drawn from each full conditional posterior given the data 
and the most recently sampled values for the other unknowns (Gelfland, Hills, Racine-
Poon, and Smith, 1990; Seltzer et al., 2002). Under mild regularity conditions (Geman and 
Geman, 1984), samples from these complete conditionals approach samples from the 
marginals for a sufficiently large number of iterations. The power and simplicity of the 
Gibbs sampler in handling complex hierarchical models involving covariates makes it an 
attractive option against alternative Bayesian/empirical Bayesian methodologies that must 
often rely on “…a number of approximations whose consequences are often unclear under 
the multiparameter likelihoods induced by the modeling” (Gelfland et al., 1990, p. 978).   
Given ( )',1 ,,...,i n Tw w w=  the full conditional posterior densities of { } { }, , , ,t i ηβ λ δ Σ Ω  and 
λΩ  are: 
( )
( )
1
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,
1 1
1
1 1
, , ,
1
, , , , , , , , ,   1,... ,
' ' ,
'
t t t
n n
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i i
n
t i t i t i t
i
Y w N b B t T
b w X X w X Y Z
B w X X
η λ
η η
η
β λ δ υ
λ δ
−
− − − −
= =
−
− −
=
Σ Ω Ω =
   
= Σ +Ω Σ − +Ω   
   
 
= Σ +Ω 
 
∑ ∑
∑

                  (2.13) 
 
( )
( )
1
1 1 1
, , , ,
1 1
1
1 1
,
1
, , , , , , , , ,   1,... ,
,
i i i
T T
i i t i t i t i t t
t t
T
i i t
t
Y w N d D i n
d w w Y X
D w
η λ
λ
λ
λ β δ υ
β
−
− − −
= =
−
− −
=
Σ Ω Ω =
   
= Σ +Ω Σ −   
   
 
= Σ +Ω 
 
∑ ∑
∑

                                                 (2.14) 
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1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 1 1
, , , , , , , ' ' , '
T T T
t t t t t t
t t t
Y w N Z Z Z Z Zη λ η δ η δ η δδ β λ υ β δ
− −
− − − − − −
= = =
      
Σ Ω Ω Ω +Ω Ω +Ω Ω +Ω             
∑ ∑ ∑   
(2.15)               
 
( )( )
1
1 1
, , , , ,
1 1
, , , , , , , ' ,
T n
i t i t i t t i i t i t t i P
t i
Y w Wishart w Y X Y X P nTη λβ λ δ υ β λ β λ ρ
−
− −
= =
  
Σ Ω Ω − − − − + +     
∑∑ (2.16) 
 
( )( )
1
1 1
1
, , , , , , , ' ,
T
t t t t Q
t
Y w Wishart Z Z Q Tη λβ λ δ υ β δ β δ ρ
−
− −
=
  
Ω Σ Ω − − + +     
∑                  (2.17) 
 
1
1 1
1
, , , , , , , ' ,
n
i i R
i
Y w Wishart R nλ ηβ λ δ υ λ λ ρ
−
− −
=
  
Ω Σ Ω + +     
∑                                                   (2.18). 
 
To complete the specification for a Gibbs sampling scheme, the full conditional 
posterior distributions of w  and υ  are required. For each element of w   the fully 
conditional posterior density is:  
( ) ( ) ( ), 1, , , , , , ,, , , , , , , ex p '  2
i t
i t i t i t i t t i i t i t t i i tw Y w Y X Y X p wη λ
ω
β λ δ υ β λ β λ υ−
 
Σ Ω Ω ∝ − − − Σ − − × 
 
    (2.19).  
For υ , the density is:  
( ) ( ),
1 1
, , , , , , , ,
n T
i t
i t
Y w p p wη λυ β δ γ τ υ υ
= =
Σ Ω Ω ∝ ∏∏                                                               (2.20). 
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From (2.13) – (2.20), it is clear that, assuming Normal level-1 residuals (i.e., if all the 
, ,  1,..., ,  1,...,i tw i n t T= = , have degenerate distributions at 1), the conjugacy of the prior 
distributions at each stage of the hierarchy leads to closed-form full conditional 
distributions for each parameter of the model, and it is thus straightforward to sample from 
them in order to obtain the marginal distributions. However, the assumption of Normal 
level-1 residuals makes inferences vulnerable to the presence of outliers (Andrews and 
Mallows, 1974; Pinheiro, Liu and Wu, 2001). Assuming a bivariate Student-t prior for ,i tY  
allows for the possibility of extreme observations, attenuating the influence of outliers 
(Berger, 1985; Gelman, Carlin, Stern and Rubin, 2004) and providing a valuable tool with 
which to assess the sensitivity of inferences to prior distributional assumptions (Carlin and 
Louis, 1996; Thum, 1997).   
A bivariate Student t prior for ,i tY  can be obtained from the normal/independent 
distribution by assuming ( ), / 2, / 2i tw Gammaυ υ υ , , 0, 0i tw υ> > .9
( ) ( )1, , , , ,1, , , , , , , 1,  '  2 2i t i t i t t i i t i t t iw Y Gamma Y X Y Xη λ
υ
β λ δ υ β λ β λ υ−  Σ Ω Ω + − − Σ − − +   

 The fully conditional 
posterior densities (2.19) and (2.20) then become: 
 
       (2.19’) 
( )/2 2 , ,
1 1
, , , , , , , 2 exp log
2 2
nT nT n T
i t i t
i t
Y w w w
υ
υ
η λ
υ υ
υ β λ δ υ
−
= =
     Σ Ω Ω Γ − −           
∑∑                     (2.20’). 
 
                                                 
9 I use the parametrization of the gamma distribution found in Rosa et al. (2003).  
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While it might be argued that working directly with a bivariate Student t density for 
, ,, '
I A
i t i tε ε    would be preferable to adding nT parameters to the model, the conditioning 
feature of the Gibbs sampler makes the augmentation of the parameter space quite natural 
(Carlin and Louis, 1996). In addition, this specification allows obtaining estimates of the 
weight parameters ,i tw , which can be useful to identify possible outliers (West, 1984; 
Congdon, 2003; Rosa et al., 2003).  Note that, from (2.19’),  
 
( ) ( ) ( ), 1, , , ,
2, , , , , , ,
'  i t i t i t t i i t i t t i
E w Y
Y X Y Xη λ
υβ λ γ υ
β λ β λ υ−
+
Σ Ω Ω =
− − Σ − − +
        (2.21),   
 
so that for a large enough υ , ( ), , , , , , , , 1i tE w Y η λβ λ γ υΣ Ω Ω → , and approximately normal 
tails are obtained for the level-1 errors. However, for low values of υ , the expected value 
of ,i tw  decreases as ( ) ( )1, , , ,'  i t i t t i i t i t t iY X Y Xβ λ β λ−− − Σ − −  increases. Therefore, the 
weight assigned to each observation in calculating posterior distributions of fixed-effects 
and level-1 regression parameters will depend on the posterior probabilities of the possible 
values of υ .10
                                                 
10 A detailed discussion of this point is provided in Seltzer et al. (2002). 
 Although (2.20’) does not have a closed form, this conditional posterior 
distribution can be approximated by discretizing the density along a grid of values and then 
sampling from the resulting discrete distributions. When the points in the grid are spaced 
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closely together, the discrete distribution of υ  provides an accurate approximation to the 
full conditional distribution (Draper, 2001; Seltzer and Choi, 2002; Seltzer et al., 2002).11
,
I
i tP
  
The two variants of the model (with bivariate normal or bivariate Student-t level-1 
errors) can be compared using standard Bayesian criteria for model selection such as the 
Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) or Bayes factors (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin and van 
der Linde, 2002; Gelman et al., 2004).  The means and standard deviation of the convergent 
Gibbs samples generated from (2.13)-(2.20’) under each variant of the model can be used 
to summarize the posterior distributions of the parameters. These marginal posterior 
distributions, however, are of no direct interest for the analysis. Rather, interest lies in the 
effect of the explanatory variables on the proportion of invalid voting and electoral 
absenteeism. I compute the impact of each of the district-level and country-level regressors 
on  and ,
A
i tP  using average predictive comparisons (Katz and King, 1999; King, Tomz 
and Wittenberg, 2000; Gelman and Hill, 2007). The algorithm implemented to estimate 
these causal effects is detailed in Appendix 2.A.  
Some aspects of the model deserve further comment. First, while in the presentation 
above it has been assumed that  , 1,...iT T i i n= ∀ =  in order to simplify the notation, the 
model can accommodate unbalanced data sets, with different number of elections per 
district. In fact, the capacity and flexibility to deal with nested unbalanced data sets is one 
additional advantage of Bayesian multilevel models versus more traditional frequentist 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, a strategy based on Metropolis-Hastings sampling can be incorporated into the 
MCMC scheme to obtain draws from υ  (Seltzer et al., 2002; Gelman et al., 2004). 
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approaches (Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002; Shor et al., 2007). Also, a more complex 
specification for the components of Σ  could be adopted (e.g., allowing for serial 
correlation of the level-1 errors – see Allenby and Lenk, 1994). Nonetheless, given the 
relatively small number of observations available in the application of Section 2.4 (with 
very few elections per state in some cases) and the inclusion of district random-effects, an 
i.i.d. assumption for the components of Σ  seems appropriate (Carlin and Louis, 1996; Bryk 
and Raudenbush, 2002). Finally, as mentioned above, although I focus on two particular 
variants of the mixed model – i.e., with Normal and Student-t level-1 errors – assuming 
alternative densities for ,i tw  would allow obtaining other thick-tailed distributions – e.g., 
slash and contaminated Normals, as in Rosa et al. (2003) - that might be appropriate to 
account for the presence of outliers.  
 
2.4 Analyzing invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in Brazil’s lower house 
elections 
   2.4.1 Data and methodology 
Brazil provides an interesting case to analyze the determinants of abstention in countries 
with mandatory voting. While invalid ballots in advanced democracies under compulsory 
voting such as Australia and the Netherlands have averaged about 2 to 3 percent, the 
equivalent rates in Brazil have been substantially higher and more volatile over time, 
reaching almost 42 percent of the votes cast in the 1994 lower house election (Power and 
Roberts, 1995; IUPERJ, 2006). In addition, despite the fact that voting has been 
compulsory in the country for over 60 years, electoral absenteeism has averaged 19 percent 
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in elections held over this period, varying from 5 to 34.5 percent (IUPERJ, 2006).  
Changes in the institutional design and the freeness and fairness of the elections 
experienced by Brazil in its recent history and the sharp differences in socio-demographic 
characteristics among its states allow examining the impact of different factors on invalid 
voting and absenteeism.12 In order to illustrate the use of the model presented in Section 2.3 
and to compare the results with those obtained using alternative modeling strategies, I 
analyze all lower house elections held in the country between 1945 and 2006. The dataset 
has an unbalance structure, with 388 observations for 27 states across 16 elections.13
The dependent variables of interest for the analysis are the proportion of invalid votes 
and electoral absenteeism in lower house elections. The proportion of invalid votes among 
the electorate is computed as the ratio of blank and null votes cast over the population 
eligible to vote. Electoral absenteeism is calculated as the percentage of potential voters 
failing to comply with their duty. Figure 2.2 presents the proportion of invalid voting and 
absenteeism by state for the elections held between 1945 and 2006. As can be seen, there is 
considerable variation in the two sources of abstention both between states and within 
states across elections.
  
14
 
  
 
                                                 
12 A description of the institutional, socioeconomic and political context of Brazilian elections 
exceeds the purposes of this chapter; an overview can be found in Power and Roberts (1995).  
13 The number of states in Brazil increased from twenty-two to twenty-seven during this period. 
14 The proportions are calculated based on the number of elections held in each state. 
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Figure 2.2  
Invalid voting and absenteeism by state, as a proportion of the electorate 
Lower house elections, 1945 - 2006  
 
Note: The figure plots the proportion of invalid votes (upper panel) and electoral absenteeism  
(lower panel) in Brazilian lower house elections by State, in percentage points. The thick 
horizontal lines mark the average proportions across elections, the extremes of the colored 
rectangles represent the 50% intervals, and the upper and lower whiskers correspond to the 95% 
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intervals. Blank circles mark the outlying observations. Sources: Banco de Dados Eleitorais 
Do Brasil, Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas de Rio de Janeiro; Power and Roberts (1995).  
 
 
In line with the different theories under consideration, socioeconomic, institutional and 
protest variables are included as explanatory variables in the model. The socioeconomic 
variables used are: Illiteracy, the percentage of the state’s voting-age population classified 
as illiterate; Urbanization, the percentage of the state’s population living in urban areas; 
and FEAP, the percentage of females in the Economically Active Population, used as a 
measure of women’s status and the state’s level of modernization. The institutional 
variables are: the number of Candidates per seat;  Franchising, a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 for elections after 1985, when suffrage was extended to the illiterates, and 0 
otherwise; Electorate, measured as the percentage of the state’s total population eligible to 
vote; and Ballot, a dummy variable coded one for elections following the introduction of 
the single official ballot in 1962, that requires voters to write their candidate’s name or 
registration number on a blank ballot and replaced the previous system of pre-printed 
ballots.15
                                                 
15 Prior to the introduction of the single official ballot (“cedula unica”) in 1962, candidates 
distributed their own pre-printed ballots, which voters just had to place in the ballot box. While 
this required considerably less information on the part of voters, it tended to favor wealthier 
candidates to the detriment of less affluent ones (Power and Roberts, 1995). 
 Finally, among the protest variables, Manipulation measures the degree of 
electoral manipulation and “political engineering”, coded by Power and Roberts (1995) on 
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a four point-scale ranging from 0 for free elections held under democratic rule to 3 for 
elections conducted under authoritarian tutelage; Growth is a two-year moving average of 
the percentage change in the national GDP; and Inflation is the natural logarithm of the 
country’s average inflation rate in the two years preceding the election.16
Variable 
 Table 2.1 
provides summary statistics for the state-level and country-level predictors for the period 
1945-2006. 
 
Table 2.1  
 Summary statistics – Independent variables  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min  percentile Max  percentile 
State-level predictors       
Illiteracy (%) 40.0 20.8 4.7 24.6 58.9 79.8 
Urbanization (%) 55.4 21.0 2.6 38.1 72.1 96.6 
Females in the EAP (FEAP) (%) 23.3 16.4 3.0 10.3 40.8 58.1 
                                                 
16 While the introduction of these “political protest” variables may lead to concerns about 
endogeneity, most previous research in this area includes either these or similar covariates, and is 
thus subject to the same criticism (Power and Roberts, 1995; Power and Garand, 2007). Hence, 
given that the focus of the chapter lies in comparing the performance of the model proposed here 
against other empirical approaches commonly used in the literature, I decided to keep these 
variables. Nonetheless, future applications of the model must explicitly take this potential 
problem into account. 
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Candidates per seat 4.4 2.8 1.0 2.3 6.0 15.4 
Electorate (%) 40.4 19.2 6.9 24.3 59.0 74.4 
Country-level predictors       
Franchising 0.4 0.5 0 0 1 1 
Ballot 0.8 0.4 0 0.8 1 1 
Electoral Manipulation 0.9 1.1 0 0 1.3 3 
Growth (%) 5.3 3.6 -1.7 3.7 7.6 11.1 
Inflation  3.7 1.7 1.7 2.7 4.2 7.5 
Number of States 27 
Number of Elections 16 
Observations 388 
Sources: Banco de Dados Eleitorais Do Brasil, Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas de Rio de 
Janeiro (IUPERJ); Power and Roberts (1995).  
 
The characterization and measurement of the independent variables closely follows 
Power and Roberts (1995); their data is complemented with information from IUPERJ 
(2006) for the 1994-2006 elections. The only difference with the respect to Power and 
Roberts (1995)’s work lies in the definition of Illiteracy: while they use the percentage of 
the state’s electorate classified as illiterate (zero until 1985, when illiterates were 
enfranchised), I use the percentage of illiterates in the state’s voting-age population. 
Although illiterates were not allowed to vote in Brazil until the 1986 election, the fact that 
more than sixty percent of the population had not finished the fourth grade by 1986 
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, 2003) and the difficulty of obtaining 
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alternative reliable indicators covering the period under study led me to use illiteracy as a 
measure of the electorate’s political skills (Power and Garand, 2007). In order to account 
for the effect of the enfranchisement of illiterates, I include the country-level variable 
Franchising and model the random-coefficients of Illiteracy as functions of it, allowing the 
effect of Illiteracy to vary across elections.  
In addition, in line with Power and Roberts’ (1995) argument that the country-level 
predictors Ballot, Manipulation, Growth and Inflation affect the proportion of invalid 
voting and absenteeism in each state-year, I specify the election random-intercepts 
'
0, 0, 0,,  
I A
t t tβ β β =   as functions of these variables. Given the small number of observations 
in the sample (Table 2.1), the coefficients of the remaining district-level variables are 
specified as fixed effects (i.e., their variation across elections is constrained to be 0), 
although the model could be written more generally to accommodate various plausible 
design alternatives for parametrizing these coefficients. 
The following equations define the hierarchical model for district ,  1,...,  i i n= at election 
,  1,...,  t t T= :   
 
, 0, 1, , 2, , 3, ,
,
4, , 5, ,
,
         + ,                         ,
s s s s s
i t t t i t t i t t i t
s
i ts s s
t i t t i t i
i t
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w
β β β β
ε
β β λ
= + + + +
+ + =
(2.22) 
0, 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0, ,  ,
s s s s s s s
t t t t t tBallot Manipulation Growth Inflation s I Aβ δ δ δ δ δ η= + + + + + =  (2.23) 
1, 1,0 1,1 1, ,
s s s s
t t tFranchising ,                                                                          s I Aβ δ δ η= + + = (2.24) 
, ,0                                                                                         , ; 2,...,5
s s
k t k s I A kβ δ= = =  (2.25)  
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with  
 
 ( )
'
, ,, 0,
I A
i t i t Nε ε  Σ   , ( )
'
0, 0, 1, 1,, , , 0,
I A I A
t t t t t N ηη η η η η = Ω   ,  ( ), 0, ,
I A
i i N λλ λ  Ω     
 
and   
( )
( )
( )
,
,
,
1 ,  bivariate normal prior for  or 
,  ,  bivariate Student t prior for 
2 2
i t
i t
i t
i t Y
p w
Gamma i t Y
υ υ υ
 ∀

=    ∀  
 
.  
 
The model was fit using WinBUGS 1.4, as called from R 2.4.1.17
( ),N I0 100
  All the 
hyperparameters in the model were assigned diffuse priors in order to let the data dominate 
the form of the posterior densities: the fixed effects were assigned a  prior, while 
Wishart priors with identity scale matrix and degrees of freedom equal to  ( ) 1rank I +  were 
used for the precision matrices. In order to ensure that inferences are data dependent, 
several alternative values for the hyperparameters were tried, yielding similar substantive 
results. Three parallel chains with dispersed initial values reached approximate 
convergence after 25,000 iterations, with a burn-in of 5,000 iterations; the results reported 
below are based on 1,000 samples of the pooled chains of deviates.18
                                                 
17 The code is available from the author on request. 
18 Approximate convergence is achieved for values of Gelman and Rubin’s (1992) estimated 
Potential Scale Reduction factor below 1.1.  
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 2.4.2 Results of the compositional-hierarchical model  
Table 2.2 below reports the posterior means and 90% credible intervals for the fixed 
effects for the two variants of the model presented in Section 2.3: assuming bivariate 
Normal (Model 1-a) and bivariate Student-t (Model 1-b)  level-1 priors.19
The table shows considerable disparity in the posterior means and credible intervals of 
the fixed effects under both models, particularly regarding the effect of state-level 
predictors on the log-ratios
 The values of the 
Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) for both models and the Bayes Factor for Model 1-b 
relative to Model 1-a are also presented.  
IY and AY .20
                                                 
19 In addition, I also estimated the model under the assumption of multivariate Student-t priors for 
the random coefficients.  The main results, however, are virtually unchanged when assuming 
heavy tails at the higher-level of the model. Thus, I retain the assumption of multivariate 
normality at level-2 and focus on the effect of adopting alternative priors for the data model.   
20 It is worth noting that, when treating 
 Comparisons between the two models based on 
both the DIC and Bayes Factor favor Model 1-b, indicating that the model with Student-t 
level-1 errors fits the data better. The evidence presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 further 
support Model 1-b. Figure 2.3 plots the mean posterior values of the standardized 
univariate and bivariate level-1 residuals from Model 1-a for the 388 observations in the 
dataset (Chaloner and Brant, 1988; Weiss, 1994). A few data points have standardized 
univariate residuals with absolute values larger than 5, and more than 2% of the 
υ  as unknown, the uncertainty regarding υ  is propagated 
into the posterior distribution of the fixed-effects parameters (Seltzer et al., 2002).  
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observations are clear bivariate outliers, suggesting that a thick-tailed distribution might 
be better suited to the data.  
 
Table 2.2 
Estimated posterior means and 90% credible intervals for fixed effects  
under alternative distributional assumptions for the error terms   
Parameters 
Model 1-a 
Gaussian  level-1 errors  
Model 1-b 
Student-t level-1 errors  
IY  AY  IY  AY  
Illiteracy 
-0.03 
(-0.94, 0.90) 
0.76 
(0.19, 1.35) 
0.24 
(-0.52, 1.01) 
0.74 
(0.18, 1.24) 
Urbanization 
-0.88 
(-1.65, -0.13) 
-0.14 
(-0.58, 0.34) 
-0.15 
(-0.79, 0.49) 
-0.17 
(-0.62, 0.27) 
FEAP 
2.30 
(0.64, 3.98) 
-0.18 
(-1.27, 0.87) 
1.00 
(-0.24, 2.24) 
0.48 
(-0.42, 1.40) 
Candidates per seat 
0.03 
(0.01, 0.06) 
0.01 
(-0.01, 0.02) 
0.02 
(-0.01, 0.04) 
0.01 
(-0.01, 0.02) 
Electorate 
1.50 
(0.62, 2.55) 
 0.74 
(0.17, 1.30) 
1.30 
(0.42, 2.17) 
0.47 
(-0.15, 1.10) 
Franchising 
1.50 
(0.70, 2.30) 
0.66 
(0.07, 1.27) 
1.50 
(0.75, 2.32) 
0.49 
(-0.04, 1.02) 
Ballot 
-0.04 
(-0.82, 0.68) 
-0.19 
(-0.97, 0.60) 
0.22 
(-0.45, 0.93) 
-0.27 
(-0.98, 0.50) 
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Manipulation 
0.52 
(0.24, 0.85) 
0.33 
(0.03, 0.64) 
0.41 
(0.15, 0.67) 
0.36 
(0.07, 0.66) 
Growth 
4.30 
(-2.40, 11.20) 
-5.40 
(-14.1, 2.90) 
5.00 
(-1.70, 11.60) 
-5.50 
(-13.70, 2.90) 
Inflation 
0.38 
(0.23, 0.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.17, 0.17) 
0.34 
(0.20, 0.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.16, 0.18) 
Intercept 
-5.40 
(-6.50, -4.30) 
-1.90 
(-3.02, -0.86) 
-5.30 
(-6.40, -4.20) 
-2.0 
(-3.10, -0.90) 
 N (first level) 388 388 
557.90  242.30 
Bayes -  9.79 ×  
1
( )( ) ( )
1
12 2log 2log
J
j
j
p y p y
J
θ θ
=
 
− + 
 
∑
 The Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) is computed as:   
, 
with ( )E yθ θ= , the posterior mean of the model’s parameters. Lower values of the DIC indicate 
better fit to the data. 
2 
jMThe Bayes factor for model  relative to model kM  is given by  
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( )
( ) ( )
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,  
,  
j j j j jj
j k
k k k k k k
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∫
.                          
I use the harmonic mean of the likelihood evaluated at the posterior draws of the parameters  
(Newton and Raftery, 1994; Rosa et al., 2003) as an estimate for ( ) ,   ,xp y M x j k= : 
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Figure 2.3 
Posterior means of the level-1 residuals from Model 1-a 
 
 
Note: The figure plots the standardized residuals from Model 1-a, in absolute values. The univariate 
and bivariate residuals are computed based on the Bayesian statistics proposed by Weiss (1994): 
( ) ( )
( )
, ,
1
1 , ,
s j s jsJ i t i t t i
s j
j
Y X
 s I A
J
β λ
σ=
− −
=∑  and ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' 1, , , ,
1
1 J j j j j j
i t i t t i i t i t t i
j
Y X Y X
J
β λ β λ−
=
− − Σ − −∑ . 
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For the univariate residuals, the dashed horizontal lines correspond to the threshold of 3. For the 
bivariate residuals, the cutoff point is determined as  ( ) ( )
2
2 1 , 3 .k  =2αχ α−= ×Φ −  
 
 
 
In the same direction, the mean posterior estimate of υ  under Model 1-b is 3.3, with its 
marginal posterior density concentrated around small values (Figure 2.4-a), indicating very 
strong departure from Normality and pointing to a heavy-tailed error distribution. As noted 
in Section 2.3, small values of υ  determine that observations are weighted by an inverse 
function of the Mahalanobis distance ( ) ( )1, , , ,'  i t i t t i i t i t t iY X Y Xβ λ β λ−− − Σ − −  adjusted by 
the degrees of freedom. Hence, for those observations identified as (bivariate) outliers in 
the model with Normal level-1 errors, the posterior probability that ,i tw   is equal or greater 
than 1 is negligible, as illustrated in Figure 2.4-b. Overall, the posterior probability that 
( ), 1i tP w ≥  is less than 1% for roughly 6% of the observations in the sample, providing 
strong evidence of outliers (Congdon, 2003; Rosa et al, 2003). In addition, given that the 
“weight parameters” also reduce the influence of extreme observations on the posterior 
distribution of the election- and state- random coefficients, the number of level-2 bivariate 
outliers in Model 1-b is also halved with respect to Model 1-a, as shown in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.4 
Posterior densities of υ  and ,i tw  under Model 1-b 
 
Note: The upper panel of the figure plots the posterior distribution of the degrees of freedom  
parameter υ  of the Student-t distribution assumed for the error terms under Model 1-b. The lower 
panel plots the posterior distribution of the weight parameters ,i tw  for the states of Rondonia (RO), 
Roraima (RR) and Pernambuco (PE) in the 1958, 1970 and 1950 lower house elections. 
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Figure 2.5 
Posterior means of the standardized election residuals and  
marginal posterior means of the weight parameters 
 
 
Note: Figure 5-a plots the posterior means of the standardized election residuals (in absolute 
values), computed as  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' 1
1
1 J j j j j j
t t t t
j
Z Z
J η
β δ β δ−
=
− Ω −∑  (Weiss, 1994). The dashed 
horizontal lines correspond to the cutoff point  ( ) ( )
2
4 1 , 3 .k  =2αχ α−= ×Φ −  Figure 5-b plots the 
marginal posterior means of the weight parameters ,i tw , by election. 
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Since the different comparison criteria examined above favor the model with Student-t 
errors, I focus on the results from Model 1-b in the remainder of the chapter. Table 2.3 
reports the posterior distribution of the covariance components from the chosen model. The 
mean posterior correlation between the level-1 errors is moderately positive (0.24) and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, contradicting the assumption of no correlation 
underlying separate univariate analyses of invalid voting and absenteeism. Hence, states 
that experience higher relative proportions of invalid voting in an election than predicted by 
the model also exhibit higher relative proportions of electoral absenteeism. In addition, the 
bottom panel of Table 2.3 reveals that there is considerable variation in the election effects 
beyond that explained by the national-level variables included in the model. While the 
average correlation in IY  and AY  within states across elections are 0.28 and 0.24, 
respectively, the corresponding intra-election correlations between states are as large as 
0.57 and 0.75, suggesting that election-specific circumstances have a substantial influence 
on both forms of abstention. 
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Table 2.3 
Posterior means of variance-covariance components under Model 1-b 
   
 Level 1-errors  
  Invalid Voting Absenteeism  
 Invalid Voting 0.17 (0.03, 0.54)  
 
 Absenteeism 0.03 (0.01, 0.09) 
0.08 
(0.01, 0.26) 
 
     
 Level 2: State random effects  
  Invalid Voting Absenteeism  
 
Invalid Voting 
0.16 
(0.09, 0.26) 
 
 
 
Absenteeism 
0.01 
(-0.04, 0.05) 
0.11 
(0.07, 0.16) 
 
     
Level 2: Election random effects 
 Invalid voting 
Intercept 
Invalid voting  
Illiteracy 
Absenteeism  
Intercept 
Absenteeism  
Illiteracy 
Invalid voting 
Intercept 
0.27 
(0.12, 0.51) 
   
Invalid voting  
Illiteracy 
-0.06 
(-0.32, 0.14) 
0.62 
(0.24, 1.27) 
  
Absenteeism  
Intercept 
0.05 
(-0.14, 0.27) 
-0.07 
(-0.39, 0.23) 
0.50 
(0.22, 0.96) 
 
Absenteeism  
Illiteracy 
-0.01 
(-0.18, 0.14) 
0.17 
(-0.06, 0.52) 
-0.12 
(-0.40, 0.09) 
0.29 
(0.12, 0.56) 
Note: 90% credible intervals reported in parenthesis. 
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Based on the convergent Gibbs samples of the parameters of Model 1-b, I estimate the 
average effect of a one-unit change in each of the state-level and national-level predictors 
on the proportion of invalid ballots and electoral absenteeism.21
                                                 
21 In the case of the two binary variables, Ballot and Franchising, the effect is measured as a change 
from 0 to 1.  
 The results, reported in 
Table 2.4, reveal some interesting discrepancies regarding the determinants of the two 
sources of abstention. While only Illiteracy had a positive and significant effect on electoral 
absenteeism at the usual confidence levels, invalid voting in Brazil’s lower house elections 
was strongly and positively related both to the average levels of education and skills among 
the electorate and to political protest. The proportion of blank and spoiled ballots rose by 
0.09 percentage points for each percentage-point increase in the share of illiterates in the 
voting-age population, and it further rose by more than 6 points on average with the 
extension of suffrage to illiterates in 1985. The addition of new voters was also positively 
related to invalid ballots: each percent increase in the fraction of the states’ population 
eligible to vote was associated to a 0.13 percentage-point rise in blank and null votes. 
Among the protest variables, higher levels of authoritarian political engineering resulted in 
an average increase of 3.4 percentage points in invalid voting. Although electoral 
manipulation also boosted illegal abstention, the impact of this predictor on absenteeism 
was much more variable across states and elections. The positive and significant effect of 
Inflation on invalid voting suggests that blank and null ballots might reflect not only 
popular dissatisfaction with inadequate representative institutions (Schwartzman, 1973; 
Lima, 1994), but also discontent with poor macroeconomic performance and economic 
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mismanagement by the political elites. While these results provide evidence in support of 
the “protest hypothesis” of invalid voting, they also suggest that less educated and newly 
enfranchised voters in Brazil face considerable barriers to voting (Power, 1991).  The 
evidence is far less conclusive in the case of electoral absenteeism, underscoring the need 
to examine additional factors that might affect noncompliance with compulsory voting 
laws.  
Remarkably, while all the socio-economic variables tend to affect both sources of 
abstention in the same direction, many of the institutional and protest variables exhibit 
opposite average effects on the two forms of non-voting. In particular, two relevant 
institutional features of the open-list PR system used in Brazil’s lower house election, 
namely, a large number of candidates running for office and the introduction of the single 
official ballot, have a positive impact on increase invalid voting but a negative average 
effect on illegal abstention. The opposite effect of Ballot and Candidates per seat on the 
two forms of non-voting suggests that there might be a certain trade-off between attracting 
voters to the polls and facilitating effective electoral participation. Factors that give voters 
more opportunities to influence electoral results ex-ante, such as the availability of more 
electoral options and a ballot design that gives voters more freedom to choose their 
preferred candidate, tend to increase turnout. However, at the moment of casting a vote, the 
proliferation of candidates and the requirement that voters record their preferred 
candidate’s name or registration number on the paper ballot tend to increase invalid voting, 
probably because they impose considerable informational requirements and heavy 
decision-making costs on the electorate, especially in the context of high illiteracy rates and 
massive expansion of the franchise experienced in Brazil throughout the  century.  
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Table 2.4 
Effect of a one-unit change in the predictors on invalid voting and absenteeism under 
Model 1-b (in percentage points)
Predictor 
a,b 
Effect on 
Invalid voting 
Effect  on 
electoral absenteeism 
Illiteracy 
0.09 0.13* 
(0.05) 
** 
(0.05) 
Urbanization  
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
Females in EAP 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
Candidates per seat 
0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.26 
(0.17) 
Electorate  
0.13 0.07 
(0.06) 
** 
(0.06) 
Franchising 
6.15 1.03 
(2.35) 
*** 
(2.57) 
Official Ballot 
2.73 
(4.17) 
-5.85 
(8.09) 
Electoral manipulation 
3.37 4.52 
(3.44) 
* 
(2.21) 
Growth 
0.67 
(0.45) 
-1.00 
(0.82) 
Inflation 
3.83 -0.82 
(1.72) 
*** 
(1.24) 
a Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
b Significance levels: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *
 
0.1. 
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2.4.3 Comparison with alternative modeling approaches 
In order to illustrate the differences between the model presented here and alternative 
approaches used to analyze abstention in compulsory voting systems, Figure 2.6 below 
contrasts the average causal effects of the predictors on invalid voting and absenteeism 
under Model 1-b with those obtained under three models that fail to account for the 
compositional and/or the hierarchical structure of the data. Model 2 uses separate ordinary 
least squares regressions for invalid voting and absenteeism, assuming independence 
among observations and simply pooling state-level and country-level predictors by 
assigning the values of the national variables to all the states in a given election. Model 3 
uses separate hierarchical linear models for invalid voting and absenteeism, accounting for 
the temporal and geographical clustering of the data but ignoring the non-negativity and 
unit-sum constraints (2.1) and (2.2). Finally, Model 4 is a compositional model with 
random intercepts for each state but no election-random effects, again assuming a 
deterministic relationship between national- and state-level predictors. The specifications of 
Models 2, 3 and 4 are detailed in Appendix 2.B. 22
 
  
 
 
                                                 
22 Models 3 and 4 were fitted by MCMC simulations (Gibbs Sampling), using a normal/independent 
distribution for the data model, Gaussian priors for the random coefficients and diffuse conjugate 
priors for the hyperparameters. The substantive results remain unchanged if Gaussian level-1 errors 
are assumed. Details of the estimation are available from the author upon request. 
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Figure 2.6 
Estimated marginal effects of the predictors across models  
(in percentage points)
 
Note: The graph shows the effect of a one-unit change in each of the predictors on invalid 
voting and electoral absenteeism. The center dots correspond to the point estimates, the thicker 
lines to the 50% credible intervals, and the thinner lines to the 90% credible intervals. 
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The results reported in Figure 2.6 shows some noticeable differences between the four 
models. As seen in the upper and lower panels, the standard errors of the marginal effects 
of the covariates on both sources of abstention under Model 1-b tend to be considerably 
smaller than for Model 3 and much larger than for Models 2 and 4, particularly in the case 
of the country-level variables. This leads to different conclusions about the relative size and 
the statistical significance of the impact of the national-level predictors on invalid voting 
and electoral absenteeism under the different models. For instance, setting the stochastic 
terms in tη  to zero in Models 2 and 4 leads to significant effects of economic growth on 
both sources of abstention at the 0.01 level. In contrast, Growth has no systematic effect on 
either source of abstention under Models 1 and 3. At the other extreme, the large standard 
errors for the country-level comparisons under Model 3 determine that none of national-
level variables has a significant effect on either source of abstention at the usual confidence 
levels.  
More importantly, the four models lead to different substantive conclusions regarding 
the impact of some of the variables on the two sources of abstention. As seen in the lower 
panel of Figure 2.6, the results from Models 2 and 4 show that that the extension of voting 
rights to illiterates led to significantly lower levels of electoral absenteeism, suggesting that 
this group of new voters was more likely to show up at the polls even when, unlike for 
literate citizens between 18 and 70 years of age, voting is optional for illiterates. While 
inferences drawn from these two models tend to support the claim that “the fact that voting 
is…optional for illiterates seems to have little practical effect on their observance of 
mandatory voting” (Power and Roberts, 1995, p. 800), the average effect of Franchising on 
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electoral absenteeism has the opposite sign under Model 1-b. Also, while a higher 
number of Candidates per seat has a positive average effect on invalid voting under Model 
1-b, suggesting that a larger number of contestants increases the likelihood of voter error 
and/or makes it more difficult for voters to choose a single preferred candidate, this 
relationship is negative under Models 3 and 4. Finally, under Model 2, Ballot has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on invalid voting, leading to the rather 
implausible conclusion that the introduction of a more complex ballot system that requires 
considerable more information on the part of voters resulted in lower rates of blank and 
spoiled ballots. These examples illustrate the fact that some of the inferences drawn from 
the model developed in this chapter contradict the results both from the separate univariate 
analyses (Models 2 and 3) and from an analysis that ignores election-to-election variability 
in both sources of abstention  beyond that explained by national-level variables (Model 4). 
The conflicting results from the different models lead to different conclusions about the 
relative validity of the alternative theories proposed to account for abstention under 
mandatory voting and might entail very different implications regarding, for instance, the 
design of electoral systems and the institutional reforms needed to promote and consolidate 
political participation in compulsory voting systems (McAllister and Makkai, 1993; Power 
and Roberts, 1995). 
In order to compare the fit of the four models, I use posterior predictive simulations 
(Gelman et al., 2004, Gelman and Hill, 2007).  Following Iyengar and Dey (2004), a 
plausible comparison criteria based on the discrepancy between observed and simulated 
data would favor the model that minimizes the predictive loss 
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( ) ( )2Rep Rep, Obs Obs Obsd P P E P P P= − , where ( ) ( )( )1, , ,,...,Rep Rep JRepi t i t i tP P P=  denotes the 
replicate data sampled from the predictive distribution 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,| | |Rep Obs Rep Obsi t i t i t i tp P P p P p P dθ θ θ= ∫  under each model.23
d
 The posterior predictive 
loss  can then be estimated as: 
                                            ( )
2
Rep
, ,
1 1 1
1n T J jObs
i t i t
i t j
d P P
J= = =
 
= −  
 
∑∑ ∑                                  (2.26). 
 
Table 2.5 reports the estimates and 90% credible intervals for the posterior predictive 
loss based on 1,000J =  hypothetical replications of ,
I
i tP  and ,
A
i tP  for the four models. The 
compositional-hierarchical model exhibits the lowest discrepancy between the replicated 
and the actual data (at the 0.01 level). In contrast, the two models that implement separate 
univariate analyses for each source of abstention have the highest estimated predicted 
losses. In particular, Model 2, which in addition ignores the multilevel nature of the data, 
exhibits the worst fit.  The superior performance of Model 1-b is also illustrated in Figure 
2.7, which plots the actual proportions of invalid voting and absenteeism and the expected 
proportions under the four models, obtained by averaging ( )Rep, ,  1,...,1000,
j
i tP j =  over the 
simulations. As seen in the figure, Models 2 and 3 lead to negative expected proportions of 
invalid votes for 49% and 14% of the state-years in the sample, respectively. While both 
                                                 
23 In the case of the compositional-hierarchical model, Rep,i tP  are obtained from ,
Rep
i tY  using the 
logarithmic transformations (1.3) and (1.4). 
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compositional models avoid this problem, relaxing the assumption of a deterministic 
relationship between national- and state-level predictors and allowing for additional 
variability in the election effects results in a better fit for Model 1-b vis-à-vis Model 4. 
Hence, the evidence presented above indicates that the statistical model developed in this 
chapter provides a much improved fit over the other three modeling approaches considered, 
and reveals that the methodological differences between these competing empirical 
strategies have substantial consequences in terms of the analysis of the determinants of 
abstention under compulsory voting.  
 
Table 2.5 
Estimates of the Posterior Predictive Loss  
for alternative modeling 
Model 
  
d  
1-b 
2.84 
(2.33, 3.51) 
2 
16.71 
( 13.72, 19.97) 
3 
8.33 
(7.33,  9.44) 
4 
6.59 
( 5.75, 7.55) 
                                 % credible intervals reported in parenthesis. 
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Figure 2.7  
Actual and expected proportions of invalid voting and electoral absenteeism  
under alternative modeling strategies  
 
 
Note: The gray circles correspond to the expected proportion of invalid voting and electoral 
absenteeism for each state-election of the sample for the model under consideration. The black 
circles correspond to the actual values.  
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2.5 Concluding remarks 
Different theories, drawing on the literature on voter turnout in industrialized 
democracies, have been proposed in order to account for the phenomena of invalid voting 
and electoral absenteeism under mandatory voting. This chapter integrates the 
socioeconomic, institutional, and political-protest approaches in a statistical model aimed at 
analyzing the determinants of both sources of abstention in district-level elections. The 
model presented here accounts for the compositional and hierarchical structure of district-
level electoral data and easily accommodates sensitivity analysis, encompassing a family of 
thick-tailed distributions that can be used for robust inference. 
 Results obtained from the application of the model to analyze abstention in Brazil’s 
legislative elections allow drawing interesting substantive and methodological conclusions. 
The evidence presented above reveals substantial differences in the determinants of both 
forms of non-voting. In line with Power and Roberts (1995), I find that the proportion of 
blank and null ballots in Brazil’s lower house elections was strongly positively related both 
to political protest and to the existence of important informational barriers to voting, in 
particular for less educated and newly enfranchised voters. The influence of these variables 
on illegal abstention, however, was less evident. In addition, some of the institutional 
characteristics of the electoral system, such as the proliferation of candidates and the 
introduction of a complex ballot design, seem to affect the two sources of abstention in 
opposite directions. Comparisons based on posterior simulations indicate that the model 
presented here fits the data considerably better than several alternative empirical strategies 
used to analyze abstention under compulsory voting. More importantly, the main 
conclusions and the policy implications resulting from the compositional-hierarchical 
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model might differ significantly from those drawn using less appropriate modeling 
approaches prevailing in previous research in this area.  
Although the model was applied to the particular case of Brazil, it provides a general 
tool to analyze the determinants of abstention in compulsory systems. Also, the mixed 
model presented in Section 2.3 can be modified in order to accommodate other possible 
distributions of the error terms at each level of the hierarchy (Andrew and Mallows, 1974; 
West, 1984; Seltzer et al., 2002; Rosa et al. 2003). An immediate extension of the chapter 
would be to include a larger number of countries and additional covariates in order to 
analyze the performance of the model and the robustness of the results from a comparative 
politics perspective. From a methodological standpoint, using non-parametric methods to 
estimate the joint density of invalid voting and absenteeism would allow examining their 
determinants and interactions without imposing specific parametric distributions. 
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Appendix 2.A 
Algorithm implemented to compute the causal effects 
 
Let 
( ){ } ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( )1 1 1 ,, , , , , , , ,  1,..., ,j jj j j j j jt i i tw j Jη ξη λ δ υ− − −Σ Ω Ω =  denote convergent 
samples generated from (2.14)-(2.21). In order to compute the average effect of each of the 
independent variables on invalid voting and electoral absenteeism, the following algorithm 
is implemented (Katz and King, 1999; Bhaumik, Dey and Ravishanker, 2003; Gelman and 
Hill, 2007):      
1. Samples of the estimated expected proportions of invalid voting and absenteeism in 
each district-year for given covariates are calculated using the additive logistic 
transformations (2.3) and (2.4):   
                  

 
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   + +      
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1 1 1 1 1
,   , ,
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and , ,i t tx z  are vectors of observed district-level and country-level predictors.  
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2. Step 1 is repeated after changing the value of the predictor whose effect is 
analyzed by 1 unit, while keeping all other regressors at their observed levels, 
obtaining 
( )
,
I j
i tP  and 
( )
, ,
A j
i tP 1,...j J= . 
3. The average effect of the predictor on invalid voting and absenteeism for all district-
years in the sample can be estimated by averaging  
( ) ( )
, ,
I j I j
i t i tP P−  and  
( ) ( )
, ,
A j A j
i t i tP P−  
over all   1,..., ; 1,..., ; 1,...,i n t T j J= = =  (Bhaumik, Dey and Ravishanker, 2003; 
Gelman and Pardoe, 2007). Credible intervals summarizing the approximate 
distribution of the causal effects can also be easily constructed using standard 
methods from sampling theory (Gelman and Pardoe, 2007).   
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Appendix 2.B 
Alternative strategies to modeling invalid voting and electoral absenteeism 
( ), 0 1 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 8
9 10 , ,
s s s s s s
i t t i t i t i t
s s s s
i t i t t t
s s s
t t i t
P Franchising Illiteracy Urbanization FEAP
       Candidates per Seat + Electorate Manipulation Ballot
       Growth Inflation           
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ ε
= + + + + +
+ + +
+ +                                                     s=I,A.
Model 2: 
   (2.B.1) 
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w
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Model 3: 
    (2.B.2) 
0, 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0, ,  ,
s s s s s s s
t t t t t tBallot Manipulation Growth Inflation s I Aβ δ δ δ δ δ η= + + + + + = (2.B.3) 
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s s s s
t t tFranchising                                                                          s I Aβ δ δ η= + + =  (2.B.4) 
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Model 4: 
        (2.B.6) 
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with ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,, 0, , , 0, , , ,2 2
I A I A
i t i t i i i tN N p w Gammaλ
υ υε ε λ λ υ     Σ Ω =       
    
and , , ,,
I A
i t i t i tP P P =   obtained from 
'
, , ,,
I A
i t i t i tY Y Y =    using (2.3) and (2.4). 
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C h a p t e r  3  
Structural Cleavages, Electoral Competition and Partisan Divide: a 
Bayesian Multinomial Probit Analysis of Chile's 2005 Election24
There has been considerable debate among scholars about the reshaping of the Chilean 
political system and about the relative influence of different factors on voters’ behavior in 
this new setting (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Torcal and 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chile’s post-authoritarian party structure, dominated by two stable and solid multiparty 
coalitions, contrasts with the highly fragmented system existing prior to the 1973 military 
coup (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Alemán and Saiegh, 2007). 
Since the re-establishment of democracy, the center-left Concertación coalition, 
comprising the Socialist Party (PS), the Party for Democracy (PD), the Christian 
Democrats (CD) and the Radical Social-Democratic Party (PRSD), has been in control of 
the presidency and held the majority of the legislative seats. The other major coalition, the 
conservative Alianza por Chile, is made up of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), 
the National Renewal Party (RN) and the Centrist Union (UCC). Although other minor 
parties exist outside these blocks, the two coalitions have dominated contemporary politics 
in Chile. 
                                                 
24 Joint with R. Michael Alvarez. Both authors contributed equally to the following chapter, which 
was published in Electoral Studies 28(2), 177 – 189, 2009. 
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Mainwaring, 2003). Some authors argue that the social and cultural cleavages (in 
particular, class and religious divisions) that originally structured the Chilean political 
system still play a predominant role in defining political identities, and that the division 
between supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime that marked the  democratic 
transition was the result of a particular historical background and is likely to fade away as 
democracy is consolidated (Scully, 1995; Valenzuela, 1999; Bonilla, 2002). Other 
researchers, however, maintain that the new authoritarian-democratic cleavage has come to 
dominate party competition, integrating and reorganizing traditional sources of partisan 
divide and reflecting intense discrepancies about regime preferences and conceptions of 
democracy in the Chilean society that are likely to subsist (Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Torcal 
and Mainwaring, 2003). 
The 2005 Presidential election offers an especially interesting opportunity to test these 
alternative explanations in an electoral setting, while at the same time exhibiting distinctive 
characteristics that bring about substantive and methodological implications that have 
received little attention in the literature on voter behavior in Chile.  It was the fourth 
Presidential election since Chile’s return to democracy, held at a time  of continuing 
economic growth and high popularity of the incumbent Concertación government, and 
with Pinochet relegated to a marginal role in the national political scene (Bonilla, 2002; 
Angell and Reig, 2006). Also, for the first time in its history, the two main partners of the 
Alianza por Chile, UDI and RN, presented independent candidates who adopted relatively 
different electoral strategies: while Lavín (UDI) adopted an aggressive campaigning style 
aimed at consolidating the vote among his right-wing supporters, the candidate of the 
National Renewal Party, Sebastián Piñera, took a more moderate stance, distancing himself 
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from the traditional right and the legacy of the military regime in order to capture the 
support of centre in view of the almost certain second-round runoff between the candidate 
of the Concertación and one of the two conservative candidates (Angell and Reig, 2006; 
Gamboa and Segovia, 2006). Together with the formation of the left-wing alliance Juntos 
Podemos Más, this resulted in relatively clear leftist (Juntos Podemos Más), center-left 
(Concertación), center-right (RN) and rightist (UDI) electoral options available for Chilean 
voters.  
In order to analyze the relative influence of socio-demographic, ideological and political 
variables on voter choice at the individual level, we specify and estimate a Bayesian 
multinomial probit model that explicitly accounts for the multi-party character of the 
election by letting voters evaluate all competing candidates simultaneously and to ‘group’ 
alternatives they consider similar when choosing for which candidate to vote. Our model 
allows testing the relative validity of the competing theories in explaining voters’ electoral 
behavior. In addition, it enables us to examine other factors that might have had substantial 
influence in this particular election, such as the presence of a second conservative 
contestant and its effect on voters’ behavior in the view of the second-round runoff.  
Therefore, the chapter offers two important contributions with respect to prior studies of 
the Chilean case. First, while past research analyzed citizens’ party identification or vote 
intention (Frei, 2003; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003), no study has so far examined actual 
vote choice at the individual level. Theoretical and empirical arguments indicate that party 
identification and vote intention are dynamic concepts influenced by election-specific 
circumstances and campaign effects, and that there is no linear relationship between party 
preferences and actual vote (Franklin and Jackson, 1983; Alvarez, 1998; Hillygus and 
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Jackman, 2003). In the case of Chile’s 2005 election, held in a context of declining party 
identification among the electorate and increasing number of respondents not expressing 
any vote intention in opinion polls (Frei, 2003), short-term factors such as candidates’ 
campaigning style and the impressive economic record of President Lagos’ administration 
might have played a considerable influence on voters’ decisions (Angell and Reig, 2006; 
Navia, 2006).  
Second, all previous individual-level studies of candidate choice in Chile (Frei, 2003; 
Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003) employed binary choice models, restricting comparisons to 
pairs of parties and imposing the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property on 
voters. The IIA condition is a very restrictive assumption to make about voters’ electoral 
behavior, in that it implies that the probability of a voter choosing an electoral alternative is 
independent of the other alternatives available and of the characteristics of these other 
alternatives (Alvarez, Nagler and Bowler, 2000; Train, 2003); in particular, the presence or 
absence of the candidate of the RN in the election would not change the relative 
probabilities of choosing any of the other candidates. Thus, imposing the IIA condition 
neglects the possibility that centrist voters who were disenchanted with the Concertación 
but were not willing to vote for a clear right-wing candidate might find a moderate 
conservative candidate attractive. Also, it implies that an Alianza supporter could not see 
the candidates of the UDI and the RN as substitutes, an assumption that is at odds with the 
view that coalition labels are meaningful for Chilean voters (Huneeus, 2006; Alemán and 
Saiegh, 2007) and that might have been particularly inappropriate in the context of the 
2005 election, when the declining popularity of Lavín and the better prospects of Piñera in 
a second-round runoff against Bachelet (Gamboa and Segovia, 2006) might have driven 
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UDI sympathizers to vote for the RN candidate for tactical reasons. The potential for 
strategic voting in the 2005 election was substantially increased due to the fact that opinion 
polls close to the election date indicated that a ballotage between Bachelet and one of the 
conservative candidates was almost certain, and that the contest between Lavín and Piñera 
for the second place in the first round was very tight (Angell and Reig, 2006).  
Even if relaxing the IIA condition might not necessarily improve the model fit or lead to 
substantially different results regarding the determinants of voter choice (Horowitz, 1980; 
Quinn and Martin, 1998), it allows addressing central substantive questions for the analysis 
of Chile’s 2005 election, namely whether Piñera’s entry into the race was determinant in 
bolstering Alianza’s vote support, and how it affected voters’ electoral behavior. While, 
prior to the election, Alianza leaders expressed concerns that the divisions between the two 
conservative candidates could weaken the right-wing coalition (Gamboa and Segovia, 
2006), Piñera’s candidacy might in fact have contributed to its relative success in the 
presidential election, in which the right did considerably better than in the simultaneous 
legislative election and obtained more votes than the Concertación for the first time since 
Chile’s return to democracy (Navia, 2006). The impact of Piñera’s candidature on the 
election cannot be directly quantified using vote choice models that rely on the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives property such as the multinomial logit (Dow and 
Endersby, 2004). Therefore, these relevant questions have not been addressed in previous 
analyses of the 2005 election.  
In view of the computational complexity of fitting the multinomial probit model (Train, 
2003), there have been relatively few applications of this model in the political science 
literature (e.g., Alvarez and Nagler, 1995; Alvarez, Nagler and Bowler, 2000; Dow and 
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Endersby, 2004). Most applications have used maximum likelihood estimation, relying 
on asymptotic normality in making inferences about the error variance and covariance 
parameters. As shown by McCulloch and Rossi (1994), however, asymptotic 
approximations are quite problematic in the context of the multinomial probit model. The 
main advantage of the Bayesian approach based on Gibbs sampling is that it allows 
obtaining arbitrarily precise approximations to the posterior densities, without relying on 
large-sample theory (McCulloch and Rossi, 1993; Jackman, 2004). In addition, it avoids 
direct evaluation of the likelihood function and the resulting convergence problems 
exhibited by maximum likelihood optimization, and is computationally more efficient than 
simulation-based methods of classical estimation (Kim, Kim and Heo, 2003). Hence, the 
Bayesian approach overcomes some of the main criticisms that have been leveled against 
the use of multinomial probit in electoral studies (Dow and Endersby, 2004). Furthermore, 
since the Bayesian framework allows for straightforward comparisons of models that can 
be used to operationalize alternative sets of hypothesis (Quinn and Martin, 1998), it is 
particularly well suited to examine the relative validity of the different explanations 
proposed to account for voters’ behavior in Chile.  
 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents an initial 
look at voting behavior in the 2005 Presidential election using survey data. Section 3.3 
presents a multinomial probit model to analyze voter-choice in multi-party elections and 
describes the data and methodology used to fit the model to the Chilean case. Section 3.4 
presents the most salient results, and Section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2 A first look at Chile’s 2005 presidential election  
Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems post-election survey 
(CSES, 2007), we provide preliminary evidence regarding the impact of different sets of 
variables on the support for each of the candidates running for office in the 2005 election: 
Michelle Bachelet, of the governing Concertación; Tomás Hirsch, of the left-wing coalition 
Juntos Podemos Más (JPM); and the two Alianza candidates, Joaquín Lavin (UDI) and 
Sebastián Piñera (RN).  Table 3.1 presents the percentage of voters in the sample 
supporting each of the four candidates, based upon respondents’ relevant socio-
demographic traits, party identification, opinions regarding democracy and evaluation of 
the incumbent government. 
Table 3.1 
Vote choice by respondents’ views and characteristics
 
* 
 Bachelet (Concertación) 
Hirsch 
(JPM) 
Lavín 
(UDI) 
Piñera 
(RN)  N   % % % % 
       
Age 18 -29 45.05 12.87 8.91 33.17 202 
 30-44 53.23 11.03 15.97 19.77 263 
 45-64 53.36 5.83 15.25 25.56 223 
 65+ 55.56 6.35 23.81 14.28 63 
       
Education None 37.50 0.00 37.50 25.00 8 
 Primary 66.41 5.47 11.72 16.41 128 
 Secondary 50.00 8.55 14.74 26.70 468 
 University 42.86 17.01 14.97 25.17 147 
       
Gender Female 56.56 8.20 13.66 21.58 366 
 Male 46.23 10.91 15.32 27.53 385 
       
Household Income 57.89  quintile 6.58 22.37 13.16 76 
 55.66  quintile 8.49 13.52 22.33 318 
 47.89  quintile 11.05 13.16 27.89 190 
 43.38  quintile 11.76 12.50 32.35 136 
 45.16  quintile 9.68 22.58 22.58 31 
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Religious  Yes 52.38 6.35 15.56 25.71 630 
Denomination No 45.45 26.45 9.09 19.01 121 
       
Democracy is the best  Disagree strongly 12.50 25.00 0.00 62.50 8 
Form of government Disagree 14.55 3.64 32.73 49.09 55 
 Agree 46.82 9.92 16.79 26.46 393 
 Agree strongly 65.08 9.83 8.47 16.61 295 
       
Satisfaction with Unsatisfied 13.51 29.73 16.21 40.54 37 
democracy in Chile Not very satisfied 24.78 8.84 26.99 39.38 226 
 Fairly satisfied 61.46 9.43 9.97 19.14 371 
 Very satisfied 82.05 5.13 4.27 8.55 117 
       
Government  Very bad 0.00 16.67 16.67 66.67 12 
Evaluation Bad 7.32 13.01 41.46 38.21 123 
 Good 55.04 8.40 11.34 25.21 476 
 Very good 81.43 10.00 1.43 7.14 140 
       
Party identification Concertación 83.33 5.56 3.33 7.78 90 
 JPM 33.33 66.67 0.00 0.00 15 
 UDI 0.00 0.00 57.14 42.86 22 
 RN 0.00 0.00 20.69 79.31 29 
 Others 25.00 12.50 37.50 25.00 8 
 Independents 51.79 9.37 14.48 24.36 587 
       
Sample  51.44 9.58 14.70 24.49 751 
*
In accord with the assumption that an authoritarian/democratic cleavage is prevalent in 
the restructured Chilean party system, a strong division between voters regarding their 
attitudes towards democracy and their regime preferences can be seen in Table 3.1. Sixty-
five percent of the respondents who stated they were unsatisfied with democracy and 79% 
of those stating that democracy is not always the best form of government supported the 
RN and UDI candidates. Interestingly, those expressing more critical views towards 
 Table entries are the percentage of each row-variable voting for the designated candidate.  
Percentages sum to 100 across rows. 
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democracy tended to support the more moderate Piñera, although dissatisfaction with 
democracy, however, was higher for Lavín supporters.  
Socio-demographic variables also factor into the choice between the competing 
candidates, as seen in Table 3.1. The high support for Bachelet among women marked a 
clear difference with respect to previous Concertación candidates (Angell and Reig, 2006; 
Huneeus, 2006). Hirsch did twice as well among younger, better-educated voters than 
among the older and less educated respondents. The electoral support-base of the two 
conservative candidates was also quite different, with Piñera having higher support than 
Lavín among better educated and wealthier voters. Religion seems to have strongly 
affected the choice for Hirsch: agnostic, atheists and respondents with no religious 
affiliation were much more likely to vote for Hirsch, while those belonging to a religious 
denomination (Catholics and Christians, essentially) were more likely to choose one of the 
other three candidates.   
As for the effect of short-term factors, citizens’ assessments of the incumbent 
Concertación government clearly influenced the choice between Bachelet and the three 
candidates of the opposition. Eighty percent of the respondents expressing dissatisfaction 
with the performance of the incumbent administration voted for the two conservative 
parties UDI and RN.  The vote-share of Juntos Podemos Más was also disproportionately 
high among government critics, suggesting that Hirsch’s vocal disapproval of the 
government’s economic policies might have attracted the far-left voters disenchanted with 
the Concertación’s espousal of market economy and neo-liberal policies (Valenzuela and 
Scully, 1997; Navia, 2006). In contrast, 61% of those with favorable opinions of the 
government supported Bachelet. However, a majority of voters had positive evaluations of 
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the government’s performance, reflecting the unusually high popularity of President 
Lagos among the electorate (Angell and Reig, 2006; Navia, 2006). 
Finally, another remarkable fact emerging from Table 3.1 is the relationship between 
partisanship and vote choice, particularly for respondents identified with the Concertación 
and UDI in the sample: 8% of the former and more than 43% of the latter voted for Piñera 
in the election. As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that opinion polls indicated that 
Bachelet would easily defeat Lavín in a two-candidate runoff while Piñera would pose a 
more serious challenge to the Concertación (Gamboa and Segovia, 2006) suggests that 
tactical voting might be the reason underlying the high electoral support of the RN 
candidate among UDI sympathizers.25
 
 This interpretation, however, does not account for 
the moderate support of Piñera among Concertación identifiers. Rather, the explanation in 
this case seems to be related to Piñera’s moderate positioning and his appeal to Christian 
Democrats during the electoral campaign. Figure 3.1 explores this issue further by plotting 
the distribution of votes among Concertación partisans, discriminated between Christian 
Democrats (CD) and other Concertación identifiers. As shown in the figure, almost 20% of 
respondents in the sample expressing identification with the CD voted for the RN, a 
percentage 6 times higher than for other partisans of the center-left coalition.   
 
 
                                                 
25 Party identification is defined based on respondents’ answer to the question “Which party do you 
feel closer to?” in the CSES survey. 
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Figure 3.1 
Distribution of votes among Concertación identifiers 
 
 
         Note: The figure shows the percentage of electoral support for each of the competing 
          parties among respondents identified with the Concertación in the 2005 election. The upper  
          panel summarizes vote choices among partisans of the Christian Democrats (DC), while  
          the lower panel reproduces the information for respondents identified with other parties of the  
         Concertación coalition.  
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Hence, this preliminary analysis suggests that, in line with the hypothesis 
underscoring the prevalence of an authoritarian/democratic cleavage in Chilean politics, 
voters’ views and attitudes towards democracy played a key role on their decision of 
whether to vote for the Concertación or the Alianza candidates. In contrast, while socio-
demographic variables also influenced voter behavior, they did not clearly determine a 
division between supporters of the two main political coalitions. In addition, the evidence 
presented above reveals that election-specific factors such as the emergence of a moderate 
conservative candidate and voters’ strategic considerations also had a considerable 
influence on electoral behavior. This indicates that the different hypothesis proposed to 
account for voter behavior in Chile must be considered in the light of the particular political 
and institutional context of the 2005 election, and that previous analyses based entirely on 
citizens’ party identification would probably fail to provide a complete account of voting 
patterns in the presidential race.  
These bivariate relationships, however, do not allow us to assess the relative influence 
of the different variables on voter choice in a controlled way. In to assess which factors 
were more relevant in the 2005 election and to test alternative hypothesis about the 
determinants of voter behavior in Chile, we specify and estimate a model of multi-
candidate vote choice.  
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3.3 A  multi-candidate model  of vote choice for the 2005 election 
In order to test the competing explanations and to account for possible substitution 
patterns between electoral choices, we specify and estimate a multinomial probit model that 
allows us to examine the effect of different individual characteristics on voter choice after 
controlling for other confounding factors, as well as to assess how changes in candidates’ 
spatial positions affect their expected vote-share. Unlike previous models applied in 
individual-level analysis of Chilean elections, the multinomial probit specification assumes 
that the voter simultaneously considers all the electoral options when making her choice, 
allowing us to test for the violation of the IIA assumption and to assess whether the relative 
probabilities of a voter choosing between any two candidates depends on the presence of 
other electoral options.26
Our source of data is the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems post-election survey 
(CSES, 2007). In line with the competing theories about the determinants of electoral 
behavior in Chile, we examine the effect of respondents’ socio-demographic 
characteristics, attitudes towards democracy and assessment of the incumbent Lagos’ 
government on their vote choice. The socio-demographic variables included in the model: 
 
 
3.3.1 Data and research design 
                                                 
26 The IIA assumption underlying logistic models can be tested on subsets of alternatives (Hausman 
and McFadden, 1984) and cross-alternative variables (McFadden, 1987). However, rejection of 
IIA using these tests does not provide much guidance on the correct specification to use (Train, 
2003). 
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Age; Education, recorded on an four point-scale ranging from no education to university 
degree; a dummy variable for Female; Income, by household quintile; and Religion, coded 
1 for respondents belonging to a religious denomination (Catholicism and other Christian 
faiths, essentially), 0 otherwise. We also include Regime preference, recording 
respondents’ agreement with the statement “Democracy is better than any other form of 
government”; Satisfaction with democracy, a variable reflecting how satisfied respondents 
are with the way democracy works in Chile; and Government evaluation, measures 
respondents’ assessment of the performance of Lagos’ government; the three variables are 
scored on four-point scales in ascending order. As an alternative, all variables coded on an 
ordered scale were discretized, with the lower category taken as baseline and dummy 
variables specified for the remaining categories; the main substantive findings reported in 
Section 3.4, based on the default parametrization, remain unchanged under this alternative 
specification.27
In addition, in line with the prevalent spatial model of voting (Hinich and Munger, 
1994; Merrill and Grofman, 1999), we include Ideological distance, a measure of 
respondents’ spatial perceived ideological distance from each of the candidates in the 
model, defined as the squared difference between the respondent’s self-reported placement 
on an 11-point left-right scale and her placement of each of the parties on the same scale 
(Merrill and Grofman, 1999). The left-right ideological dimension plays a key role in terms 
of popular perceptions of party differences in Chile (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Tironi 
  
                                                 
27 A complete set of results using the alternative coding scheme is available from the authors upon 
request.  
  
74 
and Agüero, 1999), where there are relatively minor differences between the main 
political forces regarding fundamental political and economic issues (Scully, 1995; 
Fuentes, 1999; Angell and Reig, 2006). In the case of Concertación, we use a weighted 
average of respondent’s placements of the parties that form the coalition, while we use 
respondent’s placements of the Communist Party to approximate the location of Juntos 
Podemos Más.28 Although the CSES survey asks Chilean respondents only about parties’ 
positions, we compared the ideological locations obtained from the CSES survey with 
candidates’ perceived positions form the October-November 2005 Centro de Estudios 
Públicos (CEP, 2005) national survey; the ordering of the candidates on the left-right scale 
is the same in both surveys, and differences in the mean of respondents’ placements of the 
candidates between the surveys are quite small.29 While the results reported below are 
based on the distance measure computed from parties’ perceived location in the CSES 
survey in order to avoid statistical complexities brought about by combining information 
from different sources (Lohr, 2005; Raghuanthan et al., 2006), using the candidates’ 
placements obtained from the CEP survey yields similar results.30
                                                 
28 The Communist Party is the major partner of Juntos Podemos Más and the only party of the 
alliance whose location respondents were asked about in the CSES survey.  
29 Less than 0.9 points on an eleven-point scale for each of the candidates.   
30 See footnote 5. 
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3.3.2 Model specification and empirical strategy 
Our basic model specification is grounded in the spatial voting and random utility 
maximization literature, and draws on Alvarez and Nagler (1995) and Alvarez, Bowler and 
Nagler (2000). We assume that the voter’s utility for each candidate is composed of a 
systemic component, specified as function of characteristics of the individuals and the 
candidates, and a stochastic component that represents the influence of unobserved factors 
on voters’ choice.  Following Alvarez and Nagler (1995), voter i ′s utility for candidate j , 
denoted by ,i jU , is given by: 
 
               ' ', , , ,    =Bachelet, Hirsch, Lavín, Piñerai j i j i j i jU z x jα δ ε= + +                        (3.1), 
where iz  is a vector of characteristics of the i
th
,i jx voter (including a constant term),  is a 
vector of characteristics of the j th jα candidate relative to the voter,  and δ  are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated, and ,i jε  is a disturbance term. We assume that the four error 
terms ( ),Bachelet ,Hirsch ,Lavín ,Piñera, , ,i i i iε ε ε ε  follow a multivariate normal distribution with 
mean vector 0 and variance-covariance matrix Σ , allowing the random components of 
utility to be correlated across parties. In line with random utility models, each voter is 
assumed to vote for the candidate that provides her with the highest utility; that is,  
 
                                            ( ),     if   maxi i j iY j U U= =                                               (3.2), 
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where iY   is the observed voter choice,  Given that only differences in utility matter and 
thus any location shift will not change the observed vote, we can solve the identification 
problem by taking one party as the base alternative and expressing i ′s utility for the other 
candidates relative to her utility for the base alternative. Assuming, without loss of 
generality, that we take Piñera (RN) as the base alternative, and defining , , ,Piñera , i k i k iU U U= −   
 Bachelet, Hirsch, Lavín,k =  we can express the random utility model as j: 
 
                                                    i i iU W β ε= +                                                        (3.3), 
where               
                                                  *3, ,i i iW z I X = ⊗    
                                           
' '
,Bachelet ,Piñera
* ' '
,Hirsch ,Piñera
' '
,Lavín ,Piñera
i i
i i i
i i
x x
X x x
x x
 −
 
= − 
 
−  
,   
 
                                ( ) ( ),Bachelet ,Hirsch ,Lavín 3, , 0,i i ii Nε ε ε ε= Σ  ,  , , ,Piñera ,  i k i k iε ε ε= −   
and 
                     ( )
( ) 
( )
,    if  max 0,    Bachelet,Hirsch,Lavín
Piñera    if  max 0
i i k
ii
i
k U U k
Y U
U
 = > == 
<
                (3.4). 
 
  
77 
The parameters  ( ),θ β= Σ  are still not identified, because a scale shift will not change 
the observed choices.31
1,1σ
 We follow McCulloch and Rossi (1994) and achieve identification 
by normalizing the parameters with respect to :      ( )' '' 1,1 1,1, / , /θ β β σ σ = Σ = Σ   .  
The likelihood for the multinomial probit model is then given by:               
                                   
                               ( )  ( )' ' ' '
1
, , Pr | , ,
n
i
i
f Y W Y Wβ β
=
Σ = Σ∏                                            (3.5), 
                                  ( )   ( ) ' ' ' '3, , , ,                  
j
i ii i i
A
P Y W U W dUβ φ βΣ = Σ∫                             (3.6), 
where 3φ  is the trivariate normal probability density function, and  
 
  ( )
 
, ,: max ,0         if , Bachelet,Hirsch,Lavín
: 0                              if  Piñera
i i k i k i
j
i i i
U U U Y k k
A
U U Y
− > = == 
 < =
. 
 
The posterior density of the parameters is given by Bayes theorem as   
                
             ( )  ( ) ( ) ( )' ' ' ' ' ', , ,   W f Y Wπ β β π β πΣ ∝ Σ Σ                               (3.7), 
 
where ( )'  π β and ( )'π Σ  denote the prior densities of  'β  and  'Σ , respectively. 
                                                 
31 That is, ( ) ( )   0i ii iY U Y Uα α= ∀ > .  
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 The model was fit through Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations, using McCulloch 
and Rossi’s (1994) Gibbs sampling algorithm.32,33 As mentioned in the introduction, 
Bayesian procedures based on Gibbs sampling allow making exact finite sample inferences 
without relying on large-sample theory (McCulloch and Rossi, 1994; Kim, Kim and Heo, 
2003). Because of the discrete nature of the dependent variable, a considerable sample size 
may be required for accurate asymptotic approximations (McCulloch and Rossi, 1994). 
Hence, the Bayesian approach is particularly appropriate given the relatively small dataset 
available to analyze the 2005 election.34
In addition, the Bayesian model-fitting strategy allows for comparison of competing 
models and explanations of voter behavior in a straightforward and computationally 
 The Bayesian approach is also better suited to deal 
with a large number of alternatives than the simulation-based methods of classical 
estimation, which require deriving the likelihood function with respect to each element of 
the variance-covariance matrix, thus resulting in substantial increases in computational 
time (Greene, 1999; Train, 2003; Kim et al., 2003).  
                                                 
32 See McCulloch and Rossi (1994), McCulloch, Polson and Rossi (2000) and Imai and van Dyk 
(2005) for a detailed presentation of the sampling algorithm. A general discussion of Gibbs 
sampling can be found in Gelfland and Smith (1990) and Casella and George (1992). 
33 The Gibbs sampler was implemented using the ‘bayesm’ package in R (Rossi, Allenby and 
McCulloch, 2005). 
34 McCulloch and Rossi (1994) show that non-normality of finite sampling distributions of the error 
variance-covariance parameters can arise with even 1,000 observations per parameter, indicating 
that “asymptotic theory may be of little use for the MNP model” (p. 219).  
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practical way using Bayes factors (Kass and Raftery, 1995). The Bayes factor for model 
jM  relative to model kM  is given by:  
                                 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),
,  
,  
j j j j jj
j k
k k k k k k
p y M p M dp y M
B
p y M p y M p M d
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
= = ∫
∫
                          (3.8),  
 
where, in the application of Section 3.4, we used the harmonic mean of the likelihood 
values evaluated at the posterior draws (Newton and Raftery, 1994) as an estimate for 
( ) ,   ,xp y M x j k= : 
                                                  ( ) ( )( )
1
1
1
1| |
R
r
x x
r
p y M p y
R
θ
−
−
=
 
=  
 
∑                                  (3.9). 
 
Diffuse proper priors were assumed for the parameters in the model,  ( )1,   N Bβ β −
and  ( )~  ,Inverse Wishart v VΣ , with 10,  0.0001 ,  6,  B I v V vIβ −= = = =  (McCulloch, Polson 
and Rossi, 2000); routine sensitivity analyses were performed to assess the robustness of 
the results with respect to different priors and starting values for the sampling algorithm, 
yielding similar results. A single Markov chain was run for 3,000,000 cycles, with the first 
50,000 discarded as burn-in; while McCulloch and Rossi’s (1994) sampler is quite easy to 
implement, high correlation between the parameters and the latent variables introduced by 
the data augmentation algorithm used to form the Gibbs sampler (Tanner and Wong, 1987; 
McCulloch and Rossi, 1994; Imai and van Dyk, 2005), coupled with a high-dimensional 
parameter space, determined that the Markov chain was extremely slow in navigating the 
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state space, and some parameters required more than 2,000,000 draws to converge.35
Table 3.2 reports the posterior means and 95% Bayesian credible intervals of the 
parameters of the multinomial probit model.  The coefficients for the individual-specific 
variables give the effect of each the variable on the vote for Bachelet, Hirsch and Lavín 
relative to Piñera. The coefficient for Ideological distance indicates the effect of 
respondents’ perceived ideological distance from the parties in the probability of voting:  a 
negative coefficient indicates that a voter is more likely to vote for a party the closer the 
party’s position is to her own. At the bottom of Table 3.2 are the estimates for the error 
correlations between Concertación, Juntos Podemos Más and UDI.
 The 
results presented in Section 3.4 are based on the last 50,000 Gibbs sample draws of the 
parameters.  
 
  3.4   Empirical results  
3.4.1 Multinomial probit estimates 
36
                                                 
35 Convergence was assessed using Geweke’s (1992) diagnostic based on a test for equality of the 
means of the first 10% and last 50% of the Markov chain.  
36 In fact, we estimate the covariance matrix of the differences in utility, with RN as the base 
category. This does not make any substantive difference in the interpretation of the model.   
 The model correctly 
predicts voter choice in 59.6% of the cases, while a “null model” predicting that voter 
choice for each respondent will take the value of the most common outcome in the sample 
(Concertación) correctly classifies 51.4% of the vote. Such a model, however, would 
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provide no information about the effect of the predictors on the relative probability of 
voting for the different parties.  
The summaries of the posterior densities shed substantial light on the relative influence 
of respondent’s socio-demographic characteristics, attitudes towards democracy and 
evaluation of government performance on their electoral behavior. First, regarding the 
effect of socio-demographic variables, wealthier voters were more likely to vote for the 
Renewal Party (RN) than for Concertación or UDI, and younger voters were also more 
likely to choose Piñera over Lavín. None of these variables significantly affected the choice 
between the RN candidate and Hirsch. In contrast, and in line with the data presented in 
Table 3.1, more educated voters and those not belonging to any religious denomination 
were more likely to vote for JPM than for RN, but these variables did not affect the choice 
between Piñera and the other two candidates at the 95% level.  Although these estimates 
indicate that socio-demographic factors did influence voters’ electoral behavior, they did 
not necessarily affect the choice between Concertación and Alianza. Rather, the evidence 
indicates that some of the socio-economic variables that had a positive effect on the 
probability of choosing Bachelet over Piñera – e.g., Income - also increased the probability 
of voting for Lavín over the candidate of the Renewal Party.  
On the other hand, respondents’ regime preferences and their evaluation of the 
incumbent government significantly affected the choice between Bachelet and the two 
candidates of the Alianza. Respondents who stated that democracy is always the best form 
of government and those expressing favorable views of Lagos’ administration were more 
likely to vote for Bachelet than for Piñera, but this variable did not affect vote choice 
between the UDI and the RN candidates. Voters satisfied with the way in which democracy 
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works in Chile were more likely to vote for Bachelet and for Lavín than for Piñera, but 
they were less likely to choose Hirsch over the RN candidate. 
 
Table 3.2 
Posterior means and 95% credible intervals (in parenthesis)  
for the parameters of the multinomial probit model  
Coefficients Bachelet/Piñera Hirsch/Piñera Lavín/Piñera 
Intercept 
-1.88 
(-3.83, -0.73) 
-0.11 
(-0.57, 0.31) 
-1.02 
(-2.03, -0.06) 
Age 
0.11 
(-0.00, 0.23) 
0.00 
(-0.06, 0.07) 
0.20 
(0.04, 0.38) 
Education 
-0.17 
(-0.36, 0.02) 
0.13 
(0.02, 0.24) 
-0.07 
(-0.31, 0.17) 
Female 
0.11 
(-0.09, 0.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.11, 0.13) 
0.10 
(-0.13, 0.35) 
Income 
-0.17 
(-0.27, -0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.08, 0.06) 
-0.17 
(-0.34, -0.04) 
Religion 
0.09 
(-0.15, 0.34) 
-0.34 
(-0.52, -0.17) 
0.21 
(-0.10, 0.60) 
Regime preference 
0.19 
(0.02, 0.36) 
0.02 
(-0.07, 0.11) 
0.08 
(-0.15, 0.28) 
Satisfaction with democracy  0.33 -0.13 0.26 
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(0.13, 0.51) (-0.24, -0.04) (0.06, 0.48) 
Government evaluation 
0.31 
(0.07, 0.66) 
0.07 
(-0.02, 0.17) 
-0.13 
(-0.46, 0.18) 
Ideological distance 
-0.01 
(-0.01, 0.01) 
    
Correlations    
 
-0.77 
(-1.00, 0.26) 
,Concertación UDIρ  
0.92 
(0.55, 1.00) 
,JPM UDIρ  
-0.93 
(-1.00, -0.63) 
 
% Correctly predicted (vs. Null Model*):  59.6% (51.44%) 
Number of observations: 751 
*
A remarkable result emerging from Table 3.2 is that, although the coefficient of 
Ideological distance has the expected negative sign, in line with the spatial voting literature, 
it is not statistically significant at the usual confidence levels. This finding is robust to 
alternative definitions of the ideological distance measure, such as using the absolute value 
rather than the square of the difference between the respondents’ and the parties' locations 
The null model predicts that voter choice for each respondent will take the value of the most 
common outcome in the sample. 
 
,Concertación JPMρ
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on the left-right scale or approximating parties’ location using the mean of respondents’ 
placements (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989; Alvarez and Nagler, 1995). Nonetheless, it 
must be mentioned that 24% of the respondents in the sample who placed themselves in the 
far-left end of the ideological scale stated that they had voted for one of the two Alianza 
candidates. This suggests that this result might stem from the methodological difficulties 
inherent in collecting perceptual data (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; King, Murray, 
Salomon and Tandon, 2004) or from flaws in the CSES questionnaire. In order to address 
this problem, we re-estimated the model using estimates of respondents’ self-placement 
and parties’ locations obtained through Aldrich and McKelvey’s (1977) method of scaling, 
with virtually identical outcomes.  Hence, although we cannot discard the hypothesis that 
this result is mainly driven by problems in the CSES questionnaire and well-known 
difficulties associated to the use of ordinal scales (King et al., 2004), a possible explanation 
lies in the absence of important policy differences between the three main candidates and in 
the fact that the first round of the election was presented as a choice between candidates’ 
personal traits, rather than between parties or ideological positions (Gamboa and Segovia, 
2006).   
A different interpretation has to do with the extent of tactical voting among the Chilean 
electorate. Given the high probability of a ballotage and the highly disputed contest 
between Piñera and Lavín for the second place in the election, voters - in particular, 
Concertación sympathizers - might have had an incentive to cast a ballot for a candidate 
other than their most preferred one in order to affect the race between the two candidates of 
the Alianza and to influence who would face Bachelet in the second-round runoff (Cox, 
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1997).  The relationship between partisanship and vote-choice reported in Table 3.1 and 
the high percentage of split-ticket voting between the presidential and legislative races 
(Navia, 2006) suggests that tactical voting might have been relatively important in the 2005 
election; we explore this argument in Section 3.4.3 below.  
Finally, the estimated error correlations between Concertación and UDI and between 
Juntos Podemos Más (JPM) and UDI are statistically significant at the usual confidence 
levels: we find a positive correlation between Concertación and UDI and a negative 
correlation between JPM and UDI. Although the positive correlation between 
Concertación and UDI is at odds with received knowledge about citizens’ partisan 
identities in Chile, it is in line with Angell and Reig’s (2006) observation that the RN 
candidate was disliked by a significant proportion of Lavín's supporters, and might help 
account for the fact that a considerable percentage of them voted for Bachelet in the 
second-round runoff against Piñera (Gamboa and Segovia, 2006; Huneeus, 2006). These 
results indicate that the IIA assumption is violated and that models that impose such 
condition might produce incorrect inferences about voter choice in Chile’s 2005 election 
(Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler, 2000). More importantly, such models would neglect the fact 
that Piñera’s entry into the election significantly affected citizens’ probabilities of voting 
for the other competing candidates.  
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3.4.2 The effect of individual characteristics on vote choice 
The coefficients reported in Table 3.2 are difficult to interpret directly due to the 
nonlinear functional form of the multinomial probit model and the fact that the voters’ 
utilities are expressed with respect to a baseline alternative (Piñera). In order to assess the 
relative impact of the different factors proposed to account for voter behavior in Chile and 
to be able to make pairwise comparisons between candidates, we estimate the marginal 
effect of the individual-specific variables on the probability of voting for each candidate 
using “first differences” (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). For each respondent in the 
sample, we compute vectors of choice probabilities 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Bachelet , Hirsch , Lavín , Piñerai i i iP P P P    based on the value of the regressors and 
the Gibbs sample draws of the models’ parameters using the GHK algorithm 
(Hajivassiliou, McFadden and Ruud, 1996). Then we alter one independent variable at a 
time and recompute the predicted probabilities for each respondent, holding all other 
variables constant. Finally, we average the differences between these probabilities over all 
simulations and respondents, obtaining the mean value and 95% credible intervals for the 
causal effect of the variable under analysis. Table 3.3 summarizes the average impact on 
the probability of support for each party of changing the values of the predictors from one 
end of the scale to the other.37
 
  
 
                                                 
37 In the case of the binary variables, Female and Religion, we measure the impact of a 
change from 0 to 1. 
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Table 3.3 
Marginal effect of individual-specific variables on voter choice  
Variable 
Bachelet 
(Concertación) 
Hirsch 
(JPM) 
Lavín 
(UDI) 
Piñera 
(RN) 
Age 
0.00 
(-0.02, 0.01) 
-0.07 
(-0.18, -0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01, 0.18) 
0.00 
(-0.01,0.01) 
Education 
-0.21 
(-0.31, -0.01) 
0.11 
(0.04, 0.23) 
0.04 
(-0.10, 0.10) 
0.07 
(-0.03, 0.15) 
Female 
0.02 
(0.00, 0.03) 
0.00 
(-0.01, 0.01) 
0.02 
(0.00, 0.04) 
-0.03 
(-0.04, -0.01) 
Income 
-0.21 
(-0.27, -0.01) 
0.04 
(0.01, 0.12) 
-0.01 
(-0.17, 0.00) 
0.18 
(0.03, 0.24) 
Religion 
0.04 
(-0.04, 0.10) 
-0.17 
(-0.28, -0.06) 
0.02 
(0.00, 0.07) 
0.11 
(0.00, 0.25) 
Regime preference 
0.33 
(0.03, 0.47) 
0.02 
(0.01, 0.05) 
-0.10 
(-0.20, 0.10) 
-0.26 
(-0.33, -0.14) 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
0.42 
(0.18, 0.52) 
-0.19 
(-0.38, -0.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.11, 0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.31, -0.01) 
Government evaluation 
0.66 
(0.33, 0.85) 
0.09 
(0.02, 0.23) 
-0.54 
(-0.73, -0.29) 
-0.22 
(-0.35, -0.11) 
95% credible intervals reported in parenthesis. 
 
  
 
  
88 
In line with the results presented in Table 3.2, the estimated first differences do not 
support the hypothesis that socioeconomic or religious cleavages played a key role in the 
choice between leftist and conservative candidates. While, ceteris paribus, higher 
education levels increased the probability of voting for the left-wing Juntos Podemos Más 
by 11 percentage points, it reduced the likelihood of voting for Concertación by 0.21. 
Respondents belonging to households in the wealthiest income quintile were 0.18 more 
likely to vote for Piñera than those in households at the bottom quintile, but they were also 
0.04 more likely to vote for Hirsch. Also, respondents belonging a religious denomination 
were 0.18 less likely to cast a ballot for Hirsch than atheist or agnostic voters, but this 
variable had no statistically significant effect on the probability of voting for Bachelet or 
for either of the two candidates of the Alianza.  
In contrast, opinions about regime preference and government performance did have 
substantive and opposite effects on the probability of voting for the two leftist and the two 
conservative candidates. Respondents would be on average 0.33 more likely to vote for 
Bachelet and 0.02 more likely to vote for Hirsch if they felt that democracy is always the 
best form of government, but they would be 0.26 less likely to vote for Piñera. Also, 
moving from a very negative to a very positive evaluation of the incumbent government 
increased the likelihood of voting for Bachelet and Hirsch by 0.66 and 0.09, respectively, 
while reducing the average probability of supporting Lavín and Piñera by 54 and 22 
percentage points. Given the success of the President Lagos’s economic and social policies 
and the fact that neither of the UDI nor the RN candidates proposed substantial 
transformations in this regard, it seems reasonable to assume that the strong positive effect 
of a negative evaluation of the government on the probability of supporting the Alianza is 
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not necessarily reflecting retrospective voting. Rather, it might be related to a series of 
important democratizing reforms implemented during Lagos’ term in office, such as the 
elimination of designated senators and the restoration of the presidential power to designate 
and remove the heads of the different branches of the military, as well as to the adoption of 
divisive “symbolic” measures like the reparations to victims of human rights violations 
(Angell and Reig, 2006; Navia, 2006). 
On the other hand, although Satisfaction with democracy also had a significant influence 
on voter choice, the effect of this variable does not reveal a clear left-right division. On 
average, moving from a very negative to a very positive opinion of the way in which 
democracy works in Chile increased the likelihood of voting for Bachelet by 0.42, but 
decreased the probability of voting for either Hirsch or Piñera by 0.19. Notice, however, 
that the causal effect of this variable on the probability of choosing Lavín is not statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. The positive relationship between dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of democracy and the likelihood of voting for Hirsch and Piñera might reflect a 
demand for alternative electoral options among voters disenchanted with the two major 
blocs dominating electoral competition, rather than respondents’ anti-democratic values. 
While Hirsch adopted a critical position towards both the Concertación and the 
conservative opposition during the campaign, Piñera emphasized the need to build a broad 
center-right “New Coalition” based on “Christian Humanist” principles to replace the 
Concertación/Alianza dichotomy (Angell and Reig, 2006; Gamboa and Segovia, 2006). 
In order to better illustrate the relative validity of the hypotheses emphasizing the role of 
socio-economic and authoritarian-democratic cleavages, Figure 3.2 summarizes the effect 
on the choice probabilities of a hypothetical voter of shifting all the predictors used to 
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operationalize each approach from the lower to the upper end of the scale.38
                                                 
38 Our hypothetical voter is male, of mean age, education and income, and belongs to a religious 
denomination; his opinions on democracy and the government and his ideological distance from 
each party are set to be at the mean sample values. Although the values of the independent variables 
used to construct this hypothetical voter influence the baseline probability estimates, they do not but 
substantively influence the effect of changes in the predictors on the voter’s choice probabilities. 
 The upper 
panel of Figure 3.2 plots the probabilities of voting for each candidate as a function of the 
voter’s views on democracy and government performance, while holding the socio-
demographic variables at the mean sample values. The lower panel reproduces the analysis, 
varying the voter’s education and income levels and fixing the remaining predictors at their 
average values. 
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Figure 3.2 
Effect of views on democracy and the government and of  
socio-economic variables on choice probabilities 
 
      Note: The upper panel plots the probabilities of voting for each candidate as a function Regime 
     preference, Satisfaction with democracy and Government evaluation. The lower panels plots the 
     choice probabilities as functions of Education and Income.  
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The comparison of the upper and lower panels in Figure 3.2 suggests that differences 
in the attitudes towards democracy and the evaluation of the government are the main 
source of divide between Alianza and Concertación supporters. Going from the lower to 
the upper end of the scale on Regime Preference, Satisfaction with democracy and 
Government evaluation increases the probability of voting for Bachelet from 0 to 87 
percent, while decreasing the likelihood of voting for Lavín and Piñera from 0.25 and 0.65 
to 0 and 0.01, respectively. Simultaneous increases in Education and Income also have a 
substantial effect on the likelihood of choosing Bachelet, lowering it by as much as 50 
percentage points, from 0.77 to 0.27. However, the effect of such increases on the 
likelihood of supporting the candidates of the Alianza is much smaller, raising it from 0.11 
to 0.27 in the case of Piñera, while having virtually no effect on the vote for Lavín. Hence, 
our findings support the arguments underscoring the role of the authoritarian-democratic in 
the choice between Concertación and Alianza (Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Torcal and 
Mainwaring, 2003). In contrast, the evidence presented above shows that socio-economic 
and cultural factors are the main determinants of the support for Hirsch.  
It is worth mentioning, however, that the comparison of a model including only socio-
economic variables vis-à-vis a model including only respondents’ views on democracy and 
the government does not favor any of the two specifications: the Bayes factor between the 
second and the first model is 1.09, and remains essentially unchanged (1.11) when 
including the spatial distance measure in both specifications. Hence, neither the hypothesis 
emphasizing the role of social and cultural cleavages nor the theory underscoring the 
authoritarian-democratic divide provides a single best explanation of voter choice in 
Chile’s 2005 election.  
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3.4.3 The role of the electoral context: candidate competition and voter calculus  
The salience of the authoritarian-democratic cleavage in structuring the competition 
between the two main political blocs in the 2005 election suggests that Chile is still, in the 
words of Constable and Valenzuela (1991), a ‘nation of enemies’. In this context, it is 
particularly relevant to examine whether Piñera’s candidacy and his campaign strategy 
aimed at distancing himself from the far right and the military dictatorship, contributed not 
only to his victory over Lavín in the contest for the second place in the election, but also to 
increase the support for the Alianza.  
In order to do so, we exploit the fact that the multinomial probit model allows us to 
estimate the effect of the entry of Piñera in the presidential race and determine where the 
RN votes had gone in his absence. For each respondent in the sample, we calculate his 
expected utility difference for Bachelet, Hirsch and Lavín with respect to Piñera using the 
Gibbs sampling draws of the coefficients. Based on these differential utilities and on the 
draws of elements of the variance-covariance matrix, we can simulate vectors of choice 
probabilities for Bachelet, Hirsch and Lavín in a three-candidate race and estimate their 
expected vote-shares. In order to compare the results with those obtained under a scenario 
in which Piñera had been the only candidate of the Alianza, we also computed the 
probability of each voter choosing between Bachelet, Hirsch and Piñera in a three-
candidate race with Lavín omitted. Table 3.4 reports the simulated vote-shares of the 
candidates in these two hypothetical three-candidate races and contrast them with the 
model’s predictions for the four-candidate election.       
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Table 3.4 
Expected vote-shares of the candidates under alternative electoral scenarios 
(in percentage points) 
Candidate Four-candidate race 
Three-candidate races 
without Piñera without Lavín 
Bachelet (Concertación) 
50.87 
(48.34, 53.31) 
51.64 
(49.04, 54.27) 
57.10 
(54.83, 59.56) 
Hirsch (JPM) 
8.19 
(6.83, 9.79) 
17.52 
(15.31, 19.90) 
9.57 
(8.03, 11.23) 
Lavín (UDI) 
14.53 
(12.74, 16.72) 
30.84 
(23.38, 33.81) 
- 
Piñera (RN) 
26.41 
(23.81, 28.17) 
- 
33.33 
(31.60, 35.12) 
95% credible intervals reported in parenthesis. 
 
As seen in the table, in a four-candidate election, our model predicts an expected vote-
share of 50.9% for Bachelet, 8.2% for Hirsch, 26.4% for Piñera and 14.5% for Lavín, close 
to the actual proportion of votes for each candidate in the sample (Table 3.1).39
                                                 
39 In the CSES sub-sample of 751 respondents we use, there is a positive bias for Bachelet and 
Hirsch and a negative bias for Lavín, which our multinomial probit model reproduces. 
 While the 
expected vote-share for the two candidates of the Alianza would add to almost 41% in the 
four-candidate election, none of the two conservative candidates running alone would have 
obtained more than 34% of the vote in a three-candidate race against Bachelet and Hirsch. 
  
95 
This indicates that Piñera’s candidacy was an important determinant of Alianza’s relative 
success in the 2005 election, increasing the support for the center-right by more than 10 
percentage points with respect to the hypothetical case in which Lavín had been the only 
candidate of the coalition, as originally expected. Moreover, the support for Hirsch among 
the respondents in the sample would more than double under this scenario when compared 
to the four-candidate race, suggesting that the RN candidate was backed by a segment of 
voters who were not willing to cast a ballot for either Bachelet or Lavín. This interpretation 
is in line with the results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 showing that Hirsch and Piñera had a strong 
support among voters disenchanted with the workings of democracy in Chile and who 
might have been looking for alternatives to the two “traditional” electoral options.  
Figure 3.3 explores this issue further, plotting the distribution of the candidates’ vote-
share among different groups of respondents in both hypothetical three-candidate elections. 
The upper panel of Figure 3.3 summarizes the model’s predictions for a three-candidate 
race between Bachelet, Hirsch and Lavín, plotting the distribution of the support for the 
candidates among those respondents who voted for Piñera in the actual election, among 
Christian Democrats (DC), and among the rest of the respondents in the sample. 
Analogously, the bottom panel of Figure 3.3 presents the results for a three-candidate 
election with Lavín omitted, plotting the distribution of the support for Bachelet, Hirsch 
and Piñera among those who voted for Lavín in the presidential election, among DC 
partisans and among the remaining respondents. 
The upper panel shows that, in a three-candidate race between Bachelet, Hirsch and 
Lavín, respondents who voted for Piñera in the actual election were more likely to vote for 
Juntos Podemos Más than the rest of the respondents in the sample. Also, comparing the 
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two hypothetical three-candidate races between Bachelet, Hirsch and a single Alianza 
contender, the support for JPM among respondents who voted for Piñera in the presidential 
election would have been twice as large as among respondents who voted for Lavín. 
Hence, far from weakening the Alianza’s electoral prospects, the division between the UDI 
and the RN candidates seems to have actually increased the coalition’s vote-share. While 
the Alianza retained its customary right-wing vote, Piñera’s candidacy allowed the 
coalition to expand its electoral appeal to some citizens dissatisfied with the workings of 
democracy in Chile and demanding alternative electoral options; Lavín, Alianza’s “natural” 
candidate, would not have offered an attractive choice for this group of voters.  
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Figure 3.3  
Predicted vote-shares in the two hypothetical three-candidate races 
 
 
      Note: The upper panel plots the distribution of support for Bachelet, Hirsch and Lavín among  
      different groups of respondents in a three-candidate race with Piñera omitted. Analogously, the  
       lower panel plots the expected-vote share of Bachelet, Hirsch and Piñera in a three-candidate    
      race, with Lavín omitted.  
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Nonetheless, the evidence reported in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3 also point out that 
Piñera’s  success was, to a large extent, due to the specific circumstances surrounding the 
2005 election and, in particular, to the uncertainty about which of the two Alianza 
candidates would join Bachelet in the almost certain second-round runoff (Angell and Reig, 
2006; Gamboa and Segovia, 2006). Three main results back up this claim. First, as seen in 
the upper panel of Figure 3.3, Piñera voters were more likely to vote for Lavín than for the 
other contestants if the RN candidate had not entered the race, and the expected vote-share 
of the UDI among them is much higher than among the other respondents in the sample. 
Hence, Piñera seems to have attracted many conservative voters who would have otherwise 
voted for Lavín and who might have seen the RN candidate as a more viable option in a 
second-round runoff against Bachelet. Second, as seen in the third column of Table 3.4, 
even though the Alianza would had done slightly better in a three-candidate race in which 
Piñera, rather than Lavín, had been the coalition’s only nominee, Bachelet’s expected vote-
share among respondents in the sample would have peaked at more than 57% under this 
scenario. Moreover, Hirsch’s support in this case would remain essentially unchanged in 
comparison to the actual four-candidate race. Hence, some voters who would support the 
minority candidate in an election with Bachelet and Lavín as real contenders for the 
presidential office would chose to cast a ‘useful’ vote for the Concertación in a less 
polarized election in which Piñera was the only nominee of the Alianza. Finally, although 
Christian Democrats were twice as likely to vote for Piñera than for Lavín in the actual 
election (Figure 3.1), Figure 3.3 shows that their propensity to vote for Piñera and for Lavín 
in the two hypothetical three-candidate races would not be significantly different. This 
result indicates that some respondents who voted for the National Renewal Party in order to 
  
99 
prevent Lavín from advancing to the second round would have had no incentive to do so 
in a three-candidate election with Bachelet and Piñera as the main aspirants for office. 
Therefore, our findings underscore the fact that the political and institutional context 
played a key role in explaining Piñera success and Alianza’s unprecedented support in the 
2005 election. In particular, tactical voting seems to have been an important determinant of 
the support for the RN candidate. Interestingly, however, the strategic calculus of Chilean 
voters corresponds only in part to the predictions of received models of strategic vote under 
top-two runoff (Myerson and Weber, 1993; Cox, 1997). In line with the theoretical 
literature, Piñera’s support among UDI sympathizers might reflect the desire of 
conservative voters to coordinate on the candidate of the Alianza that, according to public 
opinion polls, stood the best chance in a two-candidate runoff against Bachelet. In contrast, 
his support among Concertación partisans and potential Hirsch voters indicates that 
strategic voting among center-left and left-wing respondents stemmed from their desire to 
exclude Lavín from the ballotage, rather than to improve the probability of victory for their 
most-favored candidate (Cox, 1997).  
Again, this calls attention to the persistence of the authoritarian/democratic cleavage and 
its influence on the election results. The prevalence of this division in the society, together 
with the broad consensus over economic and social issues and strong party and coalition 
labels, impose powerful limitations to party leaders and political elites intending to alter 
their long-established electoral coalitions (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997). Their success in 
doing so might depend on their ability to shift their bases of electoral competition by 
politicizing new dimensions of conflict that cross coalitions and partisan lines, such as the 
ones underlying the growing “demand for rights” among the electorate and the increased 
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debate over moral and social issues (Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Angell and Reig, 
2006). 
 
3.5   Final remarks 
The 2005 election in Chile had several unusual characteristics. Among them, the 
presence of two viable conservative candidates marked a clear difference with previous 
elections. In this chapter, we specify and fit a Bayesian multinomial probit model to study 
the presidential race, accounting for the multi-party character of the election and allowing 
estimation of substitution patterns among the candidates that enable us to assess how their 
expected vote-shares would change under alternative electoral scenarios. The Bayesian 
approach is particularly well suited for analyzing this election, given its advantages over 
classical estimation techniques for dealing with a relatively large number of alternatives 
and small sample sizes, as well as for providing a practical way of testing competing 
hypothesis and statistical models.  
 Our results shed light on the debate about the transformation of the political system in 
Chile and the redefinition of voters’ preferences since the re-establishment of democracy. 
In line with Tironi and Agüero’s hypothesis (1999), we find that voters’ regime preferences 
and their attitudes towards democracy played a substantial role in the choice between the 
candidates of the Concertación and the Alianza. Earlier works suggested that the 
authoritarian-democratic cleavage would probably lose its influence over time as the 
memories of the dictatorship receded, as democracy was consolidated and as parties found 
new political issues to mobilize their supporters (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Torcal and 
Mainwaring, 2003). However, the empirical evidence from the 2005 election shows that, 
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sixteen years after the plebiscite that marked the end of Pinochet’s rule, voters’ electoral 
behavior still reflects the durability of the division between supporters and critics of the 
military regime.  
In addition, our analysis underscores the considerable impact of the particular electoral 
context of the 2005 presidential race on voter choice, an aspect that has received relatively 
little attention in previous analyses of Chilean elections. Specifically, we show that the 
entry of a second conservative candidate into the presidential race increased the vote of the 
right, gathering the support of some Christian Democrats and, especially, of voters who 
were not inclined to favor either Bachelet or Lavín. We also find that much of Piñera’s 
support was due to strategic calculus on the part of voters in view of the almost certain 
second-round runoff and the tight contest between Lavín and Piñera for the second place in 
the first round of the election. An in-depth analysis of this argument, however, requires 
developing a statistical model to estimate the amount of strategic voting in multiparty 
elections under top-two runoff, an extension that we leave for further research. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
Correcting for Survey Misreports using Auxiliary Information with 
an Application to Estimating Turnout40
In the political science literature, concerns about misclassification have been particularly 
prevalent in the analysis of voting behavior. Empirical studies of the determinants of voter 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
Much of the empirical work in the social sciences is based on the analysis of survey 
data. However, as has been widely documented (Battistin 2003; Bound, Brown and 
Mathiowetz 2001; Poterba and Summers 1986), these data are often plagued by 
measurement errors. There are many possible sources for such errors. Interviewers may 
erroneously record answers to survey items, and respondents may provide inaccurate 
responses due to an honest mistake, misunderstanding or imperfect recall (Gems, Ghaosh 
and Hitlin 1982; Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton 1998; Molinari 2003). Also, as 
underscored by the social psychology literature, survey respondents tend to overreport 
socially desirable behaviors and underreport socially undesirable ones (Cahalan 1968; 
Loftus 1975). In the case of discrete or categorical variables, mismeasurement problems 
have been traditionally referred to as “misclassification" errors (Aigner 1973; Bollinger 
1996; Bross 1954). 
                                                 
40 Joint with Jonathan N. Katz. Both authors contributed equally to the following chapter. 
Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science 54(3), July 2010. 
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turnout focus on how the probability of an individual voting varies according to relevant 
observable factors, such as citizen's level of political information, registration laws, or 
demographic characteristics. That is, these studies are interested in estimating the 
conditional distribution of the turnout decision given certain characteristics of interest.41
However, it has been long established that some survey respondents misreport voting, 
i.e., they report that they have voted when in fact they did not do so (Burden 2000; Clausen 
1968; Katosh and Traugott 1981; Miller 1952; Parry and Crossley 1950; Sigelman 1982; 
Silver, Anderson and Abramson 1986). The evidence that misreporting is a problem can be 
found in a series of validation studies that the ANES conducted in 1964, 1976, 1978, 1980, 
1984, 1988 and 1990. These validation studies were possible, but expensive, because 
 
The decision to vote, however, is typically not observed due to the use of secret ballot in 
the U.S. Furthermore, even if we could observe turnout from the official ballots we would 
not, in general, be able to observe all the characteristics - e.g., the voter's policy preferences 
or information about the candidates - that presumably affect the decision. Hence, political 
scientist rely on the use of survey instruments, such as the American National Election 
Study (ANES) or the Current Population Survey (CPS), that include both measures of 
respondents' relevant characteristics and their self-reported voting behavior. This almost 
always leads to estimation of the common logit or probit models, since the turnout decision 
is dichotomous, although there are alternatives such as scobit (Nagler 1994) or non-
parametric models (Hardle 1990) for discrete choice models. 
                                                 
41 The literature is far too vast to even begin to fully cite here. See Aldrich (1993) for a review of the 
theoretical literature and Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) for an influential empirical study. 
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voting is a matter of public record, although for whom a voter voted is not. After 
administering a post-election survey to a respondent, an official from the ANES was sent to 
the respondent's local registrar of elections to see if in fact they were recorded as having 
voted in the election. This is not an easy task, since respondents often do not know where 
they voted, election officials differ in their ability to produce the records in a usable form, 
and there might be differences between the survey data and the public records due to errors 
in spelling or recording. This means that the validated data may also be mismeasured, but 
for this chapter we will assume it is correct. That said, the ANES for these years included 
both the respondent's self-reported vote and the validated vote. The differences between the 
two measures are fairly shocking. Depending on the election year, between 13.6 and 24.6 
percent of the respondents claiming to have voted did in fact not according to the public 
records.42
                                                 
42 The Current Population Survey (CPS) also exhibits considerable turnout overreporting, although 
the magnitude is substantially lower than for the ANES (Highton 2004). As shown by Hausman, 
Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) and Neuhaus (1999), however, even modest amounts of 
misreporting can affect parameter estimates. 
 In contrast, only between 0.6% and 4.0% of the respondents in the 1964 - 1990 
validated surveys who reported not having voted did vote according to the official records. 
Since there is no reason to believe that measurement errors should mainly be of false 
positives - i.e., reporting voting when the official record contradicts this claim - , this lends 
some credence to the social pressures argument for misreporting (Bernstein, Chadha and 
Montjoy 2001) and should help mitigate some of our concerns about other potential sources 
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of classification errors, such as inaccurate records.43 The large differences between 
reported and validated turnout led to a cottage industry analyzing the causes of 
misreporting (Abramson and Claggett 1984, 1986a,b, 1991; Ansolabehere and Hersh 2008; 
Cassel 2003; Hill and Hurley 1984; Katosh and Traugott 1981; Sigelman 1982; Silver, 
Anderson and Abramson 1986; Weir 1975) and to a debate about how to best measure 
misreporting (Anderson and Silver 1986). All of these studies find that misreporting varies 
systematically with some characteristics of interest, but none of them provides an 
estimation solution to correct for possible misreporting. The open question then is what to 
do about the problem of respondents misreporting. One possibility would be to use only 
validated data. At some level this is an appealing option. If we are sure that the validated 
data is correct, then estimation and inference is straightforward. Unfortunately, collecting 
the validated turnout data is difficult and expensive, and ANES has stopped doing 
validation studies for these reasons. Furthermore, even if validation studies were free, some 
states, such as Indiana, make it impossible to validate votes. Hence, if we are going to limit 
ourselves to use only fully validated data, our samples will be much smaller. Moreover, 
would also be throwing away the useful information included in the already collected but 
non-validated studies.44
                                                 
43 Clearly, other reasons besides social desirability may also contribute to explain differences 
between self-reported and validated turnout (Abelson, Loftus and Greenwald 1992). 
 On the other hand, simply ignoring misreporting and using self-
44 In the case of the ANES, turnout is one of the few survey items included since the late 1940s, 
covering a larger period than any other continuing survey (Burden 2000). Validation studies, on 
the other hand, only comprise a handful of elections. 
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reported turnout to estimate standard probit or logit models can result in biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates and inaccurate standard errors, potentially distorting the 
relative impact of the characteristics of interest on the response variable and leading to 
erroneous conclusions (Davidov, Faraggi and Reiser 2003; Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-
Morton 1998; Neuhaus 1999).45
In this chapter we develop a simple Bayesian approach to correct for misreporting, 
allowing researchers to continue to use the self-reported data while improving the accuracy 
of the estimates and inferences drawn in the presence of misclassified binary responses.
 
46
                                                 
45 A third strand of research focuses on procedures for reducing the frequency of overreporting, 
such as altering question wording or reformulating survey questions (Belli, Traugott and 
Rosenstone 1994; Belli et al. 1999; Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz 2001). Nonetheless, while 
this can improve the quality of future datasets, we would still be wasting large amounts of data 
collected in previous surveys. 
46 We focus on the case of misclassified responses and error-free covariates. Several methods have 
been proposed to adjust for measurement error in the covariates. See Carroll, Ruppert and 
Stefanski (1995) and Thurigen et al. (2000) for a review. 
 
Our model draws on Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998), but incorporates 
information on the misreporting process from auxiliary data sources, aiding in 
identification (Gu 2006; Molinari 2003) and making it easier to avoid the problems that 
limit the use of Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998)'s modified maximum 
likelihood estimator in small samples such as those typically used in political science 
(Christin and Hug 2004; Gu 2006). While incorporating this information into the analysis 
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of the sample of interest using frequentist methods is far from straightforward (Prescott 
and Garthwaite 2005), this can be easily accomplished within the Bayesian framework via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations. Although other Bayesian approaches 
have been proposed to adjust for misclassification using prior information to overcome 
fragile or poor identifiability, they either rely exclusively on elicitation of experts' opinions 
(McInturff et al. 2004; Paulino, Soares and Neuhaus 2003) or assume that information on 
both the true and the fallible response is available for all subjects in a random subsample of 
the data (Viana 1994; Prescott and Garthwaite 2002, 2005). In contrast, the information on 
the misreport patterns incorporated into our model need not come from the sample of 
interest, and can be combined with elicitation of experts' beliefs if needed. In the empirical 
application presented in this chapter we will use earlier and small-sample validation studies 
to correct for misreporting. However, matched official records, administrative registers and 
possibly even aggregate data might be used to gain this information. Given the potential 
difficulties of eliciting probabilities from experts' opinions and the scarcity of internal 
validation designs relative to administrative data sets, external validation studies and other 
sources of ancillary information (Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz 2001; Garthwaite, 
Kadane and OHagan 2004; Hu and Riddert 2007; Wiegmann 2005), the correction 
developed in this chapter provides a more flexible way of incorporating prior information 
and can be more widely applied than existing approaches.47
                                                 
47 In internal validation studies, the true response is available for a subset of the main study and 
can be compared to the imperfect or observed response. In the case of the external validation 
designs, the misreport pattern is estimated using data outside the main study. 
 In addition, these alternative 
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approaches focus only on the case in which the misclassification rates are independent 
of all covariates. As mentioned above, this assumption seems to be inappropriate in the 
case of the determinants of voter turnout, as well as in many other potential applications. 
The magnitude and direction of the biases when misreporting is covariate-dependent can be 
quite different than in the case of constant misclassification rates (Davidov, Faraggi and 
Reiser 2003; Neuhaus 1999) and, in the context of analyzing voting behavior, Bernstein, 
Chadha and Montjoy (2001) show that ignoring the correlation between the covariates of 
interest and the misreport probabilities may seriously distort multivariate explanations of 
the turnout decision. Finally, our approach enables us to simultaneously address another 
important problem with survey data, namely missing outcome and/or covariate values, 
using fully Bayesian model-based imputation (Ibrahim et al. 2005). 
Although our model is developed in the context of estimating the conditional probability 
of turning out to vote, the method is general and will be applicable whenever 
misclassification of a binary outcome in a survey is anticipated and there is auxiliary 
information on the misreporting patterns. For instance, our approach could be used to 
analyze survey data on participation in social welfare programs (Hernanz, Malherbet and 
Pellizzari 2004), pension plans (Molinari 2003), energy consumption (Gu 2006), 
employment status (Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton 1998) and many other areas 
where we expect to see substantial rates of misreporting and potential correlation between 
some of the covariates affecting the response and the misreport probabilities. The model 
can also be implemented when misreporting depends on covariates other than those 
influencing the outcome. For example, for a substantial proportion of the CPS sample, 
turnout is measured by proxy, rather than self-reported (Highton 2004). In this case, the 
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misclassification probabilities would be modeled using information on misreporting 
patterns among household members reporting other members' turnout decision, which 
could be obtained from validated CPS studies.48
Let 
 Extensions of our method to discrete 
choice models with more than two categories along the lines of Abrevaya and Hausman 
(1999) and Dustmant and van Soest (2004) are possible as well. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section formally lays out the estimation 
problem in the presence of misreporting and develops our proposed solution. Section 4.3 
presents results from a Monte Carlo experiment illustrating how important misreporting 
can be in practice and comparing the estimates from our method with those obtained under 
several alternative approaches. We also evaluate the robustness of our approach to 
misspecification of the misreport model and assess its performances in the presence of both 
misclassification and missing data. In Section 4.4, we provide three applications of our 
methodology using data on voter turnout from the ANES. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2   Correcting for misreporting in binary choice models 
4.2.1 Defining the problem 
iy
 
be a dichotomous (dummy) variable, and denote by ix  a vector of individual 
characteristics of interest. We want to estimate the conditional distribution of  iy given ix , 
[ ]|i iP y x . However, instead of observing the “true” dependent variable , iy  assume we 
                                                 
48 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to this potential application of our model. 
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observe the self-reported indicator  iy . Most studies use the observed  iy  as the 
dependent variable, typically running either a probit or logit model to estimate  | iiP y x   . 
In order to know whether this substitution can lead to incorrect inferences, we need to 
know the relationship between [ ]|i iP y x  and  | iiP y x   . We can always write: 
 
                           
  [ ]
 [ ]
1| 1| , 1  1|
                         1| , 0  0 |
i i i i ii i
i i i ii
P y x P y x y P y x
P y x y P y x
   = = = = • = +   
 = = • =           
                (4.1) 
 
by the law of total probability. All that we have done is to rewrite the probability 
 1| iiP y x =   into two components: when the self-reported or observed variable 

iy  
coincides with the true response iy , and when it does not. Also, noting that 
 0 | , 1 1 1| , 1i i i ii iP y x y P y x y   = = = − = =    , we can re-write the relationship as: 
 
                                 ( ) [ ]1|0 0|1 1|01| 1 1|i i i i i iiP y x P y xπ π π = = − − = + 
         
                  (4.2), 
 
where 1|0 1| , 0i i iiP y x yπ  = = =   is the probability that the respondent falsely claims 
 1iy =  when in fact 0iy = , and 
0|1 0 | , 1i i iiP y x yπ  = = =  is the probability the observed 
response takes the value 0 when the true response is 1iy = . It is important to note that the 
probability of each type of misreporting is conditional on ix . 
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Standard methods for estimating binary choice models generally assume that the 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable given ix  is known up to a parameter 
vector β . However, unless 1|0 0|1 0 i i iπ π= = ∀ , estimating the conditional probability 
 1| iiP y x =   rather than [ ]1|i iP y x=  will generally lead to biased estimates of β  and 
inaccurate standard errors, with even small probabilities of misreporting potentially leading 
to significant amounts of bias (Davidov, Faraggi and Reiser 2003; Hausman, Abrevaya and 
Scott-Morton 1998; Neuhaus 1999). In addition, the marginal effect of covariate x  on the 
observed response  iy and on the true response iy  will differ by: 
 
                 
 [ ] [ ]
( ) [ ]
1|0 0|1
1|0
1|0 0|1
1| 1|
1|
1|
                                                    
ii i i i i
i i
i i i
i i
P y x P y x
P y x
x x x x
P y x
x x
π π
π
π π
 ∂ = ∂ =  ∂ ∂  − = − + = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∂ = ∂
− + +
∂ ∂
        
  (4.3). 
 
As a result, inferences drawn on the relationship between the covariates of interest and 
the response variable may change substantially when estimated based on the likelihood 
function defined by  1| iiP y x =   rather than on the true model [ ]1|i iP y x= , depending 
on the distribution of ' ixβ  and the covariate vector ix , on the prevalence of 
misclassification and on the relationship between the probabilities of misreporting and the 
covariates in ix  (Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 2001; Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-
Morton 1998; Neuhaus 1999).  
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Different parametric models have been proposed to correct for misclassification of 
the dependent variable in binary choice models (Carroll, Ruppert and Stefanski 1995; 
Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton 1998; McInturff et al. 2004; Morrissey and 
Spiegelman 1999; Paulino, Soares and Neuhaus 2003; Prescott and Garthwaite 2002, 
2005).49
1|0 0|1 1i iπ π+ <
 In particular, Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) proposed a modified 
maximum likelihood estimator that requires the “monotonicity" condition  to 
achieve identification. Using Monte Carlo simulations, they showed that their model 
consistently estimates the extent of misclassification and the parameter vector β , at least in 
large samples. More recently, however, Christin and Hug (2004) replicated the work of 
Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) for different sample sizes, and found that the 
modified maximum likelihood estimator performed consistently better than simple probit 
models ignoring misclassification only in samples of 5,000 or more observations. In 
smaller samples, standard probit estimators outperformed it in many cases, and Christin 
and Hug (2004) concluded that the modified maximum likelihood estimator is only 
advisable for large samples. As noted by Gu (2006), the failure of Hausman, Abrevaya and 
Scott-Morton (1998)'s estimator in small samples is likely due to the insufficiency of the 
monotonicity condition to ensure model identification. For such sample sizes typically 
available in political science, even moderate rates of misclassification may hinder model 
identification, so different assumptions may be required to put bounds on the 
misclassification rates and the regression coefficients. In addition, Hausman, Abrevaya and 
                                                 
49 A comprehensive review of different methods developed to deal with misclassification and 
measurement errors in nonlinear models can be found in Carroll, Ruppert and Stefanski (1995). 
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Scott-Morton (1998) and, in fact, most empirical applications of models proposed to 
correct for misreporting, assume constant misclassification rates, failing to account for the 
potential influence of the covariates of interest on 1|0iπ  and 
0|1
iπ .
50
x
 Relevant prior 
information on the misreport patterns is often available from auxiliary data sources, such as 
internal or external validation studies, small sample pilots or administrative registers, which 
can be used to impose restrictions on the misreport probabilities and regression coefficients 
to aid in identification and improve inferences on the relationship between  and y  (Chen 
1979; Molinari 2003). 
In order to incorporate the information on the misreporting structure from auxiliary data 
sources, we propose a Bayesian approach based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
methods. This approach has three basic advantages in this setting. First, results from 
previous statistical studies can be easily incorporated into the model for the sample of 
interest within the Bayesian framework (Dunson and Tindall 2000; Ibrahim and Chen 
2000; Ibrahim, Ryan and Chen 1998). Second, MCMC methods directly account for the 
extra uncertainty in the variances caused by using estimates of the misreport probabilities 
obtained from the auxiliary data instead of their true values. In contrast, in the context of 
frequentist estimation, this would require additional “post-estimation” steps, such as 
bootstrapping (Haukka 1995), applying the results of Murphy and Topel (1985) for two-
                                                 
50 Abrevaya and Hausman (1999); Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) and Paulino, 
Soares and Neuhaus (2003), among others, discuss extensions to deal with covariate-dependent 
misclassification, but they do not analyze this case in practice. 
  
114 
step estimators, or using numerical techniques (Kuha 1994).51
β
 In addition, our approach 
does not rely on large sample assumptions and avoids the need for complicated numerical 
approximations (Viana 1994) when the posterior distributions are analytically intractable. 
The model is a simple modification of Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998)'s 
estimator and can be easily implemented by practitioners and applied researchers using 
flexible and freely available software for Bayesian analysis such as WinBUGS or JAGS 
(Plummer 2009; Spiegelhalter, Thomas and Best 2003). 
  
4.2.2 A Bayesian model to correct for misreporting using auxiliary data  
We are interested in accurately estimating the effect of the individual characteristics of 
interest on the conditional distribution of the true response. Hence, the focus of our analysis 
lies in the marginal posterior distribution of , while the modelization of the conditional 
probabilities 1|0iπ  and 
0|1
iπ  can be regarded as “instrumental”. 
Since the observed response variable is dichotomous, we can start by assuming that, 
conditional on some set of relevant individual characteristics, the observations are 
independently and identically distributed according to a Bernoulli distribution - as in 
                                                 
51 Another possible approach is to assume that misclassification rates are known and equal to 
those prevalent in the auxiliary data (Poterba and Summers 1995). Nonetheless, as noted by 
Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998), not only will this lead to inconsistent parameter 
estimates if the assumed misclassification probabilities are not consistent estimates of the true 
probabilities, but the standard errors of the coefficient estimates will be understated. 
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Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998). The probability of the sample can 
therefore be written as: 
                            ( ) 

( )
1
1
| , | , 1 | ,
i
i
yN y
i ii i
i
L P y P yθ θ θ
−
=
   = −   ∏y x x x
         
                 (4.4), 
 
with { }1|0 0|1 ', ,i iθ π π β= . We will further assume that the conditional probability of the true 
response variable is given by [ ] ( )'1 |i i iP y x F xβ= = , where ( )F   is some cumulative 
density function. For ease of exposition, we use the probit link, so that ( )F   is the 
standard normal distribution denoted by ( )Φ  . This will lead to a probit model with a 
correction for misreport; the use of the logit link function would result in a logit model 
with a correction for misreporting. We also assume that [ ]1|i iP y x= is a priori 
independent of 1|0iπ  and 
0|1
iπ .
52
 | iiP y x   Substituting for in Equation 4.2 and denoting 
by  
 
the sample data, we arrive at: 
 
                 
( ) ( ) ( )

( ) ( )( )

1|0 0|1 1|0 0|1 ' 1|0
1
1
1|0 0|1 ' 0|1
, , | 1
                                        1 1
i
i
N y
i i i i i i
i
y
i i i i
L x
x
π π β π π β π
π π β π
=
−
 = − − Φ + 
 × − − −Φ +   
∏
         
  (4.5), 
 
                                                 
52 This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably without entailing any obvious drawback 
from a practical perspective (Paulino, Soares and Neuhaus 2003). 
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which represents the probability of observing the sample under misreporting. The 
joint posterior density of { }1|0 0|1 ', ,i iθ π π β= is therefore given by:53
( ) ( ) ( )1|0 0|1 1|0 0|1 1|0 0|1, , | , , | , ,i i i i i ip L pπ π β π π β π π β∝ × 
 
                            
                    
(4.6). 
 
Without prior substantive information, a common choice for ( )1|0ip π  and ( )0|1ip π
would be vague Beta distributions, while independent normal priors with zero means and 
(possible common) large variances could be assigned for the components of β  
(McInturff et al. 2004; Prescott and Garthwaite 2005). However, as mentioned above, 
using at priors for the misclassification errors will likely lead to poor identifiability (Gu 
2006). In addition, specifying diffuse priors for β  can also hinder convergence in some 
circumstances (Gu 2006; McInturff et al. 2004; Prescott and Garthwaite 2002). 
Incorporating prior information on 1|0 0|1, ,i iπ π  and β  from auxiliary data sources can help 
overcome these problems and improve the accuracy of the parameter estimates (Gu 2006; 
McInturff et al. 2004; Prescott and Garthwaite 2002, 2005).  
Suppose that both the true and the self-reported dependent variables are recorded for 
all respondents in a validation study of size M . Comparing jy  to 

jy  for every 
1,...,j M= , we can estimate the misreport probabilities for the validated sample. Let 1jz  
and 2jz denote sets of regressors that are useful in predicting the conditional probabilities 
                                                 
53 Alternatively, a “latent variable” approach based on data augmentation (Tanner and Wong 
1987) can be used to simplify the computations. See McInturff et al. (2004). 
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1|0
jπ and 
0|1
jπ , where the notation allows for the fact we may use different regressors to 
predict the two types of misreporting.  1jz  and 
2
jz may include some or all of the variables 
in x , as well as other variables not affecting the true response. Again, for ease of 
exposition, we assume probit link functions and specify the conditional probabilities of 
misreporting as ( )1|0 ' 11j jzπ γ= Φ and ( )0|1 ' 22j jzπ γ= Φ . Since our interest lies primarily on 
the distribution of β , { }' '1 2,γ γ γ= could in principle be viewed as “nuisance” parameters 
in our setting (Ibrahim, Ryan and Chen 1998), although they help provide meaningful 
interpretations for the underlying misreporting process (Chen 1979).54  Letting  denote 
the data from the validation study, the likelihood from   is: 
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∏
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                 (4.7). 
 
The posterior distributions ( )1 2, , |p γ γ β   or ( )1 2, |p γ γ  could then be used to 
specify the priors for β , 1γ  and 2γ  in the model fit to the sample of interest by repeated 
application of Bayes' theorem. However, since these posteriors cannot be expressed as 
                                                 
54 It is worth mentioning, however, that ( )1|0 1j jzπ  and ( )0|1 2j jzπ  are not necessarily identified. See 
Lewbel (2000). 
  
118 
tractable distributions, there is no straightforward way of transferring the relevant 
information from the validation study to the analysis of the main sample (Prescott and 
Garthwaite 2005). In addition, unless the validation study is a random sub-sample of the 
main study, heterogeneity between the two samples might in some circumstances lead to 
misleading conclusions if inference on β  is based on the pooled datasets (Duan 2005). 
Hence, we consider both samples simultaneously, combining the likelihoods in 4.5 and 
4.7 with vague independent priors ( )1p γ , ( )2p γ  and ( )p β and weighting the likelihood 
from the validated sample by a “tunning” parameter δ  that controls how much influence 
the validated data has relative to the main sample (Chen, Ibrahim and Shao 2000; Ibrahim 
and Chen 2000). The joint posterior density of the unknown parameters is therefore given 
by:     
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1|0 0|1 1|0 0|1 1 2 1 2, , | , , | , , |i i i ip L L p p pδπ π β π π β γ γ β γ γ β∝ × × × ×  
  
(4.8), 
 
with 0 1δ≤ ≤ , where 0δ = corresponds to the case in which no auxiliary information is 
incorporated into the analysis for the main sample, while 1δ =  gives equal weights to 
( )1|0 0|1, , |i iL π π β   and ( )1 2, , |L γ γ β  . δ  can be assigned either a fixed value or a prior 
distribution - e.g., ( ),Beta c dδ   (Chen, Ibrahim and Shao 2000; Ibrahim and Chen 
2000).55
                                                 
55 In the latter case, the prior for 
 Although Equation 4.8 is intractable analytically, inference can be performed 
( )p δ would be added to Equation 3.8. See the discussions in 
Chen, Ibrahim and Shao (2000) and Ibrahim and Chen (2000) for additional details. 
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using Gibbs sampling along with Metropolis steps to sample the full conditionals for 
β , 1γ  and 2γ  (Gelfland and Smith 1990; Casella and George 1992; Chib and Greenberg 
1995). Under mild regularity conditions (Gilks, Richardson and Spiegelhalter 1996; 
Robert and Casella 2004), for a sufficiently large number of iterations, samples from 
these conditional distributions approach samples from the joint posterior. The posterior 
marginals obtained from these convergent samples can then summarized and used to 
estimate the effect of the relevant individual characteristics on the true response and the 
misreport probabilities. In addition, Bayes factors can be easily implemented within our 
modeling framework to compare alternative link functions (Paulino, Soares and Neuhaus 
2003).  
Thus, we only need to have validated data from a previous sample or for a sub-sample 
of the respondents in order to correct for misreporting in the model for the main study. In 
case several validation studies are available, they can be easily integrated into our 
analysis by adapting the method proposed in Ibrahim and Chen (2000) to incorporate 
historical data in binary choice models, substituting ( )1 2, , |L γ γ β  in Equation 4.8 by: 
                                                         
                                                         ( )1 2
1
, , | d
D
d
L δγ γ β
=
∏ 
                               
                 (4.9), 
 
where { }1 2, ,..., D=     denotes the data from D  validation samples and  
{ }1 2, ,..., Dδ δ δ δ= ,  0 1dδ≤ ≤  can be assigned I.I.D. beta priors (Ibrahim and Chen 2000; 
Ibrahim, Ryan and Chen 1998). Note that, while we must assume that the same error 
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structure appears in the validated and nonvalidated samples and that the process 
generating misreporting is similar in both datasets, the covariates included in x  and 
{ }1 2,z zz =  do not have to be necessarily identical for both datasets. For instance, when 
estimating the determinants of the turnout decision, we could allow for election-specific 
factors affecting the turnout and the misreport probabilities, combining information from 
validation studies with experts' opinions, theoretical restrictions or even specifying 
diffuse priors for some of the predictors. Covariates that were not measured in previous 
studies can be incorporated into the analysis of the sample of interest by specifying the 
priors for these new covariates through the “initial” prior ( )1 2, ,p γ γ β  in Equation 4.8 
(Ibrahim et al. 2005).  
Even if we did not have access to a validation sample, several other sources of 
information, such as administrative records or even aggregate data could be used to 
impose informative constraints on the misclassification rates and improve the parameter 
estimates. For example, in the analysis of voter turnout, we could observe turnout rates in 
small geographic areas, such as counties or congressional districts, that could be used to 
specify the misreport probabilities for all individuals in the sample belonging to a given 
area. While it will not be generally possible to specify a generalized linear model of 
misreporting in such circumstances, hierarchical beta priors can be used to summarize 
auxiliary information available on misreporting patterns by location or relevant socio-
demographic characteristics (Dunson and Tindall 2000). Finally, if no relevant 
information to predict misreporting exists either in validation studies or other auxiliary 
data, constraints on the misreport probabilities could be imposed via elicitation of experts' 
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opinions. Our model would then be virtually identical to McInturff et al. (2004) and 
Paulino, Soares and Neuhaus (2003).  
Despite the advantages of our approach, it is worth mentioning that, like all parametric 
estimators, our model might be quite sensitive to distributional and modeling 
assumptions. Although semi-parametric methods have been used to estimate discrete 
choice models with misclassified dependent variables (Abrevaya and Hausman 1999; 
Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton 1998; Dustmant and van Soest 2004), they are 
also subject to potential misspecification (Molinari 2003). Moreover, in the case of 
covariate-dependent misclassification, available semi-parametric techniques require 
either sacrificing identification of some of the parameters in β  (Abrevaya and Hausman 
1999) or complex computations that are not likely to be attractive for practitioners and 
empirical researchers (Lewbel 2000). A different approach would be to adapt and 
implement non-parametric methods based on Manski (1985), Horowitz and Manski 
(1995) and Molinari (2003). In particular, the “direct misclassification approach" 
proposed by the latter allows incorporating prior information on the misreporting pattern 
to obtain interval identification of parameters of interest, and can be easily applied to the 
case in which misclassification depends on perfectly observed covariates with relatively 
little computational cost. However, as is well known, non-parametric methods are subject 
to the curse of dimensionality, which can pose a problem in applications where the 
misreporting probabilities might depend on a relatively large set of covariates, and is 
uncertain whether point identification can be achieved in this setting (Hu 2008). To the 
best of our knowledge, there is very little research comparing the performance of 
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parametric versus non-parametric methods to correct for covariate-dependent 
misclassification and evaluating the relative weaknesses and advantages of both 
approaches in applied work. 
 
4.2.3 Extending the model to account for missing data  
Besides measurement errors, survey data is often plagued with large proportions of 
missing outcome and covariate values due to non-response or loss of data. As is well 
known, unless the data are missing completely at random (MCAR), using list-wise 
deletion and restricting the analysis only to those respondents who are completely 
observed can lead to biased estimates (Little and Rubin 2002; Chen et al. 2008).56 
Furthermore, even if the data are MCAR, complete-case analyses may lead to discard a 
large proportion of observations and can be therefore quite inefficient (Ibrahim et al. 
2005). Ad-hoc approaches to dealing with missing data, such as excluding covariates 
subject to missingness from the analysis or using mean imputation, are easy to implement 
but exhibit several potential problems such as biased estimates, inefficiency and 
misspecification (Chen et al. 2008; Ibrahim et al. 2005; Gelman and Hill 2007).57
                                                 
56 It is worth mentioning, however, that there are situations in which inference based on a 
complete-case analysis might yield unbiased estimates and outperform imputation methods 
even when the data are not missing completely at random (Little and Wang 1996). 
57 A detailed review of different methods commonly used to handle missing data is beyond the 
scope of this paper. See Horton and Kleinman (2007), Ibrahim et al. (2005), Little and Rubin 
(2002) and Schafer and Graham (2002), among others, for a detailed discussion. 
 On the 
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other hand, Bayesian methods such as the one presented in this paper can easily 
accommodate missing data. There is no distinction between missing data and parameters 
within the Bayesian framework, and thus inference in this setting essentially requires 
defining a prior for the missing values and sampling from the joint posterior distribution 
of the parameters and missing values, incorporating just an “extra-layer” in the Gibbs 
sampling algorithm compared to the complete-case analysis (Gelman et al. 2004; Ibrahim 
et al. 2005). In particular, our model can be immediately extended to deal with missing 
response and covariate values, including cases with missing responses alone, with 
missing covariates alone, and with missing covariates and responses. This allows us to 
accommodate item and unit nonresponse in both the main and the validation studies.58
Let 
 
( )',1 ,2 ,, ,... ,  1,..,i i i i pw w w i N=w =  denote a 1p×  vector of covariates included in 
ix , 
1
iz  and 
2
iz , and denote the marginal density of iw  by ( )|ip αw , where α  
parametrizes the joint distribution of the covariates. Adopting the notation in Chen et al. 
(2008), we write ( ), ,,i i obs i misw = w w , where ,i misw  is the 1iq ×  vector of missing 
components of iw , 0 iq p≤ ≤ , and ,i obsw  is the observed portion of iw . Similarly, we use 

,i misy if the self-reported outcome  iy  is missing, and  ,i obsy otherwise. We assume that the 
missing data mechanism is ignorable (Rubin 1976; Little and Rubin 2002). That is, we 
assume that the missing data mechanism does not depend on the missing values, but may 
depend on the observed outcome and covariate data included in the model - i.e., the data 
                                                 
58 However, as seen in Equation 3.11 below, respondents with completely missing outcomes and 
covariates do not contribute to the likelihood function. 
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are missing at random (MAR) - and that the parameters governing the missing data 
mechanism are distinct from the parameters of the sampling model. The observed-data 
likelihood for the main study can then be written as: 
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(4.10) 
 
which, as noted by Chen et al. (2008), reduces to: 
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As suggested by Ibrahim, Chen and Lipsitz (2002), it is often convenient to model the 
joint distribution ( )|ip αw  as a series of one-dimensional conditional distributions: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,1 ,2 , , ,1 ,2 , 1
, 1 ,1 ,2 , 2 1 ,1 1
, ,... | | , ,... ,
                                     | , ,... , ... |
i i i p i p i i i p p
i p i i i p p i
p w w w p w w w w
p w w w w p w
α α
α α
−
− − −
= ×
× ×
                    
(4.12), 
 
where ,  1,.., ,l l pα =  is a vector of parameters for the l lth conditional distribution, the lα
's are distinct, and ( )1 2, ,..., pα α α α= . As noted by these authors, specification 4.12 has 
the advantages of easing the prior elicitation for α  and reducing the computational 
burden of the Gibbs algorithm required for sampling from the observed data posterior, 
and is particularly well-suited for cases in which w  includes categorical and continuous 
covariates. While the modeling of the covariate distributions depends on the order of the 
conditioning, Ibrahim, Chen and Lipsitz (2002) show that posterior inferences are 
generally quite robust to changes in the order of the conditioning. Obviously, 4.12 needs 
to be specified only for those covariates that have missing values. If some of the 
covariates in w  are completely observed for all respondents in a survey, they can be 
conditioned on when constructing the distribution of the missing covariates.  
The joint posterior density of the unknown parameters based on the observed data is 
then given by: 
                            ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2, , , | , , , | , , ,obs obsp L pγ γ β α γ γ β α γ γ β α∝ × 
             
(4.13). 
 
Information on the misreport patterns and on all the parameters of interest can be incorporated 
from the validation study in essentially identical way as in the case with no missing data. A joint 
prior for ( )1 2, , ,γ γ β α could be specified as: 
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                ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , | obsp L p p p p
δγ γ β α γ γ β α γ γ β α∝ × × × ×
  
(4.14), 
 
where ( )1 2, , , | obsL γ γ β α   is obtained from the complete-data likelihood of the 
validation study: 
                        ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2, , , | , | , , , ,  obs mismisL p d y dγ γ β α γ γ β α= ∫ ∫ y y w w                (4.15) 
 
 
and, as mentioned above, δ  is a scalar prior parameter that weights the validated data 
relative to the data from the main study.59

iy
 Note that our specification allows for missing 
responses  and covariate values in the validated sample as well, and can accommodate 
cases in which the missing self-reported variable depends on the true iy . As in the case of 
no missing data, it is also possible to incorporate only the information from the observed 
probability of misreporting in the validation study to specify the priors for 1γ , 2γ  and a 
subset α z  of the components of α  for the main study, while using diffuse prior 
distributions for the remaining parameters. However, the additional information obtained 
from ( )1 2, , , | obsL γ γ β α   can increase efficiency in many missing data problems in 
which certain parameters in the likelihood function are not identifiable and/or very little 
information is available for inference, particularly when the “gold-standard” measure iy
is observed for a large proportion of the respondents in the validation study (Ibrahim, 
Chen and Lipsitz 2002; Reilly and Pepe 1995; Robins, Rotnitzky and Zhao 1994). 
                                                 
59 See Section 4 in Ibrahim, Chen and Lipsitz (2002) for details. 
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In principle, it is possible to extend this approach to the case of non-ignorably 
missing values following Huang, Chen and Ibrahim (1999), Ibrahim and Lipsitz (1996) 
and Ibrahim, Lipsitz and Chen (1999). However, there is usually little information on the 
missing data mechanism, and the parameters of the missing data model are often quite 
difficult to estimate (Ibrahim, Lipsitz and Horton 2001). The plausibility of the MAR 
assumption can be enhanced by including additional individual and contextual variables 
in the model specification (Gelman et al. 2004; Gelman, King and Liu 1998). 
 
4.3   A Monte Carlo experiment 
In this section, we conduct a series of simulation analyses aimed at illustrating the 
problems of ignoring misreporting in practice, comparing the performance of our solution 
vis-à-vis alternative parametric models proposed in the literature to account for 
misreporting, and assessing the sensitivity of the estimates from our model to the 
specification of the underlying model of misreporting. 
 
4.3.1 Comparison of alternative approaches to dealing with misreporting  
Based on the Monte Carlo design in Neuhaus (1999), we simulated 2,000 observations 
for two covariates: 1x  is drawn from a standard normal distribution, and 2x  is a dummy 
variable equal to one with probability 1/ 2 . The true response iy  was generated as: 
                               
                                            ( )0 1 ,1 2 ,2 0i i i iy I x xβ β β ε= + + + ≥ , 
 
  
128 
where ( )I E  is the indicator function equal to one if E  is true and zero otherwise, 
( ) ( )0 1 2, , 1,1,1β β β = −  and iε  drawn from a ( )0,1N distribution.   
The misreport probabilities 1|0iπ and 
0|1
iπ  were chosen such that: i) average  
misclassification rates are symmetric and take values of 2%, 5%, 10% and 20%; ii) 
different possible relationships between 1|0,i iπx and 
0|1
iπ are taken into account. This 
allows us to determine whether and to what extent ignoring misclassification affects the 
parameter estimates for different rates of misreporting and for different correlation 
patterns between the covariates of interest, the true response and the misreport 
probabilities. For reasons of space, we only present the results for the two basic scenarios 
considered by Neuhaus (1999), denoted as Designs A and B.60 1|0iπ In Design A, and 
0|1
iπ  
are independent of the covariates in x ; the observed response  iy  was generated by 
randomly changing iy  according to the constant misreport probabilities. Under Design B, 
the binary covariate 2x  is assumed to be strongly positively correlated with 
1|0
iπ but 
negatively related to 0|1iπ ;  iy  in this scenario was generated from iy  as a function of 2x , 
as indicated in Table 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A. This corresponds, for instance, to the 
situation described in previous analysis of voter turnout that found overreporting to be 
clearly correlated with race (Abramson and Claggett 1984, 1986a,b, 1991; Hill and 
                                                 
60 Simulations were also carried out allowing for 1|0 0|1i iπ π≠ . The results for the entire set of 
simulation exercises are available from the authors upon request. 
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Hurley 1984; Sigelman 1982). For all simulated datasets, we impose the monotonicity 
condition 1|0 0|1 1i iπ π+ <  (Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton 1998).       
In order to apply the methodology developed in Section 4.1.2, we randomly selected 
half of the observations in the sample and assigned them to be the validation study. The 
remaining 1,000 observations were assigned to be the main sample under analysis, and 
we ignored the true response and the information on the misclassification probabilities for 
these observations, using the information on conditional misreport probabilities from the 
validation study to fit the model in Equation 4.8 with 1x  and 2x  as regressors both in the 
response and the misreport models. Since the validation study is a random sub-sample of 
the main study, a point mass prior δ  = 1 with probability 1 was used, equally weighting 
the validated and main samples.61
                                                 
61 Changes in the values of 
 It is worth noting that, following Equation 4.7, we 
adopt a probit specification for the misreport probabilities, despite the fact that using a 
probit link to estimate a binary choice model with non-normal error terms can yield 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates (Horowitz 1993). However, as mentioned 
above, the main purpose of our method is to improve inferences on the conditional 
distribution of the true response given some covariates of interest rather than to estimate 
the conditional misreport probabilities. Adopting a probit specification commonly used 
by practitioners for the underlying misreport model allows us to assess how robust are the 
δ  have relatively little effect on the parameter estimates in our 
setting. See the results in Section 3.4.3. 
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estimates of β  to common misspecification errors likely to emerge in applied work.62
We compared the estimates from our method with those obtained using a standard 
probit model ignoring misreporting, as well as from two alternative approaches proposed 
in the literature to correct for misclassification. Model A-1 is similar to Hausman, 
Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998)'s parametric estimator, assuming constant 
misclassification probabilities and ignoring the information from the auxiliary data. 
Model A-2 also assumes covariate-independent misreporting, but information on the 
posterior distribution of  
 
In 4.3.2 we examine the sensitivity of our method to various forms of misspecification of 
the misreport model in more detail.       
1|0
iπ and 
0|1
iπ from the validation study is used to define ( )1|0ip π  
and ( )0|1ip π for the main sample, as suggested in Prescott and Garthwaite (2002, 2005). 
All models were fit via MCMC methods, assigning independent (0,100)N  priors for the 
components of β . The parameters in 1γ  and 2γ  under model were assigned independent 
(0,100)N distributions, while independent ( , )Beta c d  priors were specified for 1|0iπ and 
0|1
iπ  under Models A-1 and A-2. c  and d were set equal to 1 for Model A-1 and extracted 
from the misclassification rates in the validated sample for Model A-2.63
                                                 
62 Clearly, researchers should also worry about misspecified response models, but this problem is 
common to all parametric binary choice models. 
  
63 See Section 2 in Prescott and Garthwaite (2002). All the models were fit in WinBUGS 1.4. 
Three parallel chains of length 50,000 with over-dispersed initial values and a 5,000 period 
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Tables 4.A.2 and 4.A.3 in Appendix 4.A report the posterior means and central 
95% credible intervals for all the parameter estimates from the four different estimation 
approaches, and Figure 4.1 below plots the approximate posterior density for the 
coefficient of the binary covariate 2x . As the amount of misclassification increases, the 
point estimates (means and medians) for all the parameters under the standard probit 
specification become further away from the true values. The central 95% credible 
intervals from the model ignoring misclassification fail to cover the true ( )0 1 2, ,β β β  for 
average misreport probabilities larger than 5% under Design A, as well as the true 
coefficients of the simulated covariates under Design B. However, even for average 
misclassification rates 1|0iπ and 
0|1
iπ  as low as 0.05, the true coefficient of 1x  lies outside 
the credible intervals from the probit model under both experimental designs. In contrast, 
under our proposed estimation solution, the point estimates for all the parameters are 
much closer to the true β  and the central 95% intervals cover them for all values of 1|0iπ
and 0|1iπ  under the two simulation scenarios. Similar results (not shown) are obtained for 
the ratios of the estimated coefficients of the simulated covariates with respect to the 
intercept. We also note that the standard deviations for the estimates under our model 
tend to be larger than for the simple probit model due to the fact that our model captures 
the additional uncertainty in the true latent variable iy  induced by misreporting 
                                                                                                                                                 
burn-in were run for each model; convergence was assessed based on Gelman and Rubin's 
estimated Potential Scale Reduction Factor (Gelman and Rubin 1992). 
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(McGlothlin, Stamey and Seaman 2008; Neuhaus 1999). For the same reason, the 
standard deviations from our model increase considerably with the amount of 
misclassification.  
A comparison with the two alternative approaches to correct for misreporting shows 
that, when 1|0iπ and 
0|1
iπ  are assumed constant, the estimates from our method do not differ 
substantially from those obtained under Model A-2. The widths of the central 95% 
credible intervals are also similar for both models, even though we might have expected 
that the stronger distributional assumptions about the misreport process adopted in our 
approach should lead to narrower intervals (Prescott and Garthwaite 2005). In the case of 
covariate-dependent misreporting, however, the performance of Model A-2 worsens 
markedly. In particular, as seen Figure 4.1, the posterior mean for 2β  becomes 
implausibly large as the misclassification rates and the correlation between 2x  and the 
misreport probabilities increase, and the point estimates for the intercept also become far 
away from the true 0β . Model A-1, on the other hand, fails to converge for all 
1|0
iπ and 
0|1 0.02iπ > under Design B, and performs much worse than our model and Model A-2 
also in the case of constant misclassification rates.  
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Figure 4.1  
Estimated posterior densities for 2β across models 
 
    Note: The graph compares marginal posterior density for 2β  under four different estimation     
    approaches: our proposed method (solid curve), a probit model ignoring misreporting (dashed  
    curve), Model A-1 (double-dashed curved) and Model A-2 (dotted curve). The solid vertical line  
   denotes the true parameter value. 
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Furthermore, as seen in Table 4.A.4 in Appendix 4.A, Model A-1 yields markedly 
biased and imprecise estimates of the average  misclassification rates in the main sample, 
indicating that assigning diffuse distributions for ( )1|0ip π and ( )0|1ip π when the data 
provides very little information to estimate the misreport probabilities results in very 
volatile and inaccurate estimates for the parameters of interest, even when the Hausman, 
Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998)' s identification condition 1|0 0|1 1i iπ π+ < holds for all 
the cases. In contrast, the point and interval summaries of the posterior distributions 
under our proposed model and under Model A-2 are quite similar in most cases, although 
the credible intervals from the latter fail to cover the true average misreport rates in the 
scenario with covariate-dependent misreporting for 1|0 0|1, 20%.i iπ π =  
In order to illustrate the differences between inferences based on the alternative 
estimators, Figure 4.2 plots the estimated marginal effect of 1x  and 2x  on the probability 
that the response takes a value of 1 under the standard probit model ignoring 
misreporting, our proposed method, and the approach based on Prescott and Garthwaite 
(2002, 2005) (Model A-2). For both simulated covariates, the true average effects 
estimated using iy  as the dependent variable always lie comfortably within the central 
95% credible intervals from our model under both Monte Carlo designs and for all the 
misclassification rates considered. The maximal differences between the point estimates 
from our model and the true effects are at most of 2 and 8 percentage points for 1x  and 
2x , respectively. In contrast, the “naïve” probit model systematically underestimates the 
marginal effect of 1x  in the two simulation scenarios and leads to strongly biased 
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estimates for the effect of 2x  for 
1|0 0|1, 10%.i iπ π =  The differences in the performance 
of the two models increase with the prevalence of misreporting and are most notorious in 
the case in which 1|0iπ and 
0|1
iπ  depend on 2x . For 
1|0 0|1, 0.2i iπ π = , the effect of 1x  
estimated without adjusting for misclassification is less than half the true value, and the 
marginal effect of 2x  is overestimated by more than 30 percentage points. Also, while the 
marginal effects estimated using our approach and Model A-2 are quite similar under the 
scenario with constant misclassification rates, our model performs much better than 
Model A-2 when misreporting is covariate-dependent. In fact, for the binary covariate 2x , 
ignoring misreporting yields more accurate estimates of the marginal effects than 
incorporating information from the validation sample in the way suggested by Prescott 
and Garthwaite (2002, 2005). 
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Figure 4.2 
Marginal covariate effects 
 
 Note: The graph compares the marginal effects of the two simulated covariates 1x  and 2x  
estimated under three different approaches: a standard probit model, our method correcting for 
misreporting, and Model A-2. The center dots correspond to the posterior means, the vertical 
lines to the central 95% credible intervals, and the horizontal lines represent the average effects 
(dashed) and 95% intervals (dotted) estimated using iy  as the response. 
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We also fit our model using several different specifications for the model of 
misreporting and found again that the point estimates of { }0 1 2, ,β β β β=  and the 
marginal covariate effects under our approach are closer to the true values than under any 
of the alternative methods considered. Figure 4.3 illustrates this, plotting the marginal 
effects of 1x  and 1x  for Design B and 
1|0 0|1, 0.2π π =  under three alternative specifications 
for the linear predictor of the misreport model: adding an interaction term between 1x  and 
2x , omitting 1x , and including an additional variable that is not significantly related to 
either the misreport probabilities or the true response. The point estimates differ slightly 
across specifications and are more accurate for the average effect of the normally 
distributed covariate. Nonetheless, a comparison with the results in Figure 4.2 shows that 
our method performs considerably better than the other estimators under all the 
specifications of the misreport model considered. 
Hence, the evidence from this simulation study shows that, in the presence of 
misreporting, our method can considerably improve the accuracy of the parameter 
estimates with respect to standard binary choice models even for misclassification rates 
as low as 5%. When misreporting is covariate-dependent, our proposed estimation 
solution also performs considerably better than alternative approaches assuming constant 
misclassification rates, especially for non-trivial levels of misclassification. Differences 
in the parameter estimates obtained under alternative models may considerably affect 
inferences drawn from the sample under analysis, and thus ignoring misreporting or 
neglecting the potential correlation between the covariates of interest and the misreport 
probabilities could lead to quite different substantive conclusions. In addition, our results 
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indicate that using auxiliary information may be critical to improve identifiability and 
convergence properties of models correcting for misclassification in relatively small 
samples, such as those typically used in political science. 
 
Figure 4.3  
Marginal covariate effects under different specifications of the misreport model 
 
 
Note: The graph compares the marginal effects of 1x  and 2x  estimated under our proposed 
method, using three alternative specifications of the linear predictor in the model of misreporting. 
The center dots correspond to the posterior means, the vertical lines to the central 95% credible 
intervals, and the horizontal lines represent the average effects (dashed) and 95% intervals 
(dotted) estimated using iy  as the response. 
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4.3.2 Assessing robustness to the specification of the misreport model  
The results from the simulation study reported above indicate that the model proposed 
in this paper can successfully adjust for misreporting under different parametric models 
for the misclassification mechanism. Nonetheless, the sensitivity of our method to 
misspecification of the model of misreporting deserves further attention, since this may 
lead to inconsistent estimates of β  and affect inferences on the covariate of interest 
(Abrevaya and Hausman 1999; Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton 1998). In order to 
examine this issue in more detail, we draw on research analyzing a somewhat similar 
problem, namely, the sensitivity of the estimated treatment effects to the specification of 
the propensity score model (Drake 1993; Zhao 2008).  
Our main goal here is to examine the influence on the estimated covariate effects of 
misspecifying the disturbance distribution in the model of misreporting, omitting relevant 
covariates from the linear predictor, including variables not related to either the true 
response or the misreport probabilities and adding unnecessary nonlinear terms. 
Specifically, using the covariates and the true response from 4.3.1, we generate a 
dichotomous variable id  as:  
                                      
( )
( )
1,0 1,1 ,1 1,2 ,2
2,0 2,1 ,1 2,2 ,2
0 ;    if 0
0 ;   if 1
i i i i
i
i i i i
I x x y
d
I x x y
γ γ γ η
γ γ γ η
 + + + ≥ == 
+ + + ≥ =
 
 
 
where η  is an error term, and { }1 1,0 1,1 1,2, ,γ γ γ γ= , { }2 2,0 2,1 2,2, ,γ γ γ γ= are chosen to obtain 
different levels of misclassification and different degrees of correlation between the 
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simulated covariates and the misreport probabilities 1|0iπ and 
0|1
iπ . The observed 
response  iy  is in then generated as: 

( )
( )
1 ;         if 0
1 1 ;    if 1.
i i
i
i i
I d y
y
I d y
 = == 
− = =  
 
In order to analyze the sensitivity of our method to misspecification of the error 
disturbance in the model of misreporting, we follow Horowitz (1993); Drake (1993); 
Zhao (2008) and consider 4 distributions for η : a standard normal distribution, a logistic 
distribution, a bimodal distribution 0.5 (3,1) 0.5 ( 3,1)N Nη = + − , and heteroskedastic error 
terms ( )211,1 0.1N xη + . We also implement 4 alternative specifications for the linear 
predictor of the misreport model: 
                                    ,0 ,1 ,2Specification 1: ;k k ixα α+  
2
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,1Specification 2: ;k i k i k ix x xα α α+ +  
                           ( ),0 ,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,1 ,2Specification 3: ;k k i k i k i ix x x xα α α α+ + + ×  
          ,0 ,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,3Specification 4: ;k k i k i k ix x xα α α α+ + +  
 
with 1,2,k =  and 3x  drawn from a log-normal distribution. We examine the effect of both 
forms of misspecification separately -i.e., we correctly specify the linear predictor of the 
misreport model when analyzing the role of misspecified error distributions and use 
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standard normal errors when examining the influence of the functional form of the 
index term.64
Figure 4.4 reports the estimates of the marginal covariate effects when 
 
1x  is omitted 
from the linear predictor of the misreport model (Specification 1) for different values of 
1,1 2,1,γ γ  and average symmetric misreport rates of approximately 10% and 20%.
65
1x
 The 
estimates of the marginal effect of  worsen as the average misclassification rates increase 
and as the correlations between the covariate and the misreport probabilities increase. 
However, for all values of 1,1 2,1,γ γ , the estimates from our model are closer to the true 
marginal effects obtained using the true data than the estimates from a model ignoring 
misreporting. The estimates for 2x , on the other hand, are not affected by the omission of 
1x  from the model of misreporting and are again much more accurate than those from a 
standard probit model. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 We also let the covariates in 1z  and 2z  differ across speci fications and consider several values of 
1γ  and 2γ with little change in the main substantive results presented in this section. 
65 In all cases, we set 1,2 2,21.25, 1.25,γ γ= = −  and adjust the value of the intercept to achieve the 
desired average misclassification rates.  
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Figure 4.4 
Marginal covariate effects when 1x  is omitted from the misreport model
 
Note: The graph plots the marginal effects of 1x  and 2x  estimated under our method when 1x  is 
omitted from the linear predictor of the misreport model, for different values of 1γ  and 2γ . The 
center dots correspond to the posterior means, the vertical lines to the central 95% credible 
intervals, and the horizontal lines represent the average effects (dashed) and 95% intervals (dotted) 
estimated using iy as the response. 
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Table 4.1 complements the information from the figure, illustrating the influence of 
the other forms of misspecification considered for different values of  1|0 0|1 1, ,π π γ  and 2γ . 
In line with the results in 4.3.1, adding irrelevant covariates and unnecessary nonlinear 
terms to the linear predictor of the misreport model has relatively little influence on the 
estimated marginal effects, and the same holds for the case of misspecified disturbance 
distributions. In all cases, the true average covariate effects lie within the central 95% 
credible intervals from our model, and the point estimates are between 4 and 18 percentage 
points closer to the true values than those obtained ignoring misreporting. It is worth noting 
that the estimates of 1γ  and 2γ  can be far away from the true coefficients when the model 
of misreporting is misspecified, particularly when the error terms are bimodal or 
heteroskedastic (Horowitz 1993; Zhao 2008). However, the estimated covariate effects 
seem to be quite robust to the specification of the misreport model and much more accurate 
than those from standard parametric models when misclassification is non-negligible. We 
must note, though, that these results are based on limited simulation analyses and may not 
be true in general.  
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Table 4.1 
Marginal covariate effects under alternative specifications of the misreport model 
 Estimator 
 
( ) 11|P y x∂ = ∂x
 
( ) 21|P y x∂ = ∂x  
 True Model 0.25 (0.24, 0.27) 
0.25 
(0.21, 0.30) 
    
Linear predictor a     
 Specification 2 0.29 (0.24, 0.33) 
0.26 
(0.13, 0.38) 
    
 Specification 3 0.29 (0.24, 0.32) 
0.27 
(0.15, 0.38) 
    
 Specification 4 0.27 (0.15, 0.38) 
0.26 
(0.15, 0.38) 
    
Error disturbance    
 Logistic distribution b  
0.27 
(0.21, 0.32) 
0.23 
(0.09, 0.38) 
    
 Bimodal distribution c  
0.24 
(0.20, 0.28) 
0.21 
(0.10, 0.29) 
    
  Heteroskedatic c  
0.24 
(0.17, 0.29) 
0.28 
(0.17, 0.39) 
    
   
Different misreport models in both sub-samples e  
0.24 
(0.21, 0.28) 
0.30 
(0.21, 0.38) 
1|0 0|1
1,0 1,1 1,2 2,0 2,1 2,21.5, 0.05, 1.25, 0.2, 0.05, 1.25, , 0.2.
aγ γ γ γ γ γ π π= − = = = − = = − ≈  
1|0 0|1
1,0 1,1 1,2 2,0 2,1 2,21.75, 0.65, 1.3, 0.75, 0.2, 1.3, , 0.2.
bγ γ γ γ γ γ π π= − = = = − = = − ≈  
1|0 0|1
1,0 1,1 1,2 2,0 2,1 2,21.6, 0.5, 1.3, 1, 0.5, 1.3, , 0.1.
cγ γ γ γ γ γ π π= − = = = − = = − ≈  
1|0 0|1
1,0 1,1 1,2 2,0 2,1 2,22.05, 0.95, 0.1, 1.5, 2.5, 0.7, 0.1, 0.2.
d γ γ γ γ γ γ π π= − = = = − = − = − ≈ ≈
1|0 0|1, 0.1eπ π ≈  
             Validation sample: 1,0 1,1 1,2 2,0 2,1 2,21.8, 0.52, 1.3, 1.1, 0.5, 1.3.γ γ γ γ γ γ= − = = = − = = −  
             Main sample: 1,0 1,1 1,2 2,0 2,1 2,22.14, 0.89, 1.74, 1.22, 0.76, 1.32.γ γ γ γ γ γ= − = = = − = = −  
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We also conducted additional simulations assuming a slightly different misreport 
processes for the validated and the main samples. Specifically, the values of  1γ  and 2γ  in 
the main sample were obtained by adding uniformly distributed errors to the corresponding 
parameters from the validation study, preserving the amount of misclassification and the 
direction of the relationship between the covariates and the misreport probabilities but 
changing the magnitude of the effect of 1x  and  2x  on 
1|0
iπ and 
0|1
iπ . Again, as illustrated at 
the bottom of Table 4.1, the marginal effects estimated from our model are quite close to 
the true covariate effects. In contrast, the model ignoring misclassification systematically 
underestimates ( ) 11|P y x∂ = ∂x  and overestimates ( ) 21|P y x∂ = ∂x .  
 
4.3.3 Accounting for missing response and covariate values 
Finally, we compared the performance of our proposed method to other approaches in 
the presence of both misclassification and missing data. For this exercise, we draw 1x  from 
a standard normal distribution, as in 4.3.1, and simulate 2x  from a Bernoulli distribution 
with success probability modeled as ( ),2 0 1 ,1Pr 1i ix xφ φ = = Φ +  . We assume that ,1ix  is 
completely observed for all subjects, and that ,2ix  and the observed response 

iy  are 
missing at random (MAR) for some subjects. The missing mechanisms for  iy  and ,2ix  are:  
                                            
 ( )1,0 1,1 ,1 1,2 ,2Pr 1yi i im x xα α α = = Φ + +             and 
                                             
                                            ( )2 2,0 2,1 ,1Pr 1 ,xi im xα α = = Φ +              
 
where  1yim =  or 2 1
x
im =  if  iy  or ,2ix  is observed, and 0 otherwise. Using the same 
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Monte Carlo designs as in 4.3.1, we generated samples of 2,000 observations with 
various levels of misclassification and different patterns of missing covariates and 
response, ignoring the true response iy  for half of the sample.  
Table 4.2 illustrates the results for two combinations of misreporting and missing data 
patterns, contrasting the estimates of β  from our method with those from a probit model 
ignoring misclassification and from Model A-2, based on Prescott and Garthwaite (2002, 
2005).66
β
 For the three estimators, we use a fully Bayesian approach for inference with 
missing covariate and response values. In addition, we compare the estimates from our 
model under an all-case (AC) analysis – i.e., incorporating observations with missing 
values – and a complete-case (CC) analysis. (Chen et al. 2008). 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Posterior means and 95% credible intervals for  with missing data 
Average 
misreport 
probabilities 
Missing data  
patterns Estimator 0β  1β  2β  
  True values -1 1 1 
      
      
1|0
0|1
12%
18%
aπ
π
≈
≈
 
Only  :14.1%biy  
Only ,2 : 25.4%ix  

iy and ,2 :8.2%ix  
 
Ignoring 
Misreporting 
-0.98 
(-1.15, -0.83) 
0.55 
(0.44, 0.67) 
 
1.37 
(1.12, 1.63) 
 
                                                 
66 We omit the results for Model A-1 since, as seen before, this model fails to converge for large 
values of 1|0iπ and 
0|1
iπ . 
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  Proposed Method    
  AC -0.92 (-1.43, -0.55) 
0.82 
(0.55, 1.24) 
0.92 
(0.34, 1.59) 
 
  CC -0.72 (-1.31, -0.05) 
0.69 
(0.20, 1.21) 
 
0.67 
(0.34, 1.45) 
 
  Model A-2 -2.33 (-3.60, -1.41) 
1.61 
(0.94, 2.46) 
 
3.40 
(2.14, 5.13) 
 
      
1|0
0|1
8%
7%
cπ
π
≈
≈
 
Only  : 35.5%diy  
Only ,2 :11.8%ix  

iy and
,2 :13.9%ix  
 
Ignoring 
Misreporting 
-0.85 
(-1.06, -0.62) 
0.72 
(0.56, 0.89) 
 
1.05 
(1.72, 1.36) 
 
  Proposed Method    
  AC -0.94 (-1.43, -0.52) 
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c
i i i i i i i ix x x xπ π π π= = = =  
1,0 1,1 1,2 2,0 2,10.7, 0.45; 1.1, 0.7, 0.4.
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4.4 An empirical application: correcting for misreporting in the analysis of voter 
turnout  
Next, we illustrate the potential consequences of misreporting in the context of 
estimating the determinants of voter turnout and provide three different applications of 
our methodology using data from all the validated ANES surveys between the 1978 and 
1990.67
                                                 
67 We use data from the 1978–1990 validated studies in order to preserve the comparability of the 
survey questions regarding the conditions of the interview; we will use this information to 
model the conditional probability of misreporting. While we illustrate the application of our 
method analyzing ANES data in view of the fact that it is the most widely used survey for 
studying U.S. turnout (Burden 2000), the main substantive results reported in this Section hold 
for the Current Population Survey as well, and are available from the authors upon request.  
 This dataset comprises three Midterm (1978, 1986, 1990) and three Presidential 
elections (1980, 1984, 1988), and has the obvious advantage of allowing us to directly 
compare the estimates from our model to a known benchmark, i.e., the same model 
estimated directly on the validated vote. We assume the validated vote to be the “gold-
standard” measure of turnout, although there is considerable disagreement on this point 
(Burden 2000; Mcdonald 2007). The concern is that the validation studies are far from 
perfect. As stated at the outset, vote validation is expensive and difficult. The ANES is 
conducted in two parts, a pre-and post-election survey. In the studies from 1978, 1980, 
1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990 there were in total 11,632 completed post election surveys. 
Unfortunately of these completed surveys, the ANES was unable to validate 2,189 
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respondents, about 19.8 percent of the usable sample.68
                                                 
68 The rate of non-validation varies considerably across Election Studies, from around 2% of 
sample in 1978 to more than 31% in 1990.  
 The majority of these failures 
were caused either because no registration records were found or because the local 
election office refused to cooperate with the ANES. If we are willing to maintain the 
assumption that these errors are essentially random (in the sense of being independent of 
the characteristics of interest), then there is no real harm done. The measurement error 
will merely result in less efficient estimates of the misreporting model and a 
corresponding reduction in efficiency of the corrected turnout model. However, if there is 
systematic error, then we are just substituting one form of measurement error for another.  
In Section 4.4.1, we estimate a simple model of the determinants of the turnout 
decision using both self-reported and validated turnout as the dependent variable in order 
to assess the consequences of ignoring misreporting. In 4.4.2, we re-estimate the turnout 
model with self-reported vote but applying our proposed solution to correct for 
misreporting, using a random sample of each survey as a validation sub-study. In 4.4.3, 
we apply our correction for misreporting under an external validation design, using 
information from previous ANES studies to correct for misreporting in the main sample 
under analysis. Both applications are based on a complete-case analysis. We deal with the 
problem of incomplete data in 4.4.4, where we account for item and unit non-response 
using the model-based, fully Bayesian imputation approach described in Section 4.2.3.  
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4.4.1 Turnout misreporting in the 1978 – 1990 ANES  
As mentioned in the Introduction, it has long been established in the political science 
literature that survey respondents often report to have voted when they did not actually do 
so (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2008; Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 2001; Clausen 1968; 
Katosh and Traugott 1981; Miller 1952; Parry and Crossley 1950; Sigelman 1982; Silver, 
Anderson and Abramson 1986). Figure 4.5 illustrates the differences between turnout 
rates computed from self-reported and validated vote in the six ANES studies under 
analysis. Validated turnout is systematically lower than reported turnout, and while both 
rates tend to follow similar trends, differences vary considerably across years, ranging 
from 7 percentage points in 1990 to more than 15 percentage points in 1980. The 
percentage of survey respondents who claimed to have voted but did not do so according 
to the validated data was 17.3 percent, and more than 28% of those who did not vote 
according to the official records responded affirmatively to the turnout question. In 
contrast, only 84 respondents in the 1978-1990 ANES studies reported not voting when 
the official record suggested they did, representing 0.7% of the sample respondents. 
Additional descriptive statistics on vote misreporting in the 1978–1990 validated ANES 
can be found in Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B.  
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Figure 4.5 
Estimated turnout from self-reported vs. validated responses 
 
         Note: The graph shows the self-reported and validated turnout from the 1978 – 1990 
        ANES only in years for which there were vote validation studies. Reported turnout  
        rates are systematically larger than the validated ones.  
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In order to examine whether such high rates of overreporting affect inferences on 
the determinants of the turnout decision, we fit two hierarchical probit models allowing 
for election year and regional effects with both self-reported and validated turnout as the 
response variable:  
                                                
 ( )
   ( )
Reported
'
Pr ~ii i
t r ii
y y Bernoulli p
p xλ η β
 = 
= Φ + +
           and 
 
                                                
( )
( )
Validated
'
Pr ~i i i
i t r i
y y Bernoulli p
p xλ η β
 = 
= Φ + +  
 
where the 1,...,k K=  elements of β  are assigned diffuse prior distributions:  
           
                                                           ( )2,k kk N β ββ µ σ  
 
and ( )ttλ λ  and  ( )rrη η  are election-and region-random effects distributed:  
                                       ( )2~ , ,    1978,1980,1984,1986,1988,1990;t N tλ λλ µ σ =  
 
                                   ( )2~ , ,    Northeast,North Central, South, West.r N rη ηη µ σ =  
 
 
The regressors included in ix  are indicators for demographic and socio-economic 
conditions and political attitudes: Age, Church Attendance, Education, Female, Home 
owner, Income, Non-white, Party Identification and Partisan Strength. A description of 
the coding used for each of the variables may be found in Appendix 4.B. We should note 
that, while this specification includes some of the variables most commonly used in 
models of voter turnout found in the literature (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2008; Bernstein, 
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Chadha and Montjoy 2001; Highton 2004; Leighley and Nagler 1984; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980), it does not examine the effect of other factors we might plausibly 
believe could alter turnout, such as political information (Alvarez 1998) or differences in 
state-level ballot laws (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). The sample used in the analysis 
consists of 6,411 observations for the 6 elections under study and were constructed so 
that they are identical for both models. Only the respondents with no missing response or 
covariate values are included in the analysis; the remaining observations were dropped 
using list-wise deletion. 
Figure 4.6 presents the main results from both models.69
                                                 
69 Three parallel chains with dispersed initial values reached approximate convergence after 
50,000 iterations, with a burn-in period of 5,000 iterations. In order to ensure that inferences are 
data dependent, several alternative values for the hyperparameters were tried, yielding 
essentially similar results.  
 
 The left panel summarizes 
the posterior distribution of the model’s coefficients using self-reported vote as the 
dependent variable, and the right panel re-does the analysis with the ANES validated 
vote.  
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Figure 4.6 
Coefficients of the probit models for self-reported vs. validated turnout 
 
 Note: The graph summaries the posterior distribution of the coefficients of the turnout model, 
using self-reported and validated vote as the response variable. The center dots correspond to the 
posterior means, the thicker lines to the 50% credible intervals, and the thinner lines to the 95% 
credible intervals. 
 
 
Most of the parameter estimates are quite similar in both models, and inferences on the 
role of these predictors on the probability of voting agree with common expectations. For 
example, for both sets of estimates, older, wealthier and more educated respondents are 
more likely to turn out to vote. Also, strong partisans are on average 15 percentage points 
more likely to vote than independents, while respondents who attend church every week 
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are 0.12 more likely to turn out to vote than those who never attend. Likewise, 
respondents are much more likely to turn out to vote in Presidential than in Midterm 
elections, and are less likely to vote if they live in the South. These results are essentially 
similar using either reported or validated vote as the dependent variable. However, there 
are some interesting differences between the two sets of results regarding the role of 
some socio-demographic variables such as gender and race. In particular, the mean 
posterior of the coefficient for the race indicator is more than twice as large (in absolute 
value) using validated vote than using self-reported vote as the dependent variable.  
These differences in the parameter estimates can affect inferences drawn from both 
models regarding the impact of the covariates on the turnout decision. In order to 
illustrate this fact, Figure 4.7 plots the marginal effect of race on the probability of voting 
using reported and validated vote for each election under analysis. As seen in the figure, 
the negative effect of being Non-white on turnout is higher when validated vote is used as 
the response variable for each of the surveys considered: the average marginal effects 
(posterior means) are more than 6 percentage points higher than if we look only at the 
reported vote, with differences ranging from about 3 percentage points in the 1984 and 
1986 elections to almost 11 points in the 1978 and 1988 elections. While a researcher 
using reported turnout would conclude that race had no significant effect on the 
probability of voting in the 1978 and 1988 elections at the usual confidence levels, the 
results obtained using validated data indicate otherwise.70
                                                 
70 In the case of the 1988 election, the marginal effect of Non-white estimated from the self-
reported vote is not significant even at the 0.1 level.  
 Fitting a model of turnout 
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using reported vote as the dependent variable will therefore tend to overpredict the 
probability of voting among non-white respondents and might in some cases affect 
substantive conclusions about the effect of race on turnout.  
Figure 4.7 
Marginal effects of race on turnout 
 
            Note: The graph shows the marginal effect of the race indicator on the likelihood of voting     
           for each election year under study, using both reported and validated vote. The center dots  
            correspond to the point estimates (posterior means), the thicker lines to the 50% credible  
          intervals, and the thinner lines to the 95% credible intervals. 
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Finally, we examine whether over-reporting varies systematically with 
respondents’ characteristics, fitting a probit model for ( )Pr 1| 0iiy y= = . As with the 
turnout model, the misreport model is fairly simple. The predictors include four variables 
that have been shown to be strongly correlated with overreporting in previous studies: 
Age, Church Attendance, Education, Non-white, and Partisan Strength (Ansolabehere 
and Hersh 2008; Belli, Traugott and Beckman 2001; Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 
2001; Cassel 2003). In addition, we also include three additional covariates aimed at 
capturing some of the conditions of the interview.71
                                                 
71 All interviewers in the 1978 – 1990 ANES were asked to rate the level of cooperation and 
sincerity of the respondent after the completion of the survey.  
 The first is an indicator of whether 
the interview was conducted while the respondent was alone. According to the “social 
pressures” argument (Cahalan 1968; Loftus 1975), a respondent should be more likely to 
lie about voting if others will learn of the statement. The other two variables are the 
interviewers’ assessments of the respondents’ cooperation and sincerity during the 
interview. Point and interval summaries of the posterior distribution of the model’s 
parameters are presented in Figure 4.8.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
158 
Figure 4.8 
Determinants of misreporting 
 
 
            Note: The graph shows the parameter estimates for the model of over-reporting. The  
            center dots correspond to the point estimates (posterior means), the thicker lines to the  
          50% credible intervals, and the thinner lines to the 95% credible intervals. 
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In line with previous analyses, we find that overreporters tend to be more educated, 
older, more partisan, and are more likely to be regular church attendees. Also, consistent 
with the results reported in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, being nonwhite has a positive effect on 
the probability of misreporting vote status: non-whites are on average 0.05 more likely to 
overreport than their white counterparts, and this effect is significant at the 0.1 level. 
Several scholars have argued that African Americans and Latinos feel pressured to appear 
to have voted due to the struggles and sacrifices needed to gain voting rights for their 
racial or ethnic group (Abramson and Claggett 1984; Belli, Traugott and Beckman 2001; 
Hill and Hurley 1984), although recent research has suggested that the relationship 
between race and overreporting is much more complex than previously thought and 
depends on the demographic and geographical context (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2008; 
Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 2001; Fullerton, Dixon and Borch 2007).72
                                                 
72 It is worth mentioning that this relationship between race and vote over-reporting could also be 
associated to the socio-economic status of the non-white population. If it is the case that 
nonwhites, who are more concentrated in poorer areas, are more likely to be incorrectly 
validated or excluded from the validation studies because no records can be found (e.g., due to 
poorly staffed and maintained election offices), then this result -as well as those reported in 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 -could very well be an artifact. While it is difficult to rule this claim out, 
addressing this concern is beyond the focus of this paper. Hence, as noted above, we proceed as 
if the validated data provides “gold-standard” information on turnout, or is at least not subject 
to systematic bias. 
 None of the 
other variables has a statistically significant effect on misreporting at the usual 
confidence levels. In particular, the interviewers seem unable to pick up a “feeling” that 
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is not otherwise captured by the characteristics observable from the survey. This is 
probably caused by the fact that very few of the interviewers were willing to rank a 
respondent as uncooperative and/or insincere.73
0|1
iπ
  
Hence, the results from these simple models indicate that the probability of 
misreporting varies systematically with characteristics we might be interested in, and that 
failing to account for misreporting may affect parameter estimates and inferences about 
the determinants of voter turnout drawn from non-validated survey data. Unfortunately, 
as mentioned in the Introduction, the ANES has stopped conducting validation studies 
due to the cost and difficulty in collecting the data as well as to the fact that few 
researchers used the validated data. The next three sections allow us to evaluate the 
performance of our proposed method to correct for misreporting and improve estimates 
and inference obtained from self-reported turnout. Although our model accounts for the 
possibility of two types of misreporting, we saw before that virtually no one reports not 
voting when they did, and thus  would be poorly estimated (Prescott and Garthwaite 
2005). Therefore, in the applications below we will assume that 0|1 0iπ = , and we 
therefore only need to account for 1|0iπ . 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 Only 1.3% of all the respondents in the sample were ranked as uncooperative by the ANES 
interwievers, and only 0.7% were deemed to be “often insincere”. 
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4.4.2 Correcting for misreporting using a validation sub-sample  
We first apply our method assuming an internal validation design. As in the simulation 
exercise in Section 4.3.1, we randomly assign half of the respondents in each of the 1978–
1990 surveys to be the validation sub-study and ignore the validated data for the remaining 
respondents. We then used the information from the validated sub-sample to correct for 
over-reporting in the main sample, equally weighting both datasets.  
For illustrative purposes, we fit the same turnout and misreport models described in 
4.4.1 for all the ANES studies considered. Nonetheless, as indicated above, the probability 
of voting is considerably higher in Presidential than in Midterm elections, and it is likely 
that different factors affect turnout in different election years. More importantly, the 
patterns of overreporting have also been shown to differ substantially across types of races 
and election years (Cassel 2003). As a result, the misreport model does not predict over-
reporting very well: as seen in Figure 4.9, which shows the predicted probability of 
misreporting as a function of the linear predictor of the misclassification model, the 
covariates included in the specification do not allow clearly distinguishing overreporters 
from “truthful” voters. The mean error rate of the misreport model across election studies is 
36%, while a null model that simply predicts that no respondent overreports has an error 
rate of 31%. The model correctly classifies 64% of the survey respondents in cases, and the 
mean predicted probability of misreporting averaged across simulations is 0.45; ideally this 
would be near zero or one for the entire sample (Gelman and Hill 2007). Hence, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.10, the predicted average misreport rates are systematically 
underestimated for some election-years. Therefore, while the simulation results from 
Section 2 suggest that our approach is quite robust to misspecification of the misreport 
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model, we note that the performance of our proposed method would benefit from better 
modeling of the misreport process. 
Figure 4.9 
Estimated probability of misreporting for the respondents  
in the 1978 – 1990 ANES validated studies  
 
             Note: The graph shows the estimated probability of turnout overreporting for the 
             respondents in the (pooled) 1978 – 1990 ANES validated studies, as a function of 
             the linear predictor of the misreport model. The solid line represents the mean posterior  
            probabilities of misreporting, while the dashed lines correspond to the 95% credible  
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    intervals.  Dots represent the actual value of the misreport indicator.  
 
Figure 4.10 
Predicted and actual misreport rates, by election-year  
 
           Note: The graph plots the actual and predicted rates of misreporting for each of  
           the ANES election validated studies between 1978 and 1990. The white circles  
           represent the actual proportion of misreporters among the respondents in each study,  
           while the black dots correspond to the estimated proportions. Vertical lines represent  
           the 95% credible intervals for the predicted misreport rates. 
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 That said, the coefficients of the misreport model estimated using only half the 
sample do not generally differ substantially from those estimated using the whole sample, 
as illustrated in Figure 4.11, which plots the posterior distribution of selected parameters of the 
misreport model estimated for the two ANES studies with lowest (1978) and largest (1984) 
percentage of overreporters (See Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B). More importantly, Figure 
4.12 summarizes the posterior distribution of the coefficients of selected regressors 
estimated using validated, self-reported vote, and corrected self-reports for these two 
election years. Assuming that the parameters estimated using validated vote are the 
“correct” estimates, the point estimates (posterior means) from our model for the two 
elections are between 32% and 92% closer to the “true” values of each of the parameters 
than the estimates ignoring overreporting. In addition, like the “true” estimate, the 
estimate of Non whiteβ −  under our approach is significantly negative at the 0.05 level for the 
1978 ANES. 
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Figure 4.11 
Posterior distributions of selected coefficients of the misreport model 
 
          Note: The figure compares the posterior densities of selected coefficients of the  
          misreport model for the 1978 and 1984 ANES studies. The solid lines plot the  
         posterior distributions of the parameters estimated using the whole sample for each  
         survey, while the dashed lines represent the estimates obtained using only half  
         of the sample.  
 
 
 
  
166 
Figure 4.12 
Posterior summaries for selected parameters under an internal validation design
 
      Note: The figure plots point and interval summaries of the posterior distributions of selected      
     coefficients for the 1978 and 1984 ANES Presidential elections, using corrected, self-reported,  
      and validated vote. The center dots correspond to the posterior means, the thick horizontal  
      lines to the central 50% credible intervals, and the thin lines to the central 95% credible  
      intervals from the three different models. 
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Figure 4.13, in turn, plots the marginal effect of race on the probability of voting 
estimated using our approach to correct for misreporting. A comparison of the results in 
the left panel of the figure with those presented in Figure 4.7 above shows that, after 
correcting for misreporting, the impact of race in the 1978 and 1988 elections is now 
statistically significant at the usual confidence levels. Moreover, as seen in the right 
panel, the point estimates from our model are closer to the “true” effects than those 
estimated from the model using self-reported vote for all the ANES studies, with 
differences ranging between 1 and 9 percentage points. Therefore, the evidence presented 
in this Section indicates that, even with the very simple model of misreporting estimated 
here, the improvements in the accuracy of the parameter estimates obtained using our 
method are important, and can eventually change the substantive conclusions drawn 
regarding the effect of relevant covariates on the turnout decision.  
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Figure 4.13 
Marginal effect of race on turnout estimated under our proposed method 
 
  Note: The left panel of the graph plots the point and interval (50% and 95%) estimates of the     
  marginal effect of race on the probability of voting estimated from our model to correct for   
  misreporting. The right panel compares the point estimates from our model and the model  
  ignoring misreporting with the estimates obtained using the validated data. 
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4.4.3 Correcting for misreporting using an external validation design 
We also apply our correction for misreporting assuming an external validation design, 
ignoring the validated vote for the sample under analysis and incorporating information 
on the misreport probabilities and regression parameters from other ANES studies. Figure 
4.14 illustrates the results of this exercise, plotting the marginal posterior distribution of 
selected coefficients for the 1988 and 1992 Presidential elections obtained by updating 
the corresponding posteriors from previous validated ANES surveys. 
The upper panel the compares the posterior distributions of Educationβ , Incomeβ , Non whiteβ −  
and  Partisan Strengthβ  for the 1988 ANES, the last Presidential election for which vote 
validation is available, using validated, self-reported and corrected vote. In order to 
implement our correction for misreporting, we used auxiliary data from the two previous 
Presidential elections for which validated turnout data was collected (1980 and 1984). As 
seen in the figure, the marginal posterior means and modes from the model accounting 
for overreporting are in all cases closer to “true” values than those obtained from the 
unadjusted self-reports. Again, as the “correct” estimate, the estimate of Non whiteβ −  under 
our model is significantly negative at the 0.05 level. In the case of the 1992 ANES, for 
which there is no validated data, we implemented our correction for misreporting using 
information from the previous presidential elections for which vote validation was 
conducted (1980, 1984 and 1988) and compared the estimates from our model with those 
from a model using self-reported vote. As seen in the lower panel of Figure 4.14, the 
posterior distribution of some of the parameters - Educationβ ,  Partisan Strengthβ - remain 
essentially unchanged when applying the correction for misreporting.  
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Figure 4.14 
Posterior densities of β  under an external validation design  
Note: The figure compares the posterior densities of selected coefficients for the 1988 and 1992 
Presidential elections. The solid lines plot the posterior distributions of the parameters estimated 
from the validated vote, the dotted lines represent the estimates obtained using self-reported vote, 
and the dashed lines the ones obtained adjusting for misreporting.  
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However, using auxiliary information does affect the posterior distribution of the 
coefficients of Income and Non-white. In particular, accounting for misreporting 
substantially affects the marginal posterior distribution of Non whiteβ − : the mean posterior is 
more than twice as large (in absolute value) when using the corrected self-reports, and the 
effect of Non-white on the probability of turning out to vote is significantly negative at 
the 0.05 level, while it is not significant even at the 0.2 level when estimated using self-
reported vote. Similar results hold when applying our model to correct for misreporting in 
the 1994 ANES -for which, again, vote validation was not conducted -using validated 
turnout data from previous Midterm elections. 
We also conducted a series of sensitivity analyses aimed at assessing the robustness of 
the parameter estimates to changes in the composition of the auxiliary data used to 
correct for misreporting and in the weight assigned to the validated vis-à-vis the main 
sample. Figure 4.15 summarizes some of the results for the 1988 and 1992 ANES. The 
left panel plots point and interval summaries for Non whiteβ −  from our model for the 1988 
ANES using two different sets of values for the weighting parameters dδ  in Equation 4.9: 
a point mass prior 1dδ =  with probability 1 d∀ , and uniform Beta(1, 1) priors d∀ , 
where 1980,1984d = . In the first case, the validated and main samples are pooled 
together and the estimates of β  for the main sample are obtained by updating the 
posteriors from the previous ANES surveys via Bayes’ theorem. In the second case, we 
allow for different a posteriori weights for each of the validated samples, thus 
accommodating heterogeneity between the previous ANES studies. The right panel, in 
turn, compares the estimates from our model for the 1992 for the cases in which only 
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validated data from the immediate previous (1988) or from all the previous (1980, 
1984, 1988) Presidential elections is used to adjust for misreporting.74
 
Note: The graph summarizes the posterior distribution of 
 For both election 
years, the estimates from our model are compared to those from the unadjusted self-
reports. 
Figure 4.15 
Sensitivity analysis for the external validation design  
Non whiteβ −  from our model for the 1988 
and 1992 elections, using alternative strategies to incorporate information from previous validated 
ANES studies. The estimates are compared to those obtained using self-reported vote. The center 
dots correspond to the posterior means, the thicker lines to the 50% credible intervals, and the 
thinner lines to the 95% credible intervals. 
                                                 
74 For the 1992 ANES, we fixed the value of  δ  at 1 for this sensitivity analysis.  
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As illustrated in the figure, the posterior standard deviations of β  tend to decrease 
with the amount of auxiliary data used to correct for misreporting in the main sample, but 
the point estimates (posterior means) and the main substantive conclusions about β  seem 
to be quite robust to changes in the values of δ  and in the size and heterogeneity of the 
auxiliary data. In particular, correcting for overreporting using information from previous 
validated studies leads to stronger negative effects of being Non-white on the probability 
of voting than using self-reported vote, with differences of approximately 4 and 9 and 
percentage points for the 1988 and 1992 ANES, respectively.  
4.4.4. Accounting for item and unit non-response  
 
Both applications of our methodology in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 have been based on 
a complete-case analysis, including in the sample only those respondents for whom both 
the response to the turnout question and all the relevant covariates are completely 
observed. When respondents with missing covariates differ systematically from those 
with complete data with respect to the outcome of interest, this approach may lead to 
significantly biased parameters and inference (Little and Rubin 2002). In our sample 
from the 1978–1990 ANES studies, 14.5% of whites and 20.9% of non-whites have 
missing covariate values (other than race), and the percentage of missingness for the self-
reported vote is almost 1.8 times larger for the latter. Since the evidence above indicates 
that voting patterns vary systematically with race, inferences from a complete-case 
analysis may be quite misleading in this setting (Ibrahim et al. 2005). In addition, list-
wise deletion due to missing values in the response variable and/or the predictors leads to 
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discard almost 45% of the respondents in the 1978–1990 ANES and more than two-
thirds of the respondents in the 1994 ANES, so that complete-case analyses are extremely 
wasteful and potentially inefficient. Table 4.B.2 in Appendix 4.B reports the rates of item 
nonresponse for all the variables included in the turnout models from Sections 4.4.2 and 
4.4.3.  
In order to accommodate item and unit non-response, we implement the approach 
described in Section 4.2.3, fitting a separate model for each of the ANES studies.75 Based 
on Equation 4.12, we specified probit regression models for all the dichotomous 
covariates in the model – Female, Non-white, Own Home, and Alone – while the 
remaining categorical covariates were assigned conditional normal distributions and 
discrete values were afterwards imputed for the missing responses (Lipsitz and Ibrahim 
1996; Gelman, King and Liu 1998).76
α
 In all cases, we assigned vague independent normal 
priors for the components of .  
Figure 4.16 illustrates the results for the 1978 and 1992 ANES. For the former, 31% of 
the survey respondents have at least 1 missing covariate value, and 0.5% of the 
respondents failed to answer the turnout question, while the corresponding rates for the 
latter are 47% and 9%, respectively. A complete-case analysis would keep 77% of our 
                                                 
75 See Gelman, King and Liu (1998) for an approach to multiple imputation for multiple surveys 
using hierarchical modeling.  
76 The substantive results are essentially unchanged if, instead of the normal distributions, one-
dimensional conditional gamma distributions are specified for these covariates, all of which are 
strictly positive. 
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sample for the 1978 ANES, and only 42% for the 1992 ANES. The left panel of the 
figure summarizes the marginal posterior distribution of Non whiteβ −  for the 1978 ANES 
using reported, validated and corrected vote. As in Section 4.4.2, our correction for 
misreporting was implemented based on auxiliary information from a random sub-sample 
of the ANES survey. The right panel plots the estimates for the 1992 ANES, for which 
we use validated turnout data from the previous Presidential elections, as in Section 4.4.3. 
In both cases, estimates obtained using Bayesian imputation are compared to those from 
the complete-case analyses.  
Two interesting facts emerge from the figure. First, for both election-studies, the 
marginal posterior distribution for Non whiteβ −  estimated using our Bayesian imputation 
model is not statistically different from that obtained using list-wise deletion, at least at 
the 0.05 level. However, the standard errors tend to be lower when missing values are 
imputed than under list-wise deletion. This result holds in fact for most of the election-
years under analysis, suggesting that by omitting the cases with missing values, much 
information is lost on the variables that are completely or almost completely observed, 
thus leading to less efficient parameter estimates (Ibrahim, Chen and Lipsitz 2002; 
Ibrahim et al. 2005). This is likely to be an important concern in the Election Studies 
examined here, given that there is substantial variation in the rates of item non-response, 
with most of the variables exhibiting relatively low percentage of missing values while a 
few others show very high rates of non-response (see Appendix 4.B).  
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Figure 4.16 
Posterior summaries for Non whiteβ − with list-wise deletion versus Bayesian imputation  
 
Note: The graph plots point and interval summaries for Non whiteβ −  for the 1978 and 1992 ANES, 
using list-wise deletion and fully Bayesian imputation. The center dots correspond to the point 
estimates (posterior means), and the horizontal bars indicate the 90% and 50% credible intervals 
for the models with imputed missing values. 
 
 
 
Second, imputing missing values does not change the substantive findings reported 
above regarding the performance of our methodology. The results for the 1978 ANES 
show that the estimated effects from our model correcting for misreporting are again 
closer to the benchmark case – using validated vote– than the effects estimated using 
recalled vote, and this result holds for all the ANES with validated vote. For the 1992 
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election, the marginal effect of race obtained from the corrected turnout model is also 
higher than in the uncorrected model, as was in the obtained from the corrected turnout 
model is also higher than in the uncorrected model, as was in the complete-case analysis. 
For both elections, once again, the main substantive conclusions regarding the effect of 
being Non-white on the probability of voting drawn from the model correcting for 
misreporting differ from those obtained using recalled vote. 
 
4.5   Concluding remarks 
Survey data are usually subject to measurement errors, generally referred to as 
classification errors when affecting discrete variables. In the political science literature, 
misclassification of binary dependent variables has received considerable attention in the 
context of estimating the determinants of voter turnout. High rates of overreporting have 
been documented in survey instruments commonly used to study turnout in the U.S., such 
as the American National Election Study (ANES) and the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), and most previous research has found that misreporting varies systematically with 
some of the relevant characteristics affecting the turnout decision.  
In the presence of misreporting, standard binary choice models will generally yield 
biased parameter estimates and inaccurate standard errors and may lead to erroneous 
substantive conclusions. This paper develops a simple Bayesian method to correct for 
misreporting using information on the misreport mechanism from auxiliary data sources. 
Our model does not require full validation studies to be conducted every time a 
researcher is concerned about potential misreporting. As long as enough data exists to 
reasonably estimate the misreporting probabilities, our approach can be applied for 
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drawing inference from the non-validated samples, improving the accuracy of the 
parameter estimates and inferences on the effect of covariates of interest on the true 
response vis-à-vis standard models ignoring misclassification and methods assuming 
constant misreport rates. This is clearly important, since obtaining “gold-standard” data is 
usually quite expensive and time consuming, and thus restricting the analysis only to 
validated studies will generally lead to discard large amounts of useful information, as in 
the case of the ANES.  
The proposed model is fully general and modular, can be easily implemented using 
freely available software, and can be readily applied in the case of missing data in the 
response and/or covariates. While we illustrate our technique using turnout data from the 
American National Election Study, it could be applied in general to account for potential 
misclassification of a binary dependent variable in many other situations in which 
auxiliary data on the misreport structure is available (Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz 
2001; Molinari 2003). Extensions to more general discrete choice models are also 
straightforward. Potential avenues for future research would be to use semi-or non-
parametric methods to estimate both the misreporting and turnout models (Horowitz and 
Manski 1995; Molinari 2003), simultaneously account for response and covariate 
measurement errors within our model (McGlothlin, Stamey and Seaman 2008), and 
explore the possibility of incorporating semi-parametric approaches for inference with 
missing data (Chen and Ibrahim 2006; Robins and Rotnitzky 1995; Rotnitzky and Robins 
1995).  
While the primary focus of the paper has been on estimation techniques as opposed to 
substantive findings, the empirical application of our model to the analysis of the 
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determinants of voter turnout has clear implications for researchers interested in race. 
Our results confirm that race does have a clear negative impact on turnout, and suggest 
that the null previous findings have been probably due to problems of misreporting, as 
had been argued by Abramson and Claggett (1984, 1986a, 1991). With the correction for 
misreporting developed in this paper, researchers could now better estimate the effect of 
race over the length of the ANES datasets and not just for the few years with validated 
turnout data. In addition, researchers might wish to revisit Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
(1980) findings of the effect of registration laws to see if properly correct misreporting 
re-enforces or diminishes their findings.  
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Appendix 4.A 
Additional results from the Monte Carlo experiment in Section 4.3 
 
Table 4.A.1 
Misreport probabilities under Design B  
 
Average 
misreport 
rates
1|0 0|1,π π  
 
  
1|0
iπ  
  
0|1
iπ  
 
2 0x =  2 1x =  
 
2 0x =  2 1x =  
2%  0.01 0.12  0.06 0.008 
5%  0.03 0.18  0.11 0.02 
10%  0.05 0.35  0.24 0.04 
20%  0.13 0.50  0.47 0.07 
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Table 4.A.2 
Posterior means and 95% credible intervals - Design A  
1|0 0|1,π π  Estimator 0β  1β  2β  
- True values -1 1 1 
     
0.02 
Ignoring misreporting 
-0.86 
(-1.01, -0.74) 
0.88 
(0.77, 0.99) 
0.92 
(0.74, 1.11) 
 
Proposed method 
-0.99 
(-1.19, -0.82) 
0.99 
(0.83, 1.17) 
1.04 
(0.80, 1.27) 
 
Model A-1 
-1.16 
(-1.56, -0.86) 
1.15 
(0.89, 1.48) 
1.20 
(0.89, 1.61) 
 
Model A-2 
-1.00 
(-1.20, -0.82) 
1.01 
(0.85, 1.18) 
1.05 
(0.84, 1.30) 
     
0.05 
Ignoring misreporting 
-0.82 
(-0.96, -0.68) 
0.78 
(0.68, 0.89) 
0.90 
(0.71, 1.08) 
 
Proposed method 
-1.00 
(-1.21, -0.80) 
1.02 
(0.84, 1.22) 
1.10 
(0.84, 1.38) 
 
Model A-1 
-1.05 
(-1.41, -0.76) 
1.08 
(0.82, 1.41) 
1.20 
(0.89, 1.62) 
 
Model A-2 
-1.03 
(-1.26, -0.84) 
1.04 
(0.87, 1.24) 
1.16 
(0.90, 1.44) 
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0.10 
Ignoring misreporting 
-0.67 
(-0.79, -0.55) 
0.64 
(0.55, 0.74) 
0.64 
(0.48, 0.80) 
 
Proposed method 
-0.96 
(-1.26, -0.70) 
0.88 
(0.69, 1.10) 
0.86 
(0.55, 1.21) 
 
Model A-1 
-0.81 
(-1.32, -0.45) 
0.77 
(0.56, 1.15) 
0.76 
(0.54, 1.21) 
 
Model A-2 
-1.03 
(-1.34, -0.78) 
0.96 
(0.76, 1.20) 
0.94 
(0.66, 1.26) 
     
0.20 
Ignoring misreporting 
-0.46 
(-0.58, -0.34) 
0.51 
(0.42, 0.60) 
0.50 
(0.34, 0.66) 
 
Proposed method 
-1.01 
(-1.47, -0.62) 
1.00 
(0.68, 1.42) 
0.97 
(0.48, 1.52) 
 
Model A-1 
-0.71 
(-1.21, -0.34) 
0.75 
(0.52, 1.12) 
0.74 
(0.44, 1.16) 
 
Model A-2 
-0.98 
(-1.38, -0.68) 
1.07 
(0.79, 1.39) 
1.02 
(0.64, 1.46) 
Constant misclassification rates. 
Sample size: N, M = 1,000. 
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Table 4.A.3 
Posterior means and 95% credible intervals - Design B  
1|0 0|1,π π  Estimator 0β  1β  2β  
- True values -1 1 1 
     
0.02 
Ignoring misreporting 
-0.95 
(-1.10, -0.82) 
0.93 
(0.81, 1.05) 
1.04 
(0.85, 1.23) 
 
Proposed method 
-0.94 
(-1.12, -0.77) 
0.99 
(0.85, 1.16) 
0.99 
(0.77, 1.22) 
 
Model A-1 
-1.18 
(-1.55, -0.89) 
1.12 
(0.90, 1.37) 
1.23 
(0.94, 1.56) 
 
Model A-2 
-1.02 
(-1.20, -0.85) 
1.01 
(0.87, 1.16) 
1.13 
(0.91, 1.34) 
     
0.05 
Ignoring misreporting 
-0.92 
(-1.06, -0.79) 
0.76 
(0.65, 0.86) 
1.05 
(0.87, 1.23) 
 
Proposed method 
-1.01 
(-1.23, -0.80) 
1.01 
(0.82, 1.21) 
1.02 
(0.75, 1.29) 
 Model A-1 - - - 
 
Model A-2 
-1.20 
(-1.44, -0.97) 
0.99 
(0.81, 1.19) 
1.33 
(1.07, 1.64) 
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0.10 
Ignoring misreporting 
-0.88 
(-1.01, -0.75) 
0.70 
(0.59, 0.80) 
1.18 
(0.98, 1.37) 
 
Proposed method 
-0.95 
(-1.24, -0.67) 
1.04 
(0.82, 1.28) 
1.07 
(0.75, 1.43) 
 Model A-1 - - - 
 
Model A-2 
-1.34 
(-1.66, -1.08) 
1.07 
(0.85, 1.32) 
1.73 
(1.40, 2.13) 
     
0.20 
Ignoring misreporting 
-1.16 
(-1.30, -1.01) 
0.45 
(0.36, 0.55) 
1.77 
(1.58, 1.99) 
 
Proposed method 
-1.06 
(-1.55, -0.56) 
0.98 
(0.66, 1.36) 
1.27 
(0.70, 1.82) 
 Model A-1 - - - 
 
Model A-2 
-2.58 
(-3.55, -1.92) 
1.00 
(0.70, 1.42) 
3.76 
(2.96, 4.92) 
Covariate-dependent misclassification. 
Sample size: N, M = 1,000. 
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Table 4.A.4 
Posterior means and 95% credible for 1|0π and 0|1  aπ  
 
Monte Carlo 
design 
True sample 
values 
Proposed method Model A-1 Model A-2 
A     
 1|0 2.75π =  
 
2.85 
(1.79, 4.29) 
2.89 
(1.77, 4.27) 
6.06 
(1.33, 11.28) 
 0|1 1.84π =  2.46 
(1.20, 4.07) 
2.39 
(1.10, 4.07) 
4.95 
(0.29, 2.12) 
     
 1|0 5.17π =  
 
5.29 
(3.84, 7.02) 
5.26 
(3.77, 7.00) 
5.68 
(1.16, 11.12) 
 0|1 4.47π =  6.56 
(4.40, 9.21) 
6.56 
(4.34, 9.25) 
8.24 
(1.11, 16.49) 
     
 1|0 9.53π =  10.35 
(8.27, 12.71) 
10.36 
(8.08, 12.65) 
6.74 
(1.88, 11.72) 
 0|1 9.13π =  
9.34 
(6.79, 12.27) 
8.87 
(6.36, 11.82) 
5.17 
(0.74, 9.60) 
     
 1|0 20.68π =  
21.23 
(18.45, 24.28) 
20.48 
(17.57, 23.33) 
11.92 
(1.58, 21.77) 
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 0|1 20.26π =  
20.44 
(16.47, 24.53) 
20.55 
(16.81, 24.44) 
10.29 
(0.45, 24.85) 
     
B     
 1|0 2.42π =  
 
1.62 
(0.84, 2.71) 
1.52 
(0.70, 2.63) 
4.55 
(0.64, 9.73) 
 0|1 2.37π =  2.60 
(1.23, 4.47) 
2.20 
(1.06, 3.75) 
2.76 
(0.13, 8.61) 
     
 1|0 5.01π =  
5.14 
(3.72, 6.97) 
5.36 
(3.79, 7.10) 
- 
 0|1 6.32π =  
5.01 
(3.15, 7.36) 
4.56 
(2.71, 6.74) 
- 
     
 1|0 10.98π =  
9.94 
(7.92, 12.10) 
9.96 
(7.89, 12.38) 
- 
 0|1 8.69π =  
11.04 
(8.27, 14.20) 
10.04 
(7.49, 12.95) 
- 
     
 1|0 20.19π =  
19.59 
(17.03, 22.17) 
17.37 
(15.02, 19.65) 
- 
 0|1 21.05π =  
21.54 
(17.97, 25.40) 
17.54 
(14.15, 21.02) 
- 
a In percentage points. 
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        Appendix 4.B 
Sample description and variable coding 
 
Table 4.B.1 
Vote misreporting in the 1978-1990 ANES a   
Election ( )Pr 1| 0iiy y= =  ( )Pr 0 | 1i iy y= =  ( )Pr 0 | 1iiy y= =  ( )Pr 1| 0i iy y= =  
1978 23.27 24.55 3.02 2.84 
1980 24.48 16.52 0.58 1.37 
1984 38.83 13.63 0.22 1.70 
1986 31.55 17.70 0.66 1.40 
1988 36.30 14.63 1.06 7.10 
1990 26.83 16.83 3.67 6.46 
a In percentage points.  
 
 
 
 
  
188 
Variables used in the turnout and misreport models  
 
Age: 1 if Age < 30; 2 if 30 ≤ Age < 45; 3 if 45 ≤ Age < 60; 4 if Age ≥ 60.  
Church Attendance: Frequency of church attendance. Coding:  1 if never; 2 if 
a few times a year; 3 if once or twice a month; 4 if every week or almost every 
week.  
Education: Highest grade of school or year of college completed. Coding: 1 if 
8 grades or less; 2 if 9–12 grades with no diploma or equivalency; 3 if 12 grades, 
diploma or equivalency; 4 if some college; 5 if college degree.  
Female: 1 if the respondent is female, 0 if male.  
Home owner: 1 if the respondent owns his house, 0 otherwise.  
Income: Household income. Coding: 1 if 0–16th percentile; 2 if 17h–33d 
percentile; 3 if 34th–67th percentile; 4 if 68th–95th percentile; 5 if 96th–100th 
percentile.  
Non-white: 0 if white, 1 otherwise.  
Party Identification: -1 for Democrats, 0 for Independents, 1 for Republicans.  
Partisan Strength: Coded on a four-point scale ranging from 1 for pure 
independents to 4 for strong partisans.  
Alone: 1 if the respondent was interviewed alone, 0 otherwise.  
Uncooperative: Respondent’s level of cooperation in the interview, as 
evaluated by the interviewer. Coding: 1 if very good; 2 if good; 3 if fair; 4 if 
poor; 5 if very poor.  
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Sincerity: How sincere did the respondent seem to be in his/her answers, as 
evaluated by the interviewer. Coding: 1 if often seemed insincere; 2 if usually 
sincere; 3 if completely sincere.  
In order to reduce the correlation between the parameters and to accelerate 
convergence and mixing of the Gibbs sampling algorithm, all variables where 
centered at their mean values (Gu, 2006). 
 
Table 4.B.2 
Rates of non-response for the variables included in the voter turnout models  
Variable 
1978 – 1990 
Validated ANES 
1992 ANES 
Age 2.07 0.00 
Church Attendance 13.20 33.72 
Education 0.80 2.61 
Female 4.28 0.00 
Income 13.58 10.66 
Non-white 4.41 1.41 
Home owner 0.70 6.44 
Partisan Strength 4.44 0.56 
Party Identification 2.60 0.36 
Alone 4.55 1.57 
Cooperation 4.49 0.16 
Sincerity 0.47 0.24 
Reported turnout 6.12 9.30 
   
Total sample 11,632 2,485 
Complete-case sample 6,411 1,206 
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C h a p t e r  5  
                                 Concluding remarks 
 
Voting behavior research has been traditionally taken to be the one areas of political 
science where theory can be systematically and quantitatively measured and tested and 
where statements of causal determinants can be more reliably formulated (Eldersveld, 
1951). As a result, the importance of sophisticated data analysis methods for academic 
studies of electoral politics can hardly be understated. In fact, while many of the 
fundamental questions in the field were already defined in the 1940s and 1950s, our 
answers to these questions have changed considerably in the past few decades, paralleling 
changes in our ways of studying them. Although many of the major controversies in this 
area are not yet settled, the development of increasingly refined research techniques has 
probably contributed to improve our understanding of these controversies and to getting us 
closer to solving them (Niemi and Weisberg, 2001).  
The increasing adoption of Bayesian methods – and, more specifically, Markov chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms – for estimation and inference in political science 
research provides further opportunities to advance in this direction. As shown in the 
previous three chapters of this dissertation, MCMC methods can be implemented to 
address substantive and methodological questions regarding voter participation and choice 
in settings in which other estimation techniques would be intractable, problematic or 
inefficient. Each chapter underscores the advantages of Bayesian simulation vis-à-vis 
alternative approaches for dealing with the specific problems at hand and points to possible 
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avenues for future research. More generally, the applications included in this 
dissertation illustrate the power of MCMC methods to handle models long thought to be 
“too hard” to estimate, contributing to the development, implementation and testing of 
more elaborated theories of voting behavior and, thereby, to the scientific study of electoral 
politics, and area in which concepts, data, methods and conclusions are intimately 
intertwined (Converse, 2006). 
Perhaps the main drawback of Bayesian simulation based on MCMC algorithms is that 
it is extremely computationally intensive and time-consuming. In order to ensure an 
accurate approximation to the posterior densities of random quantities of interest (e.g., 
parameters and missing data), a large number of draws from the corresponding conditional 
densities must be obtained, and the “quality” of the approximation is an increasing function 
of the number of iterations of the sampling algorithm. Still, computing resources available 
to scholars have become increasingly faster and cheaper during the last decade, and the 
release of flexible and freely available software for Bayesian inference (e.g., BUGS and 
JAGS) has lowered the levels of statistical and programming expertise required to 
implement MCMC methods (Jackman, 2000a). In addition, considerable efforts are 
currently being devoted by statisticians and computer scientists to developing new samplers 
in order to speed convergence and reduce execution times. In this direction, MCMC 
methods are likely to continue making strides in political science in the next years, reaching 
a growing number of academics interested not only in methodological but also in 
substantive research questions (Gill, 2000; Jackman, 2009).  
 
 
  
192 
B i b l i o g r a p h y  
Abelson, Robert P., Loftus, Elizabeth F., and Greenwald, Anthony G. 1992. Attempts to 
Improve the Accuracy of Self-Reports of Voting. In J Tanur (ed.) Questions about 
Questions: Inquiries into the Cognitive Bases of Surveys, pp. 138 - 153. New York: Russel 
Sage. 
Abramson, Paul R., and Claggett, William. 1984. Race-Related Differences in Self-
Reported and Validated Turnout. Journal of Politics 46:719–738.  
Abramson, Paul R., and Claggett, William. 1986a. Race-Related Differences in Self-
Reported and Validated Turnout in 1984. Journal of Politics 48:412–422.  
Abramson, Paul R, and Claggett, William. 1986b. Race-Related Differences in Self-
Reported and Validated Turnout in 1986. Journal of Politics 51:397–408.  
Abramson, Paul R., and Claggett, William. 1991. Race-Related Differences in Self-
Reported and Validated Turnout in the 1988 Presidential Election. Journal of Politics 
53:186–197.  
Abrevaya, Jason, and Hausman, Jerry A. 1999. Semiparametric Estimation with 
Mismeasured Dependent Variables: An Application to Duration Models for 
Unemployment Spells. Mimeo, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.  
Aigner, Dennis J. 1973. Regression with a Binary Independent Variable Subject to 
Errors of Observation. Journal of Econometrics 1:49–60.  
Aitchison, John. 1986. The Statistical Analysis of Compositional Data. London: 
Chapman and Hall. 
  
193 
Aitchison, John, and Shen, Sheng M. 1980. Logistic-Normal Distribution: Some 
Properties and Uses. Biometrika, 67: 261-72. 
Aldrich, John. H. 1993. Rational Choice and Turnout. American Journal of Political 
Science 37: 246 – 278. 
Aldrich, John H., and McKelvey, Richard D. 1977. A Method of Scaling with 
Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections. American Political Science 
Review 71(1): 111-130. 
Alemán, Eduardo, and Saiegh, Sebastián. 2007. Legislative Preferences, Political Parties 
and Coalition Unity in Chile. Comparative Politics 39(3): 253-272. 
Allenby, Greg  M., and Lenk, Peter J. 1994. Modeling Household Purchase Behavior 
with Logistic Normal Regression. Journal of the American Statistical Association 89 (428): 
1218 – 1231. 
Alvarez, R. Michael. 1998. Information and Elections. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press. 
Alvarez, R. Michael, and Nagler, Jonathan. 1995. Economic, Issues and the Perot 
Candidacy: Voter Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election. American Journal of Political 
Science 30(3): 714-744. 
Alvarez, R. Michael, Nagler, Jonathan, and Bowler, Shaun. 2000. Issues, Economics, 
and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections: The British 1987 General Election. American 
Political Science Review 94(1): 131-149. 
Ames, Barry. 1995. Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation. 
American Journal of Political Science 39(2): 406-33. 
  
194 
Anderson, Brady A., and Silver, Brian D. 1986. Measurement and Mismeasurement 
of the Validity of the Self-Reported Vote. American Journal of Political Science 30:771–
785.  
Andrews, D. F., and Mallows, C. L. 1974. Scale mixtures of normality. Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 36: 99-102. 
Angell, Alan, and Reig, Cristobal. 2006. Change or Continuity? The Chilean Elections 
of 2005/2006. Bulletin of Latin American Research 25(4): 481-502. 
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Eitan Hersh. 2008. Vote Validation in the 2006 CCES. 
Mimeo.  
Antweiler, Werner. 2001. Nested random effects estimation in unbalanced panel data. 
Journal of Econometrics 101: 295 – 313.  
Australian Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 2000. The 1998 Election: 
Report of the Inquiry into the conduct of the 1998 Federal Election and matters related 
thereto. Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
Barndorff-Nielsen, Ole E., and Jørgensen, Bent. 1991. Some Parametric Models on the 
Simplex. Journal of Multivariate Analysis 39: 106 – 116.  
Battistin, Erich. 2003. Errors in Survey Reports of Consumption Expenditures. London: 
Working Paper 0307, Institute for Fiscal Studies.  
Belli, Robert F., Traugott, Michael W., Young, Margaret, and McGonable, Katherine A. 
1999. Reducing Vote Overreporting in Surveys: Social Desirability, Memory Failure, and 
Source Monitoring. Public Opinion Quarterly 63(1): 90–108.  
Belli, Robert F., Traugott Michael W., and Beckman, Matthew N. 2001. What Leads to 
Voting Overreports? Contrasts of Overreporters to Validated Voters and Admitted 
  
195 
Nonvoters in the American National Election Studies. Journal of Official Statistics 
17(4): 479–498.   
Belli, Robert, Traugott, Santa, and Rosenstone, Steven. 1994. Reducing Over-Reporting 
of Voter Turnout: An Experiment Using a ‘Source Monitoring’ Framework. ANES 
Technical Report Series (010153).  
Berger, James O. 1985. Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Bernstein, Robert, Chadha, Anita, and Montjoy, Robert. 2001. Overreporting Voting. 
Why it Happens and Why it Matters. Public Opinion Quarterly 65(1):22–44.    
Bhaumik, Amitabha, Dey, Dipak K., and Ravishanker, Nalini. 2003. A dynamic Linear 
Model Approach for Compositional Time Series Analysis. Technical Report, University of 
Connecticut. 
Billheimer, Dean, Guttorp, Peter, and Fagan, William F. 2001. Statistical interpretation 
of Species Composition. Journal of the American Statistical Association 96(456): 1205 – 
1214. 
Blais, André, and Dobrzynska, Agnieszka. 1998. Turnout in Electoral Democracies. 
European Journal of Political Research 33: 239-261. 
Bollinger, Chris R. 1996. Bounding Mean Regressions When a Binary Regressor is 
Mismeasured. Journal of Econometrics 73: 387–399.  
Bonilla, Claudio 2002. A Micro Application of the Spatial Theory of Voting. Revista de 
Ciencia Política 21(2): 3-16. 
  
196 
Bound, John, Brown, Charles, and Mathiowetz, Nancy. 2001. Measurement Error in 
Survey Data. In J. Heckman and E. Leamer (eds.) Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 5, pp. 
3705-3843. North Holland: Elsevier. 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. 2003. Estatísticas do Século XX, Rio de 
Janeiro: IBGE. 
Bross, Irwin. 1954. Misclassification in 2 X 2 Tables. Biometrics 10:478–486.  
Browne, William J., and Draper, David. 2001. Implementation and Performance Issues 
in the Bayesian and Likelihood Fitting of Multilevel Models. Computational Statistics 
15(3): 391-420. 
Burden, Barry C. 2000. Voter Turnout and the National Election Studies. Political 
Analysis 8(4): 389–398.  
Bryk, Anthony S., and Raudenbush, Stephen W. 2002. Hierarchical linear models: 
Applications and data analysis methods. 2nd ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Cahalan, Don. 1968. Correlates of Respondent Accuracy in the Denver Validity Survey. 
Public Opinion Quarterly 32(3): 607–621.  
Carlin, Bradley P., and Louis, Thomas A. 1996. Bayesian and Empirical Bayes Methods 
for Data Analysis. London: Chapman & Hall. 
Carroll, Raymond J., Ruppert, David, and Stefanski, Leonard A. 1995. Measurement 
error in nonlinear models. London: Chapman and Hall.  
Casella, George, and George, Edward L. 1992. Explaining the Gibbs Sampler. The 
American Statistician 46(3): 167-174.  
Cassel, Carol A. 2003. Overreporting and Electoral Participation Research. American 
Politics Research 31(1): 81–92.  
  
197 
Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP). 2005. Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública Nº 
23 – Tercera Serie. Octubre – Noviembre 2005. 
Chaloner, Kathryn, and Brant, Rollin. 1988. A Bayesian Approach to Outlier Detection 
and Residual Analysis. Biometrika 75: 651-660. 
Chen, Qingxia, and Ibrahim, Joseph G. 2006. Semiparametric Models for Missing 
Covariate and Response Data in Regression Models. Biometrics 62: 177–184.  
Chen, Qingxia, Ibrahim, Joseph G., Chen, Ming-Hui, and Senchaudhuri, Pralay. 2008. 
Theory and inference for regression models with missing responses and covariates. Journal 
of Multivariate Analysis 99: 1302–1331.  
Chen, Ming-Hui, Ibrahim, Joseph G., and Shao, Qi-Man. 2000. Power prior 
distributions for generalized linear models. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 
84: 121–137.  
Chen, T. Timothy. 1979. Log-Linear Models for Categorical Data With 
Misclassification and Double Sampling. Journal of the American Statistical Association 
74(366): 481–488.  
Chib, Siddharta, and Greenberg, Edward. 1995. Understanding the Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm. The American Statistician 49(4): 327–335.  
Christin, Thomas and Simon Hug. 2004. Methodological Issues in Studies of Conflict 
Processes: Misclassifications and Endogenous Institutions. Paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September.  
Clausen, Aage. 1968. Response Validity: Vote Report. Public Opinion Quarterly 32: 
588–606.  
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). 2007. CSES Module 2 Election Study 
  
198 
Archive. 
Congdon, Peter. 2003. Applied Bayesian Modelling. London: Wiley & Sons. 
Constable, Pamela, and Valenzuela, Arturo. 1991. A Nation of Enemies: Chile under 
Pinochet. New York: Norton. 
Converse, Philip E. 2006. Researching Electoral Politics. American Political Science 
Review 100(4): 605 – 612. 
Cox, Gary. 1997. Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Davidov, Ori, Faraggi, David, and Reiser, Benjamin. 2003. Misclassification in Logistic 
Regression with Discrete Covariates. Biometrical Journal 5: 541–553.  
Derks, Anton, and Deschouwer, Kris. 1998. Vrijzinigen, ongelovigen en protest. In M. 
Swyngedouw, J. Billiet, A. Carton and R. Beerten (eds.), Kiezen is verliezen. Onderzoek 
naar de politieke opvattingen van Vlamingen, pp. 85-112. Acco: Leuven.  
Dow, Jay K., and Endersby, James W., 2004. Multinomial probit and multinomial logit: 
a comparison of choice models of voting research. Electoral Studies 23(1): 107-122. 
Drake, Christiana. 1993. Effects of Misspecification of the Propensity Score on 
Estimators of Treatment Effect. Biometrics 49:1231–1236.  
Draper, David. 2001. Bayesian hierarchical modeling. New York: Springer. 
Duan, Yuyan. 2005. A Modified Bayesian Power Prior Approach with Applications in 
Water Quality Evaluation. Blacksburg, VA: Doctoral Dissertation, Department of 
Statistics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.  
Dunson, David B., and Tindall, Kenneth R. 2000. Bayesian Analysis of Mutational 
Spectra. Genetics 156:1411–1418.  
  
199 
Dustmant, Christian, and van Soest, Arthur. 2004. An analysis of speaking fluency 
of immigrants using ordered response models with classification errors. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 22: 312–321.  
Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1951. Theory and Method in Voting Behavior Research. Journal 
of Politics 13(1): 70 – 87. 
Escobar, Marcelo, Calvo, Ernesto, Calcagno, Natalia, and Minvielle, Sandra. 2002. 
Ultimas Imágenes Antes del Naufragio: Las Elecciones del 2001 en Argentina. Desarrollo 
Economico 42: 25-44. 
Fornos, Carolina. 1996. Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America. Master’s Thesis, 
Louisiana State University. 
Fornos, Carolina, Power, Timothy, and Garand, James. 2004. Explaining Voter Turnout 
in Latin America, 1980 to 2000. Comparative Political Studies 37: 909 – 940. 
Franklin, Charles H., and Jackson, John E. 1983. The Dynamics of Party Identification.   
Political  Science Review 77(4): 957-973. 
Francese, Robert J. 2005. Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel 
Data. Political Analysis 13: 430 – 446. 
Franklin, Mark, and Hirczy de Mino, Wolfgang. 1998. Separated powers, divided 
government, and turnout in U.S. presidential elections. American Journal of Political 
Science 42: 316-326. 
Frei, Eugenio. 2003. Los Partidos Políticos Chilenos Cambio y Estabilidad en el 
Comportamiento Electoral, 1990 -2000. Revista de Ciencia Política 23(2), 109-147. 
  
200 
Fullerton, Andrew S., Dixon, Jeffrey C., and Borch, Casey A. 2007. Bringing 
Registration into Models of Vote. Public Opinion Quarterly 71(4):649–660.  
Gamboa, Ricardo, and Segovia, Carolina. 2006. Las Elecciones Presidenciales y 
Parlamentarias en Chile, Diciembre 2005 – Enero 2006. Revista de Ciencia Política 26(1): 
84-113. 
Garthwaite, Paul H., Kadane, Joseph B., and OHagan, Anthony. 2004. Elicitation. 
Pittsburgh, PA: Technical Report 808, Department of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon 
University, Department of Statistics.  
Gelfland, Alan E., Hills, Susan E., Racine-Poon, Amy, and Smith, Adrian F. 1990. 
Illustration of Bayesian Inference in Normal Data Models Using Gibbs Sampling. Journal 
of the American Statistical Association 85(412): 972 – 985. 
Gelfland, Alan E., and Smith, Adrian F. 1990. Sampling-Based Approaches to 
Calculating Marginal Densities. Journal of the American Statistical Association 85(410): 
398 – 409. 
Gelman, Andrew, Carlin, John B., Stern, Hal S., and Rubin, Donald B. 2004. Bayesian 
Data Analysis. Boca Raton: Chapman & Hall. 
Gelman, Andrew, and Hill, Jennifer. 2007. Data Analysis Using Regression and 
Multilevel/Hierarchical Models. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Gelman, Andrew, King, Gary, and Liu, Chuanhai. 1998. Not Asked and Not Answered: 
Multiple Imputation for Multiple Surveys. Journal of the American Statistical Association 
93(443): 846– 857.  
  
201 
Gelman, Andrew, and Pardoe, Iain. 2007. Average predictive comparisons for 
models with nonlinearity, interactions and variance components. Sociological Methodology 
37(1): 23-51. 
Gelman, Andrew and Rubin, Donald B. 1992. Inference for iterative simulation using 
multiple sequences. Statistical Science 7: 457-472. 
Geman, Stuart, and Geman, Donald. 1984. Stochastic Relaxation, Gibbs Distributions 
and the Bayesian Restoration of Images. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and 
Machine Intelligence 6: 721-741. 
Gems, Barbara, Ghaosh, Dhirendra, and Hitlin, Robert. 1982. A Recall Experiment: 
Impact of Time on Recall of Recreational Fishing Trips. Proceedings of the Section on 
Survey Research Methods 7: 168–173.  
Geweke, John. 1992. Evaluating the accuracy of sampling-based approaches to 
calculating posterior moments. In J. Bernardo, J. Berger, A. Dawid and A. Smith (eds.), 
Bayesian Statistics, Vol. 4, pp. 169-193
Gu, Yuanyuan. 2006. Misclassification of the Dependent Variable in Binary Choice 
Models. Australia: Masters’ Dissertation, School of Economics, University of the New 
South Wales.  
. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gilks, Walter  R., Richardson, Sylvia,  and Spiegelhalter, David  J. 1996. Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo in Practice. London: Chapman and Hall. 
Gill, Jeff. 2000. Bayesian Methods: A Social and Behavioral Sciences Approach. New 
York: Chapman & Hall. 
Goldstein, Harvey. 1995. Multilevel Statistical Models.  London: Arnold.  
Greene, William. 1999. Econometric Analysis, 5th edition. New York: Prentice Hall. 
  
202 
Hajivassiliou, Vassilis A., McFadden, Daniel, and Ruud, Paul A. 1996. Simulation 
estimation methods for limited dependent variable models. In G. Maddala, C. Rao, and H. 
Vinod (eds.), Handbook of Statistics, Vol. 11, pp. 519-543. Amsterdam: North Holland.  
Hardle, Wolfgang. 1990. Applied nonparametric regression. New York: Cambridge 
University Pres.  
Haukka, Jari K. 1995. Correction for covariate measurement error in generalized linear 
model -a bootstrap approach. Biometrics 51: 1127–1132.  
Hausman, Jerry A., Abrevaya, Jason, and Scott-Morton, Fiona M. 1998. 
Misclassification of the dependent variable in a discrete response setting. Journal of 
Econometrics 87(2): 239–269.  
Hausman, Jerry, and McFadden, Daniel. 1984. Specification tests for the multinomial 
logit Model. Econometrica 52(5): 1219–1240. 
Hernanz, Virginia, Malherbet, Franck, and Pellizzari, Michelle. 2004. Take-up of 
Welfare Benefits in OECD Countries: A Review of the Evidence. OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers 17.  
Highton, Benjamin. 2004. Self-reported versus Proxy-reported Voter Turnout in the 
Current Population Survey. Public Opinion Quarterly 69(1): 113–123.  
Hill, Lisa. 2002. On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to ‘Vote’: The 
Australian Case. Political Studies 50: 80 -101. 
Hill, Kim Q., and Hurley, Patricia A. 1984. Nonvoters in Voters’ Clothing: The Impact 
of Voting Behavior Misreporting on Voting Behavior Research. Social Science Quarterly 
65:199–206.   
  
203 
Hillygus, D. Sunshine, and Jackman, Simon. 2003. Voter Decision Making in 
Election 2000: Effects, Partisan Activation and the Clinton Legacy. American Journal of 
Political Science  47(4): 583-596. 
Hinich, Melvin J., and Munger, Michael. 1994. Ideology and the Theory of Political 
Choice. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Hirczy de Mino, Wolfgang. 1994. The impact of mandatory voting laws on turnout: A 
quasi-experimental approach. Electoral Studies 13: 64-76. 
Horowitz, Joel. 1980. The accuracy of the multinomial logit model as an approximation 
to the multinomial probit model of travel demand. Transportation Research B 14: 331-341. 
Horowitz, Joel L. 1993. Semiparametric and Nonparametric Estimation of Quantal 
Response Models. In G. Maddala, C. Rao, and H. Vinod (eds.), Handbook of Statistics, 
Vol. 11, pp. 45–72. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Horowitz, Joel L., and Manski, Charles F. 1995. Identification and Robustness with 
Contaminated and Corrupted Data. Econometrica 63(2): 281–302.  
Horton, Nicholas J., and Kleinman, Ken P. 2007. Much ado about nothing: A 
comparison of missing data methods and software to fit incomplete data regression models. 
The American Statistician 61(1): 79–90.  
Huneeus, Carlos. 2006. Las elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias del 2005 en 
Chile. Publicaciones de Coyuntura, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporanea.  
Hu, Yingyao. 2008. Identification and estimation of nonlinear models with 
misclassification error using instrumental variables: A general solution. Journal of 
Econometrics 144: 27–61.  
  
204 
Hu, Yingyao, and Riddert, Geert. 2007. Estimation of Nonlinear Models with 
Mismeasured Regressors Using Marginal Information. Mimeo.  
Huang, Lan, Chen, Ming-Hui, and Ibrahim, Joseph G. 1999. Bayesian Analysis for 
Generalized Linear Models with Nonignorably Missing Covariates. Biometrics 61: 767–
780.  
Ibrahim, Joseph G., and Chen, Min-Hui. 2000. Power Prior Distributions for Regression 
Models. Statistical Science 15(1): 46–60.  
Ibrahim, Joseph G., Chen, Ming-Hui, and Lipsitz, Stuart R. 2002. Bayesian Methods for 
Generalized Linear Models With Covariates Missing at Random. Canadian Journal of 
Statistics 30: 55–78.  
Ibrahim, Joseph G., Chen, Ming-Hui, Lipsitz, Stuart R., and Herring, Amy H. 2005. 
Missing-Data Methods for Generalized Linear Models: A Comparative Review. Journal of 
the American Statistical Association 100(469): 332–346.  
Ibrahim, Joseph G., Lipsitz, Stuart R., and Chen, Min-Hui. 1999. Missing Covariates in 
Generalized Linear Models when the Missing Data Mechanism Is Non-ignorable. Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society B 61(1): 173–190.  
Ibrahim, Joseph G., Lipsitz, Stuart R., and Horton, Nick. 2001. Using auxiliary data for 
parameter estimation with non-ignorably missing outcomes. Applied statistics 50(3): 361–
373.  
Ibrahim, Joseph G., Ryan, Luise M., and Chen, Ming-Hui. 1998. Using Historical 
Controls to Adjust for Covariates in Trend Tests for Binary Data. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 93(444): 481–488.  
  
205 
Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas de Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ). 2006. Banco de 
Dados Eleitorais Do Brasil (accessed December 2006). 
Imai, Kosuke, van Dyk, David A. 2005. A Bayesian analysis for the multinomial probit 
model using marginal data augmentation. Journal of Econometrics 124: 311-334. 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout Database, 
Compulsory Voting: ://www.idea.int/vt/index.  (accessed December 2007). 
Iyengar, Malini, and Dey, Dipak K. 2004. Bayesian analysis of compositional data. In 
D. Dey, S. Ghosh and B. Mallick (eds.), Generalized linear Models: A Bayesian 
Perspective, pp. 349-364. New York: Marcel Dekker.  
Jackman, Robert W. 1987. Political institutions and voter turnout in the industrial 
democracies. American Political Science Review 81: 405 – 423. 
Jackman, Simon. 2000a. Estimation and Inference via Bayesian Simulation: An 
Introduction to Markov Chain Monte Carlo. American Journal of Political Science 44(2): 
369 – 398. 
Jackman, Simon. 2000b. Estimation and Inference Are Missing Data Problems: 
Unifying Social Science Statistics via Bayesian Simulation. Political Analysis 8(4): 307 – 
332. 
Jackman, Simon. 2001. Voting: Compulsory. In N. Smelser and P. Baltes (eds.), 
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
Jackman, Simon. 2004. Bayesian Analysis for Political Research. Annual Review of 
Political Science 7: 483-505. 
Jackman, Simon. 2009. Bayesian Analysis for the Social Sciences. West Sussex: Wiley 
& Sons. 
  
206 
Jackman, Robert W., and Miller, Ross A. 1995. Voter Turnout in the Industrial 
Democracies during the 1980s. Comparative Political Studies 27: 467-492.   
Jocelyn-Holt, Alfredo. 1998. El Chile Perplejo. Santiago: Planeta/Ariel. 
Johnson, Norman L., and Kotz, Samuel. 1972. Distributions in Statistics: Continuous 
Multivariate distributions. New York: Wiley. 
Kass, Robert E., and Raftery, Adrian E. 1995. Bayes Factors. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 90: 773-795. 
Katosh, John P., and Traugott, Michael W. 1981. The Consequences of Validated and 
Self-Reported Voting Measures. Public Opinion Quarterly 45: 519–535.  
Katz, Jonathan, and King, Gary. 1999. A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral 
Data. American Political Science Review 93: 15 – 32. 
Kim, Yeonbae, Kim, Tai-Yoo, and Heo, Eunnyeong. 2003. Bayesian estimation of 
multinomial probit models of work trip choice. Transportation 30: 51-365. 
King, Gary. 1997. A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
King, Gary, Murray, Christopher J., Salomon, Joshua A., and Tandon, Ajay. 2004. 
Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey 
Research. American Political Science Review 98(1): 191-207. 
King, Gary, Tomz, Michael, and Wittenberg, Jason. 2000. Making the Most of 
Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation.  Journal of Political 
Science 44:
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative 
Analysis. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
 341-355. 
  
207 
Kostadinova, Tatiana. 2003. Voter Turnout Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe. 
European Journal of Political Research 42: 741-759. 
Kuha, Jouni. 1994. Corrections for exposure measurement error in logistic regression 
models with an application to nutritional data. Statistics in Medicine 13: 1135–1148.  
Leighley, Jan E., and Nagler, Jonathan. 1984. Individual and Systemic Influences on 
Turnout: Who Votes? Journal of Politics 54: 718–740.  
Lewbel, Arthur. 2000. Identification of the Binary Choice Model with Misclassification. 
Econometric Theory 16:603–609.  
Lijphart, Arend. 1997. Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma. 
American Political Science Review 91: 1-14.  
Lindley, Dennis V., and Smith, Adrian F. 1972. Bayes Estimates for the Linear Model. 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 34: 1-41. 
Lipsitz, Stuart R., and Ibrahim, Joseph G. 1996. A Conditional Model for Incomplete 
Covariates in Parametric Regression Models. Biometrika 83: 916–92.  
Little, Roderick J., and Rubin, Donald B. 2002. Statistical analysis with missing data. 
New York: Wiley.  
Little, Roderick J., and Wang, Yongxiao. 1996. Pattern-Mixture Models for Multivariate 
Incomplete Data With Covariates. Biometrics 52: 98–111.  
Liu, Chuanhai. 1996. Bayesian Robust Multivariate Linear Regression With Incomplete 
Data. Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(435): 1219-1227. 
Loftus, Elizabeth F. 1975. Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report. Cognitive 
Psychology 7:145–177.  
  
208 
Lohr, Sharon L. 2005. Inference from Multiple Frame Surveys. Statistics and 
Biostatistics Colloquium Series, Department of Statistics, Ohio State University. 
Lubbers, Marcel, and Scheepers, Peer. 2000. Individual and contextual characteristics of 
the vlaams blok vote. Acta Politica 35: 363 – 398. 
Mainwaring, Scott. 1991. Politicians, Parties and Electoral Systems: Brazil in 
Comparative Perspective. Comparative Politics 24: 21-43. 
Maas, Cora J., and Hox, Joop J. 2004. Robustness issues in multilevel regression 
analysis. Statistica Neerlandica 58(2): 127–137. 
Manski, Charles F. 1985. Semiparametric Analysis of Discrete Response: Asymptotic 
Properties of the Maximum Score Estimator. Journal of Econometrics 82:46–51.  
McAllister, Ian, and Makkai, Toni. 1993. Institutions, Society of Protest? Explaining 
Invalid Votes in Australian Elections. Electoral Studies 12: 23-40. 
McCulloch, Robert  E., Polson, Nicholas G., and Rossi, Peter E. 2000. A Bayesian 
analysis of the multinomial probit model with fully identified parameters. Journal of 
Econometrics 99: 173-193. 
McCulloch, Robert E., and Rossi, Peter E. 1994. An exact likelihood analysis of the 
multinomial probit model. Journal of Econometrics 99: 173-193. 
Mcdonald, Michael P. 2007. The True Electorate: A Cross-Validation of Voter 
Registration Files and Election Survey Demographics. Public Opinion Quarterly 71(4): 
588–602.  
McFadden, Daniel. 1987, Regression-based specification tests for the multinomial logit 
model. Journal of Econometrics 34: 63–82. 
  
209 
McGlothlin, Anna, Stamey, James D., and Seaman, John W. 2008. Binary 
Regression with Misclassified Response and Covariate Subject to Measurement Error: a 
Bayesian Approach. Biometrical Journal 50:123–134. 
McInturff, Pat, Johnon, Wesley O., Cowling David, and Gardner, Ian A. 2004. 
Modelling risk when binary outcomes are subject to error. Statistics in Medicine 
23(7):1095–1109.  
Merrill, Samuel III, and Grofman, Bernard. 1999. A Unified Theory of Voting – 
Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Miller, Mungo. 1952. The Waukegan Study of Voter Turnout Prediction. Public 
Opinion Quarterly 32:588–606.  
Moisés, Alvaro. 1993: Elections, Political Parties and Political Culture in Brazil: 
Changes and Continuities. Journal of Latin American Studies 25: 575-611. 
Molinari, Francesca. 2003. Contaminated, Corrupted and Missing Data. Evanston, IL: 
Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Economics, Northwestern University.  
Morrissey, Mary J., and Spiegelman, Donna. 1999. Matrix methods for estimating odds 
ratios with misclassified exposure data: Extensions and comparisons. Biometrics 55(398): 
338–344.  
Murphy, Kevin M., and Topel, Richard H. 1985. Estimation and Inference in Two Step 
Econometric Models. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 3: 370–379.  
Myerson, Roger B., and Weber, Robert J. 1993. A Theory of Voting Equilibria. 
American Political Science Review 87(1): 102-114.   
Nagler, Jonathan. 1994. Scobit: An Alternative Estimator to Logit and Probit. American 
Journal of Political Science 38(1): 230–255.  
  
210 
Navia, Patricio. 2006. La elección presidencial de 2005 en Chile. El Debate Político. 
Revista Iberoamericana de Análisis Político 3(4/5): 215-228. 
Niemi, Richard G., and Weisberg, Herbert F. 2001. The Study of Voting and Elections. 
In R. Niemi and H. Weisberg (eds.), Controversies in Voting Behavior, Fourth Edition, pp. 
1 – 21. Washington: CQ Press. 
Neuhaus, John M. 1999. Bias and efficiency loss due to misclassified responses in 
binary regression. Biometrika 86(4):843–855.  
Newton, Michael A., and Raftery, Adrian E. 1994. Approximate Bayesian Inference by 
the Weighted Likelihood Bootstrap. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 56: 
3-48.  
Parry, Hugh, and Crossley, Helen. 1950. Validity of Responses to Survey Questions. 
Public Opinion Quarterly 14: 61–80.  
Paulino, Carlos D., Soares, Paulo, and Neuhaus, John. 2003. Binomial Regression with 
Misclassification. Biometrics 59: 670–675.  
Pinheiro, Jose C., Liu, Chuanhai H., and Wu, Ying N. 2001. Efficient algorithms for 
robust estimation in linear mixed-effects models using the multivariate t distribution. 
Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics 10: 249 – 276.  
Powell, Bingham G. 1986. American voter turnout in comparative perspective. 
American Political Science Review 80: 17-43. 
Power, Timothy, and Garand, James. 2007. Determinants of Invalid Voting in Latin 
America. Electoral Studies 26(2): 432-444. 
Power, Timothy, and Roberts, Timmons. 1995. Compulsory Voting, Invalid Ballots, and 
Abstention in Brazil. Political Research Quarterly 48: 795-826.  
  
211 
Plummer, Martyn. 2009. JAGS version 1.03 manual. www-
ice.iarc.fr/˜/software/jags/.  
Poterba, James M., and Summers, Lawrence H. 1986. Reporting Errors and Labor 
Market Dynamics. Econometrica 54: 1319–1338.  
Poterba, James M., and Summers, Lawrence H. 1995. Unemployment benefits and labor 
market transitions: a multinomial logit model with errors in classification. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 77(2): 207–216.  
Prescott, Gordon J., and Garthwaite, Paul H. 2002. Simple Bayesian Analysis of 
Misclassified Binary Data with a Validation Substudy. Biometrics 58: 454–458.  
Prescott, Gordon J., and Garthwaite, Paul H. 2005. Bayesian analysis of misclassified 
binary data from a matched case-control study with a validation sub-study. Statistics in 
Medicine 24(3). 
Quinn, Kevin M., and Martin, Andrew D. 1998. Operationalizing and Testing Spatial 
Theories of Voting. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, IL, April 1998. 
Raghuanthan, Trivellore E., Xie, Dawei, Schenker, Nathaniel, Parsons, Van L., Davis, 
William W., Dodd, Kevin W., and Feuer, Eric J. 2006. Combining Information from Two 
Surveys to Estimate County-Level Prevalence Rates of Cancer Risk Factors and Screening. 
The University of Michigan Department of Biostatistics Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper 58. 
Rabinowitz, George, and MacDonald, Stuart E. 1989. A Directional Theory of Issue 
Voting. American Political Science Review 83(1): 93-121. 
  
212 
Rayens, W. S., and Srinivasan, C. 1991. Box Cox Transformations in the Analysis of 
Compositional Data. Journal of Chemometrics 5: 227 – 239. 
Reilly, Marie, and Pepe, Margaret S. 1995. A mean score method for missing and 
auxiliary covariate data in regression models. Biometrika 82: 299–314.  
Robert, Christian P., and Casella, George. 2004. Monte Carlo Statistical Methods. New 
York: Springer.  
Robins, James M., and Rotnitzky, Andrea G. 1995. Semiparametric Efficiency in 
Multivariate Regression Models with Missing Data. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 90: 122 – 129.  
Robins, James M., Rotnitzky, Andrea G., and Zhao, Lue P.  1994. Estimation of 
regression coefficients when some regressors are not always observed. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 89: 846–866.  
Robinson, William S. 1950. Ecological Correlation and the Behavior of Individuals. 
American Sociological Review 15: 351-357. 
Rosa, Guilherme J., Padovani, Carlos R., and Gianola, Daniel. 2003. “Robust Linear 
Mixed Models with Normal/Independent Distributions and Bayesian MCMC 
Implementation”. Biometrical Journal 45(5): 573-590. 
Rosenstone, Steve, and Hansen, John. 1993. Mobilization, participation and democracy 
in America. New York: Macmillan. 
Rossi, Peter E., Allenby, Greg M., and McCulloch, Robert E. 2005. Bayesian Statistics 
and Marketing. West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons. 
Rotnitzky, Andrea G., and Robins, James M. 1995. Semiparametric Regression 
Estimation in the Presence of Dependent Censoring. Biometrika 82: 805–820.  
  
213 
Rubin, Donald B. 1976. Inference and missing data. Biometrika 63:581–592.  
Scully, Timothy R. 1992. Rethinking the Center. Party Politics in Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century Chile. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Scully, Timothy R. 1995. Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile. In S. Mainwaring and 
T. Scully (eds.), Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America, pp. 100 
– 137. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Schafer, Joseph L., and Graham, John W. 2002. Missing Data: Our View of the State of 
the Art. Psychological Methods 7(2): 147–177.  
Seltzer, Michael, and Choi, Kilchan. 2002. “Model checking and sensitivity analysis for 
multilevel models”. In Multilevel modeling: Methodological advances, issues and 
applications, Nahiua Duan and Steven P. Reise (eds.). NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Seltzer, Michael, Novak, John, Choi, Kilchan, and Lim, Nelson. 2002. “Sensitivity 
Analysis for Hierarchical Models Employing t Level-1 Assumptions”. Journal of 
Educational and Behavioral Statistics 27(2), 181-222. 
Shor, Boris, Bafumi, Joseph, Keele, Luke, and Park, David. 2007. A Bayesian 
Multilevel Modeling Approach to Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data. Political Analysis 15: 
165–181. 
Sigelman, Lee. 1982. The Nonvoting Voter in Voting Research. American Journal of 
Political Science 26:47–56.  
Silver, Brian D., Anderson, Barbara A., and Abramson, Paul R. 1986. Who Overreports 
Voting? American Political Science Review 80:613–624.  
  
214 
Spiegelhalter, David J., Best, Nicola G., Carlin, Bradley P., and van der Linde, 
Angelika. “Bayesian measures of model complexity and fit”. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series B, 64 (4): 583-639. 
 Spiegelhalter, David J., Thomas, Andrew, and Best, Nicky G.  2003. WinBUGS, 
Version 1.4. User Manual. Cambridge, UK: Medical Research Council Biostatistics Unit, 
University of Cambridge.  
Tanner, Martin A., and Wong, Wing H. 1987. The calculation of posterior distributions 
by data augmentation. Journal of the American Statistical Association 83: 528-540. 
Thum, Yeow M. 1997. Hierarchical linear Models for Multivariate Outcomes. Journal 
of Educational and Behavioral Statistics 22(1): 77-108. 
Thum, Yeow M. 2003. Measuring Progress Toward a Goal. Estimating Teacher 
Productivity Using a Multivariate Multilevel Model for Value-Added Analysis. 
Sociological Methods & Research 32(2): 153-2007.  
Thurigen, Dorothee, Spiegelman, Donna, Blettner, Maria, Heuer, Cartsten, and Brenner, 
Hermann. 2000. Measurement error correction using validation data: a review of methods 
and their applicability in case-control studies. Statistical Methods in Medical Research 9: 
447–474. Tironi, Eugenio, and Agüero, Felipe. 1999. ¿Sobrevivirá el Actual Paisaje 
Político Chileno? Estudios Públicos 74: 151-168. 
Torcal, Mariano, and Mainwaring, Scott. 2003. The Political Recrafting of Social Bases 
of Party Competition: Chile, 1973–95. British Journal of Political Science 33: 55-84. 
Train, Kenneth. 2003. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
  
215 
Valenzuela, Julio S. 1995. Orígenes y Transformaciones del Sistema de Partidos en 
Chile. Estudios Públicos 58: 6-77. 
Valenzuela, Julio S. 1999. Respuesta a Eugenio Tironi y Felipe Agüero: Reflexiones 
sobre el presente y el futuro del paisaje político chileno a la luz de su pasado. Estudios 
Públicos 75: 273-290. 
Valenzuela, Julio S., and Scully, Timothy R. 1997. Review: Electoral Choices and the 
Party System in Chile: Continuity and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy. 
Comparative Politics 29(4): 511-527. 
Van der Brug, Wouter, and Fenemma, Meindert. 2003. “Protest or mainstream? How 
the European anti-immigrant parties have developed into two separate groups by 1999”. 
European Journal of Political Research, 42: 55 – 76.  
Viana, M. A. 1994. Bayesian small-sample estimation of misclassified multinomial 
data. Biometrics 50(1): 237–243.  
Weir, Blair T. 1975. The Distortion of Voter Recall. American Journal of Political 
Science 19:53–62.  
Weiss, Robert E. 1994. Residuals and Outliers in Repeated Measures Random Effects 
Models. Technical Report 161, Department of Biostatistics, University of California at Los 
Angeles. 
West, Mike. 1984. Outlier Models and Prior Distributions in Bayesian Linear 
Regression. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 46: 431-439. 
Wiegmann, Douglas A. 2005. Developing a Methodology for Eliciting Subjective 
Probability Estimates During Expert Evaluations of Safety Interventions: Application for 
  
216 
Bayesian Belief Networks. Hampton, VA: Final Technical Report AHFD-05-
13/NASA-05-4, NASA Langley Research Center.  
Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Rosenstone, Steven J. 1980. Who Votes? New Haven: 
Yale University Press.  
Verba, Sydney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. Participation and Political 
Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Zellner, Arnold. 1917. An Introduction to Bayesian Inference in Econometrics. New 
York: Wiley. 
Zhao, Zong. 2008. Sensitivity of Propensity Score Methods to the Specifications. 
Economics Letters 98(3):309–319.  
 
 
